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 The objective of this dissertation is to study the incentives of firms to disclose their 
environmental information and examine the reliability of the information disclosed. To achieve 
this objective, there is a need to first understand what constitutes environmental disclosures. The 
first essay, a review of prior disclosure studies, provides a classification of the different types of 
environmental disclosures and a synopsis about the motivation to disclose each type of 
information, the reliability and the relevance of the information disclosed to different 
stakeholders. The outcome of this research shows that many types of environmental information 
are relevant to the financial and non-financial stakeholders; however, there are still other types of 
information that needs to be researched to finally achieve a comprehensive framework of 
environmental disclosures. 
The second essay examines the association between environmental disclosures and firms’ 
environmental performances. The study provides a framework to explain the disclosure process 
demonstrating the effect of economic and legitimacy factors, environmental performance, and 
the media communicating these disclosures on the amount and type of information reported. The 
results suggest that environmental reporting is biased; where firms with higher levels of 
environmental performance disclose more voluntary information while firms with low-
environmental performance tend to meet the mandatory disclosure requirements. There is little 
evidence to suggest that firms with low-environmental performances use their environmental 
disclosures to maintain the legitimacy of their environmental operations. 
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The third essay examines the reliability of environmental performance indicators 
disclosed. The results suggest that the reporting of firms’ EPIs might be free of bias as the study 
finds no association between the information disclosed and firms’ environmental performance.  
In general, the dissertation provides assurances over the reliability of environmental 
information disclosed. There is no denial that firms are subject to pressures from non-financial 
stakeholders to justify the impact of their operations on the environment.  This dissertation 
shows that firms attempt to use their environmental disclosures to mitigate the effects of these 
pressures; however, it also suggests that the need to legitimize their operations is not the main 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Due to increased levels of pollution, environmental issues have gained importance over 
the last three decades. All society members are required to act responsibly to help reducing the 
amount of hazards disposed in different media: air, water, and soil. Attention is mainly focused 
on businesses as industrial emissions represent the largest portion of pollutants emitted. The 
attention is translated into tighter regulations that produce stringent environmental standards, 
increased scrutiny over corporate activities which ends in severe penalties if environmental 
standards are not met, and larger demand for corporate environmental information from different 
stakeholders as corporate environmental responsibility has increased over the years.  
As a result of this continuously growing importance of corporate environmental 
activities, the supply of environmental information increased over the last two decades as 
evidenced by the growth of environmental disclosures from less than a page in annual reports 
(Patten, 1991) to a full stand-alone report discussing corporate environmental activities 
(Clarkson et al., 2008); in addition to firms using their websites to disseminate large amounts of 
information (Aerts et al., 2008). The disclosure of environmental information has increased 
beyond the level required by the regulators and the voluntary disclosure created demand for 
accounting research to understand the different incentives and consequences of this type of 
disclosure.  
The literature revolves around three main research questions. First, researchers attempt to 
understand the motivation of firms to voluntarily disclose information beyond legal requirements 
(see Aerts et al., 2006; Cho et al., 2006; Cho, 2009; Clarkson, 1995; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; 
Neu et al., 1998; Patten & Trompeter, 2003). Second, researchers study the reliability of 
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environmental information by examining whether the information disclosed is a good indicator 
of firm’s performance (see Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cho & Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Freedman & Wasley, 1990; Hughes et al., 2001; Patten, 1991; Patten, 2002; Rockness et al. 
1986; Rockness, 1985; Wiseman, 1982). Finally, researchers examine the relevance of 
environmental information to investors and different stakeholders of the firm (Aerts et al., 2008; 
Belkaoui, 1976; Chen et al., 1980; Ingram, 1978; Spicer, 1978).  
This dissertation attempts to answer the first two questions: (1) what are the determinants 
of corporate environmental disclosure? (2) are environmental disclosures reliable measures of 
firms’ environmental performance? The two questions are intertwined in the larger debate about 
whether environmental disclosures are informative or deceptive. Proponents of economic theory 
provide support to the argument that environmental disclosures are informative and that the 
disclosure of environmental information is driven by market forces of supply and demand for 
information (see Li et al., 1997; Barth et al., 1997; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). They argue that firms will increase their disclosure in 
response to increased demand for environmental information to reduce the investor’s research 
costs and avoid discounting of their market values (Diamond, 1985). Verrecchia (1983) argues 
that costs associated with the disclosure of proprietary information act against firms disclosing 
their full set of private information. Hence, firms will usually adopt a partial disclosure strategy 
that will maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of disclosure (Li et al., 1997; Cormier & 
Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003).  
A second string of literature adopts the view that environmental disclosures could be 
explained through the legitimacy framework (see Patten, 1991; Neu et al., 1998; Buhr, 1998; 
Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; O’Donovan, 2002; Deegan, 2002, Deegan et al., 2002; de 
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Villiers & van Staden; 2006; Cho, 2009). Advocates of the legitimacy theory argue that firms use 
their environmental disclosures to mitigate the threats to their environmental operations 
legitimacy. The legitimacy framework predicts different disclosure outcomes (O’Donovan, 2002; 
Lindblom, 1994; Buhr, 1998); and research using the legitimacy framework strongly suggests 
that environmental disclosures are used as an impression management tool to portray a positive 
image of the firm’s environmental operations.  
The findings of these research studies create more questions than answers due to the 
different methodologies used and the lack of consistent definition of what constitutes 
environmental disclosure (Deegan, 2002). There have been calls for examining the disclosure 
determinants and value relevance of the different components of environmental disclosure 
(Berthelot et al., 2003). Although environmental disclosure is an aggregation of separate but 
interrelated themes, prior disclosure models mostly examine the impact of legitimacy and 
economic factors on aggregate disclosure measures – i.e. disclosure indices (see Neu et al. 1998; 
Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003). These models suggests that all types of 
information are either derived by legitimacy or economic incentives. For better assessment of 
firms’ disclosures, there is a need to dissect these disclosures into its different constituents and to 
understand why firms disclose different types of environmental performance information.  
This dissertation includes three research studies with an objective of (1) better defining 
environmental disclosure, (2) understanding why firms disclose environmental information, and 
(3) examining whether the information disclosed is indicative of the firm’s environmental 
performance. To achieve this objective I conduct three distinct but interrelated research studies 
examining corporate environmental disclosure over time. In the first essay, I review prior studies 
that examine the determinants and value relevance of the different types of environmental 
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disclosure (i.e. environmental expenditures, liabilities and litigations, performance indicators, 
etc...).  The purpose of this essay is to provide an environmental disclosure framework composed 
of the different types of information. The second essay examines the determinants of 
environmental disclosures and whether these disclosures are biased The purpose of this essay is 
to understand the extent to which legitimacy and economic factors affect the disclosure of 
environmental information. It also tests the interaction between these factors and the firm’s 
environmental performance. The third study examines the determinants for firms to disclose 
environmental performance indicators (EPIs) voluntarily. The purpose of this study is to 
understand whether firms disclose their EPIs to inform different stakeholders about their 
environmental performance or use EPIs as an impression management tool. 
The findings of this dissertation complement but also contradict the extant previously 
studies. On one hand, it reconciles both views that environmental disclosures could be motivated 
by economic and legitimacy factors at the same time. However, it refutes the notion that these 
disclosures are totally informative or totally illusive. There is strong evidence, throughout the 
three essays, that the economic forces explain the supply and demand for some types of 
environmental information – for example, the disclosure of environmental liabilities (see Li et al, 
2007) - and it would be difficult to explain how firms would use this type of disclosure to 
manage impressions in the presence of the existing accounting regulations. Furthermore, the 
findings of the second study show that in the presence of disclosure regulation and SEC 
enforcement actions, firms’ environmental disclosures become less biased.  
On the other hand, the first essay shows that there is still a need for more research to 
explain the determinants of some types of environmental disclosures - such as environmental 
governance and management systems or vision and strategy information. The second essay 
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provides evidence that these types of environmental disclosure have been increasing over time; 
however, there is a lack of evidence on whether firms disclose this information in response to 
market demand or as a reaction to societal threats to the operations’ legitimacy. 
In brief, there is indication that, over time, firms have increased their disclosure by 
revealing more information about the environmental management systems, performance 
indicators, and environmental vision and strategy beside the mandated economic disclosures. 
The dissertation provides evidence that these new types of disclosures could be considered as a 
faithful representation of the firm’s environmental performance. Although there is still evidence 
that firms may use environmental disclosures as an impression management tool, the author still 
believes that the discretion available to firms to do so has been reduced by tightening of 
disclosure regulation, demand for information from the financial market, and provision of 
voluntary reporting guidelines such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).    
Finally, this dissertation does not examine the consequences of environmental disclosure 
– i.e. the third research question in the environmental disclosure literature. At this stage, there is 
a need to first understand how to define and measure environmental disclosures before studying 
the relevance of these measures. Needless to say that disclosures need to pass the reliability test – 
i.e. information disclosed provides reliable measures of the firm’s environmental performance – 
before undergoing the relevance test. In the meantime, the first essay providing a review of the 
different environmental disclosure measures still shows that the different disclosure measures 
included in this dissertation have either economic or social implications.  
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1. First Essay 
The first essay is a review of previous literature in the area of corporate environmental 
disclosure. The objective of this essay is to provide a structure or a framework of environmental 
disclosure. There is no clear definition of what constitutes environmental disclosure as there is a 
lack of normative research in this area; this sentiment has been echoed by Berthelot et al. (2003) 
and Deegan (2002). Therefore, the objective of this study is to provide a classification of 
previously researched disclosure themes that could guide future research in environmental 
disclosure.  
Environmental disclosure is composed of separate but interrelated themes or subjects. 
The relevance of these themes to the user of environmental information differs according to the 
information content of each subject and the interests of the user. Therefore, to define 
environmental disclosure there is a need to assess each subject matter separately to understand 
the importance and the relevance of each theme to different stakeholders, to know the 
stakeholder’s interests in this information, and to understand the reliability of the reported 
information (Berthelot et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, environmental reporting should include all relevant topics related to the 
firm’s environmental performance and should satisfy the information needs of all stakeholders 
and not only investors. Therefore, there is also a need to assess firms’ total environmental 
disclosures to understand whether firms are biased towards the requirements of certain 
stakeholders; which could lead to an unbalanced disclosure by focusing on certain subject 
matters rather than others.  
In this study, I separately review different disclosure themes to answer questions about 
the interested parties in each subject matter, the relevance of the information disclosed and the 
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ability and willingness of the firm to disclose reliable information that portrays an objective 
picture of the firm’s environmental performance. Furthermore, I review four properties of 
environmental disclosure that would enable users of this information to assess the completeness, 
the specificity, the relevance and the objectivity of firms’ reporting practices. Completeness is 
related to the amount of information that the firm is willing to voluntarily report above and 
beyond what is required by the regulators. Specificity of environmental disclosures is associated 
with the firm’s ability to provide information in a form that could impact the audience decision 
making; such as making quantitative rather than narrative disclosures. Environmental disclosures 
are relevant when they provide the users with information about the firm’s future plans and 
expected performance beside information about its past performance. Finally, objectivity of 
disclosures is related to the firm’s willingness to disclose negative information related to its 
performance and not only positive information.  
2. Second Essay 
The second essay includes two empirical studies of the reliability of environmental 
disclosures. The first one is a longitudinal quantitative study of the relationship between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance. Previous research lands some 
controversial results when examining the relationship between the two variables. Some studies 
suggest that poor performers tend to disclose more environmental information that paints a 
misleading picture in order to maintain the legitimacy of their operations (Hughes et al., 2001; 
Patten, 2002; Rockness, 1985). Other studies find that environmental disclosure is associated 
with firms characterized by superior environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Clarkson et al., 2008). Such firms have a real economic incentive to disclose such information.  
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I reexamine this research question using a longitudinal panel data analysis of 78 firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries. The main objective of this study is to determine whether the 
disclosure determinants are different between of high and low performers. I examine whether 
disclosures of the two groups are driven by economic incentives, legitimacy incentives or both. 
In addition, I study the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance using a more comprehensive content index that measures the properties of the 
information disclosed, not just the amount of information disclosed. This content index measures 
the firm’s willingness to disclose specific, objective and verifiable information.  
Finally, among the contributions of this study, I measure environmental disclosures of 
firms in three different disclosure media (annual reports, 10-K reports, and sustainability reports) 
and find that disclosures made in these reports complement each other which contradicts 
previous arguments that annual report’ disclosures are the main source of environmental 
information.  
3. Third Essay 
In the third study, I examine one of the main themes of voluntary environmental 
reporting; that is the disclosure of environmental performance indicators (EPI). EPI are meant to 
provide the users of environmental information with an objective picture of the firm’s 
environmental performance. This information is relevant to different stakeholders of the firm. 
From an investor point of view, Ittner & Larcker (1998) show that non-financial measures are 
indicative of the firm’s accounting and market returns. Regulators may also use this information 
to assess whether more stringent regulations should be imposed (Government Accounting Office 
(GAO), 2004). However, previous research by Clarkson et al. (2008) shows that the level of EPI 
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disclosure is still very low. In this study, I examine the determinants of EPI disclosure to 
understand the factors driving firms to disclose this essential information. Prior research shows 
that firms’ disclosures are motivated by economic costs and benefits, as well as firms’ need to 
legitimize their actions and to show that their performance does meet society’s expectations 
(Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Neu et al., 1998). Studies also show that 
firms avoid the disclosure of negative environmental information (Rockness et al., 1986; Deegan 
& Rankin, 1996). Therefore, I examine whether the information content included in EPI 
disclosures is a disclosure determinant. In other words, I study whether firms disclose their EPI 
when the information content provides positive news to the relevant users. Although researchers 
could study the information content of disclosing firms, they could not assess those who did not 
disclose. Using the Trucost database of environmental disclosure and performance, I study the 
determinants of EPI disclosure. The Trucost database provides the opportunity to examine the 
information content of disclosing and non-disclosing firms. Trucost gathers EPI information 
from annual and sustainability reports and provides the external cost of pollution for firms listed 
on the FTSE index. In case of non-disclosure, Trucost contacts the firm to request EPI 
information or estimates this information using an econometric model. Therefore, using the 
information provided by Trucost, I am also able to examine the determinants of disclosure of 
firms who do not publicly divulge their EPI information.    
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
1. Introduction 
 The economic competitiveness of businesses is bounded by its corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities. Over the last three decades, environmental responsibility has 
gained special importance (Deegan, 2002; Gamble et al., 1995; Gray et al., 1995; Parker, 2005) 
due to pressures on businesses to operate in a responsible manner that contributes to the 
preservation of the environment
1
. This increased awareness about environmental problems has 
placed firms under the public eye and require them to spend considerable amounts to meet 
environmental standards (Clarkson et al., 2004; Johnston, 2005); thus imposing a strain on their 
cash flows. On the revenue side, the growing trends of environmentally conscious consumers 
mean that businesses may also risk losing sales if they do not adopt a “green” production strategy 
(Ambec & Lanoie, 2008).  
The increased demand for more environmental responsibility raises the importance of 
environmental disclosures. The last three decades witnessed significant developments in 
environmental reporting including increased disclosure regulation, the issuance of standalone 
environmental reports, and the emergence of reporting guidelines; which led to a large increase 
in disclosure of environmental information. With the large amount of discretion allowed to firms 
over the disclosure of environmental information, researchers attempt to understand the 
motivation of firms to disclose as well as the reliability and relevance of the information 
                                                 
1
 For example, the adoption of the Kyoto protocol in 1997 implies that firms have to reduce their greenhouse 
emissions by 5% of their 1990 levels over the period 2008-2012. 
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disclosed. However, it seems that environmental disclosure research brings up more questions 
than answers and some of the studies land contradicting results about the motivation of firms to 
disclose environmental information. For example, research on the reliability of environmental 
disclosure creates a debate about whether low or high environmental performers disclose more 
information (see Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Fekrat et al., 1996; Hughes et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 
2001; Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007). There are many reasons for the inconsistent results; 
including a lack of consistent measurement of environmental disclosure in these studies.  
It is well documented that previous research studies use different measures to proxy for 
environmental disclosure, thus potentially contributing to conflicting research findings
2
. 
Substantial differences and a lack of consensus about the elements of environmental reporting 
are also apparent among the content indexes
3
. These differences raise questions about the 
validity of environmental disclosure measures and the strength of the reported findings. Research 
on environmental disclosure remains as good as its weakest link; meaning that weak proxies for 
environmental disclosure may lead to doubtful findings. Therefore, there is a need for 
convergence towards generally accepted measures of environmental reporting to find more 
robust and comparable answers for the different research questions in that domain.  
                                                 
2 Some studies use volumetric measures – such as number of words, lines, or pages – to proxy for environmental reporting (Gray 
et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998; Patten, 1992), while other studies use content indexes as a measure of disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Wiseman, 1982) 
3 For example, (Clarkson et al., 2008) use a comprehensive content index based on the GRI guidelines that includes 45 disclosure 
themes. In contrast, (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) use a four-theme content index that measures negative disclosures that the firm is 
operating to the detriment of the environment such as disclosures on PRP designation, toxic waste, oil and chemical spills, 
environmental fines and penalties. 
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The major challenge facing environmental accounting research is to define and measure 
environmental disclosure (Clarkson, 1995; Deegan, 2002). According to Deegan (2002, p.288):  
“When describing what is disclosed, there has been much debate about how to measure 
and classify social environmental disclosure.” 
In fact, there is an ongoing debate about the difference between “environmental accounting” and 
“accounting for the environment” (see Thornton, 2013; Deegan, 2013; Cho & Patten, 2013; 
Gray, 2013; Spence et al., 2013). The former is a process that is still undefined – according to 
Deegan (2013) – where firms are held accountable to different members of the society for 
environmental damages caused by their operations. On the other hand, accounting for the 
environment is a practice engrained in financial accounting whereas firms are held accountable 
to their shareholders for any misdeeds - including noncompliance with environmental standards 
– that could affect the firm’s cash flow. The difference between the two practices explains the 
difficulty of defining environmental disclosures. While “accounting for the environment” 
necessitates firms to disclose a set of information required by the regulator, the rules of 
“environmental accounting” are still unwritten; making its disclosure requirements unclear. 
Therefore, I adopt a broad definition of environmental disclosures that includes all sets of 
relevant information that fulfils the demand of different stakeholders (i.e. investors, 
environmentalist groups, members of the society, regulators, etc). 
The objective of this study is twofold: (1) to define and measure the various types of 
disclosures that constitute firms’ environmental reporting and (2) to study the reliability and 
relevance of these disclosures. By achieving these objectives, the study would provide a tentative 
framework of environmental disclosures to consolidate the different types of environmental 
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information – or environmental themes – used by firms to communicate with investors and 
different members of the society.  
To acieve these objectives, I primarily focus on conducting a review of prior research on 
corporate social and environmental responsibility in traditional accounting journals; which have 
been the main channel for environmental disclosure research. The purpose of this study is not to 
provide an exhaustive review of environmental disclosure research; but rather a focused review 
of prior research that examine the different constituents – or themes – of corporate environmental 
disclosure. Research in traditional accounting journals focuses on examining the determinants 
and the value relevance of certain environmental disclosures; primarily in the context of firm 
valuation. The list of such  journals include  Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 
and Accounting and Business Research. These journals have published a significant amount of 
research on the role of environmental disclosures in establishing corporate accountability (see 
Deegan, 2002; Berthelot et al., 2003).  
I complement my review with other research examining the broader impact of corporate 
operations on the environment. This type of research focuses on information that is of interest to 
non-financial stakeholders of the firm such as firms’ environmental goals, vision, and 
governance and management systems. The list of such journals include Journal of Business 
Ethics, Ecological Economics, Business Strategy & the Environment, The Academy of 
Management Review, Advances in Environmental Accounting & Management , Corporate Social 
14 
 
- Responsibility and Environmental Management, Environmental and Resource Economics, and 
Management Science.  
In this study, I review prior literature with a focus on measurement issues and the 
objective of defining environmental disclosure. Environmental information is composed of 
different but interrelated themes
4
. To develop proxies for environmental disclosures, researchers 
either aggregate these themes in content indices or they use volumetric measures such as number 
of words, lines, or pages. This comprehensive and volumetric approach of assessing 
environmental disclosure is not indicative of the importance of the information disclosed since it 
does not guarantee that relevant information is disclosed nor insure that all disclosures made are 
relevant. Therefore, there is a need to assess the information disclosed by examining its 
constituents separately as well as comprehensively (Berthelot et al., 2003).  
In this study, I review research on different disclosure themes and different properties of 
environmental reporting. Environmental disclosure is composed of many themes (such as the 
disclosure of environmental liabilities, capital expenditures, performance indicators, etc…) that 
have different properties that would later define the importance of the information disclosed. 
Through the review of prior literature, I find that four different properties define environmental 
information: the disclosure of future vs. past, positive vs. negative, quantitative vs. qualitative, 
and mandatory vs. voluntary disclosures. For a better assessment of the comprehensiveness of 
firms’ environmental reporting, I suggest that future research should evaluate if disclosures 
include the different themes and satisfy the different properties. Recent research studies integrate 
some of these properties in their assessment of environmental disclosure; primarily the disclosure 
                                                 
4 Economic factors, key performance indicators, environmental management system and others are among these themes. 
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of quantitative information (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Cho & Patten, 2007; Walden & Stagliano, 
2004).  
Figure 1 shows the different themes and properties that define corporate environmental 
reporting. Environmental disclosure is a multi-dimensional construct having four different 
properties. The themes disclosed by the firm will define the properties of the information 
disclosed. For example, if a firm provides information about their past expenditures and 
liabilities, then the firm is oriented towards the disclosure of mandatory, quantitative, and past 
information. Further disclosure of a forecast of their future expenditures will make the firm 
expand their disclosure range to include forward looking information. An explanation of how 
these expenditures are allocated means that the firm is providing a qualitative aspect to help the 
relevant parties assess how these expenditures will improve the firm’s environmental 
performance. 
































































































Environmental Disclosure Themes: 
 Environmental Expenditures. 
 Environmental Liabilities. 
 Pollution abatement. 
 Environmental Performance 
Indicators (EPI). 






Berthelot et al. (2003) review the reliability and relevance of environmental disclosures 
classified as mandatory or voluntary. Berthelot et al. (2013) reckon that environmental 
disclosures have been measured in a comprehensive manner. They suggest that separate 
examination of each disclosure item will provide better assessment of the reliability and the 
relevance of each item. In this review, I extend the work of Berthelot et al. (2003) by examining 
the reliability and relevance of each element of environmental disclosure separately. The study 
provides a review of prior research of five disclosure themes: environmental expenditures, 
litigation and liabilities, pollution abatement, environmental performance indicators, and 
governance structure and management system. Furthermore, the study introduces three additional 
dimensions that could be used to assess firms’ environmental reporting: future vs. past, positive 
vs. negative, and quantitative vs. qualitative disclosures. This review essay suggests that some 
environmental disclosure themes are relevant to the financial and non-financial stakeholders of 
the firms (such as disclosures of capital expenditures, litigation and liabilities, pollution 
abatement, environmental performance indicators, and governance and management of 
environmental operations). These relevant themes could provide a disclosure framework that 
could be used in future research in environmental disclosures in a comprehensive manner. 
Furthermore, a theoretical debate exists among researchers as to what is the motivation of 
firms to disclose their proprietary environmental information. One string of research advocates 
that firms use their environmental disclosures to legitimize their actions and gain wide 
acceptance for their environmental operations (see Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; Deegan, 
2002; O’Donovan, 2002).  This line of research suggests that environmental disclosures are self-
laudatory and serve to portray a positive image of the firm’s environmental operations. The other 
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string of research argues that environmental disclosures are valuation relevant and that firms’ 
disclosure decision is driven by the market’s demand for information (see Li et al., 2007; 
Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003). To a great extent, the outcome of that 
debate determines whether firms’ disclosures are informative or opportunistic. By reviewing the 
disclosure determinants of the different environmental themes, this study contributes to that 
debate about which theory better explains the determinants of environmental information.  
The findings of this review provide regulators with feedback about firms’ environmental 
reporting practices in response to existing regulations. The findings of this paper suggest that 
disclosure regulation plays a positive role as evidenced by the continuous increase of the amount 
and quality of environmental reporting over time. Furthermore, there is also evidence that 
mandating the disclosure of different information about the firm’s environmental information 
may lead firms to change their behavior towards their environmental responsibilities. This 
research could also be useful to practitioners such as organizations that issue disclosure 
guidelines – i.e. the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) – to prepare a reporting framework of 
environmental disclosure based on a scientific approach. 
Furthermore, this review study provides researchers with a guideline to the measures and 
properties of environmental disclosures that need to be considered when assessing firms’ 
environmental reporting. Converging towards a generally accepted framework of disclosure and 
eliminating differences of construct measurements ensures more consistent and comparable 
research findings.  
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2. Conceptual Framework 
Environmental reporting research suggests that disclosures have been motivated by 
institutional factors, financial market demand for information, and firms need to legitimize their 
action to conform to society’s expectations. There is an ensuing debate among researchers as to 
how these factors influence firms’ reporting practices and the quality of the information reported.  
Evidence exists that internal and external institutional factors influence firms’ 
environmental reporting practices. Many studies show that disclosure regulations by the SEC and 
FASB induces firms to disclose more information over the years to the extent that - in certain 
cases - firms may disclose information that is deemed irrelevant to ensure compliance (Barth et 
al., 1997; Stanny, 1998; Alciatore et al., 2004). In the absence of disclosure regulation and with 
the increased uncertainty about what to disclose, there is also evidence that firms follow industry 
common practices and reporting guideline (Aerts et al., 2006).  
Economic costs and benefits of disclosure are also a determining factor of firms’ 
disclosure decisions. In the absence of information, investors will involve in costly information 
gathering, which leads firms to reveal their private information to avoid adverse market reaction 
(Diamond, 1985). Verrecchia (1983) argues that firms’ disclosures of their proprietary 
information threaten their competitive positions. Environmental disclosure research provides 
evidence that those two opposing factors impact firms’ reporting practices by setting a disclosure 
threshold that will maximize the benefits and reduce the costs of disclosure (Li et al., 1997; 
Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003). 
A third string of researchers advocate that firms’ environmental disclosures are motivated 
by their needs to legitimize their operations. The argument is that, to gain legitimacy, firms are 
under pressure to comply with societal norms and expectations. Firms with low-environmental 
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performance are risking their legitimacy which may expose them to increased scrutiny from 
regulators and other relevant parties. Hence, these firms may use disclosure tactics to ensure they 
maintain the legitimacy of their operations. However, it is not evident how attempts to maintain 
legitimacy would impact firms’ environmental disclosures as there are many courses of action 
that firms may adopt (Lindblom, 1994; O’Donovan, 2002). Some studies cast the doubt over the 
effectiveness of environmental reporting by claiming that environmental disclosures are self-
laudatory and that there is a decoupling between firms’ environmental performance and the 
information contained in their environmental reports (Patten 2002, Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho et 
al., 2012). On the contrary, Mobus (2005) provides evidence that mandatory disclosure of 
environmental information obliges firms to improve their environmental performance to avoid 
the continuous disclosure of negative news; concluding that disclosure may lead to a change in 
behavior. 
How these three factors interact and shape firms’ environmental disclosures is still 
unknown. In this study, I attempt to review research about the different types of information (i.e. 
disclosure of environmental expenditures, liabilities, performance indicators, etc) to understand 
the disclosure determinants of each of these types. I also review the reliability and relevance of 
these different types of disclosures. In an attempt to find whether disclosure is indicative of the 
firm’s real performance or not, previous studies have defined the reliability of environmental 
disclosures using the association between the disclosures and firms’ actual environmental 
performance (Berthelot et al., 2003). Concerning the relevance of the information disclosed, I 
provide a review of research examining the association between the information disclosed and 
the response of the financial market to these disclosures. This association is indicative that the 
different types of environmental disclosure carry relevant information that prompts the market to 
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revise its expectations about the firm’s future financial performance. In addition, I attempt to 
understand whether environmental disclosures are also relevant to non-financial stakeholders of 
who are mainly interested in firms’ future environmental performance (i.e. regulators, 
environmentalists, and other members of the society). For this purpose, there are few studies that 
examine the association between the information disclosed and the firm’s future environmental 
performance (see Mobus, 2005).      
In Section 3, I review the different themes and dimensions of environmental disclosure. In 
Section 4, I review the different properties of environmental disclosure. Section 5 provides a 
discussion of research findings and recommendations for future research. 
3. Environmental Disclosure Themes 
Environmental accounting research uses different measures to proxy for environmental 
disclosure. The ambiguity of defining environmental disclosure stems from the elusiveness of the 
firm’s environmental responsibility which is defined by legal and ethical mandates to preserve 
the environment. Clarkson (1995) suggests that ethical responsibilities are hard to define – let 
alone enforce - which makes it difficult to determine which environmental information should be 
disclosed.  
In the absence of a disclosure framework, the majority of environmental disclosure 
studies measure disclosure using the number of words, lines, or pages of environmental 
information (Gray et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998; Patten, 1991; Patten, 1992) or using disclosure 
indexes (Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; 
Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Patten, 2002; Wiseman, 1982) to proxy for total environmental 
disclosure. Other studies (see Belkaoui, 1976; Li et al., 1997; Rockness et al., 1986) focus on 
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specific measures they deem relevant to the operation of the firm to proxy for environmental 
disclosure. The results of these studies are difficult to compare due to the underlying differences 
between the constructs used.  
3.1. Disclosure Themes  
According to Berthelot et al. (2003), content indexes provide a compilation of various 
disclosure themes with different value relevance. Prior research shows that some of these themes 
are relevant to the investor (Belkaoui, 1976); however, aggregated disclosure measures do not 
provide enough evidence that environmental disclosure as a whole is relevant (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004). In this section, I review studies about how these themes are measured and reported, the 
decision to disclose this information, the reliability of these disclosures and the relevance of 
these themes to different users of environmental information. The main themes I review are the 
disclosure of environmental expenditures, environmental liabilities, pollution abatement, 
environmental performance indicators, and governance and environmental management. 
3.2. Environmental Expenditures 
Measurement and reporting 
The disclosure of environmental expenditures is regulated by the SEC. Item 101 and SAB 
92 requires firms to disclose past and future environmental expenditures in 10-K reports 
(Gamble et al., 1995; Alciatore at al., 2004). This theme is included in many content indexes
5
 
                                                 
5
 See Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Aerts et al., 2008; Azzone, Manzini, & Noci, 1996; Blacconiere & Patten, 1994; Cho, 
Patten, & Roberts, 2006; Cho & Patten, 2007; P. Clarkson et al., 2008; Fekrat et al., 1996; Freedman & Wasley, 
1990; S. B. Hughes et al., 2000; S. B. Hughes et al., 2001; Patten, 1992; Patten, 2002) 
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which are inspired by the Wiseman (1982) index. In their research studies, Gamble et al. (1995), 
Ingram (1978), Ingram & Frazier (1980) and Rockness et al. (1986) also use environmental 
capital expenditure to measure the cost of compliance to environmental regulation. 
In regards to research on the disclosure of environmental capital expenditures, there are 
two measurement issues that need to be taken into consideration. First, some disclosure indexes 
do not differentiate between the disclosure of past and future expenditures (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Azzone et al., 1996; Ingram & Frazier, 1980). In general, a separation between the two types of 
disclosures should be accounted for due to the difference in value relevance and the reliability in 
measuring past versus forecasted investments. Second, there are questions over the quality of 
investments made and whether firms spend to comply with regulations or to over-comply. In a 
study about the value relevance of environmental expenditures, Johnston (2005) separates 
between mandatory spending (expenditures that enable the firm to comply with environmental 
regulations) and voluntary spending (expenditures that ensure the firm is improving its 
environmental performance beyond the regulatory requirements). Table-1 provides a summary of 
the different measures of environmental expenditures. 
Decision to disclose environmental expenditures 
Regulation by the SEC and FASB has a major influence on disclosure of environmental 
expenditures information over the years. Alciatore et al. (2004) study the impact of increased 
regulation on the reporting of environmental information. They examine the disclosures of 34 
firms between 1989 and 1998; a period where the SEC and FASB issued several regulations that 
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affect firms’ environmental reporting6. They find a substantial increase in the number of firms 
reporting their past and future capital expenditures in their 10K-reports (from 10 firms in 1989 to 
18 firms in 1998). Most importantly, the average capital expenditures disclosed declined from 
101 million dollars in 1989 to 7 million dollars in 1998. The increase in number of reporting 
firms and the decline in the average reported capital expenditure may suggest that the 
introduction of new regulation has pressed firms with lower levels of environmental capital 
expenditures to disclose their private information. Similar results are found with the disclosure of 
future capital expenditure.  
In contrast, the study finds a decline in the number of firms reporting environmental 
operational expenditures (from 7 firms in 1989 to 3 firms in 1998). This decline in the number of 
firms coincides with an increase in the average reported amount (195 million dollars in 1998 to 
267 million dollars) implying that only firms with higher expenses continued reporting following 
the issuance of environmental regulation. The latter findings raise questions of whether firms 
refrain from disclosing operational expenditures information in response to their increased 
disclosure of capital expenditure; taking into consideration that SAB 92 does not clearly mandate 
the disclosure of environmental operational expenditures. 
Another study by Cho et al. (2012) examines the determinants of disclosing 
environmental capital expenditures in 10-K reports. Using a sample of Fortune 500 firms, the 
authors examine whether the discrepancy between firms’ disclosures is due to the immateriality 
of capital expenditures made by firms or due to firms non-compliance with disclosure 
                                                 
6
 The SEC issued the SAB 92 in 1993 providing guidelines to firms on reporting environmental capital expenditures 
in the MD&A sections of their 10K –reports. 
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regulations. They find that the amounts disclosed are mostly immaterial leading the authors to 
suggest that disclosure of capital expenditures information is not motivated by the need for 
regulatory compliance but rather a discretionary decision made by firms’ management.  
The authors further study the association between the information disclosed and future 
environmental performance to understand the firms’ motivation to disclose environmental capital 
information. They suggest that a positive association between disclosure and future performance 
implies that the disclosure is used to signal the firm’s strategy to deal with pollution issues and 
improve its environmental performance. On the other hand, a negative or no association between 
disclosure and future performance may imply that firms disclose information to mitigate the 
pressure emanating from environmentalists, members of the society or regulatory bodies. The 
authors find that disclosure of environmental capital expenditure information is not associated 
with future improvement in firm’s environmental performance; concluding that firms disclose 
this information to legitimize their current operation rather than to signal a change in their views 
towards the environment.  
Reliability and Value Relevance 
The study by Cho et al. (2012) suggests a bias in disclosing environmental capital 
expenditures information as they find a discrepancy between the disclosure decisions of firms 
with high and low environmental performance. The study shows that the decision to disclose is 
associated with lower environmental performance. Along with their findings that disclosure is 
not associated with an improvement in future performance, the authors conclude that the 
disclosure of environmental capital expenditure is meant to legitimize firm’s environmental 




Another study by Patten (2005) examines the reliability of environmental capital 
expenditure projections. He compares the projected and actual environmental capital 
expenditures disclosed by firms in 10-K reports. He finds that the actual expenditures are - on 
average - lower than the projected figures by 16.4%. Furthermore, the author finds that this lack 
of precision in estimating future environmental capital expenditures does not match the accuracy 
in projecting firms’ overall capital expenditures. After further examination, Patten (2005) could 
not conclude that this lack of forecast precision is due to a reduction in environmental capital 
expenditures resulting from a decline in the firm’s financial performance. Patten (2005) suggests 
that these overly optimistic forecasts are a tool of legitimization to portray the firm’s 
environmental operations in a positive light.  
Regarding the relevance of environmental capital expenditures, prior research confirms 
that past capital expenditures information is value relevant. Using an event study, (Belkaoui, 
1976) shows that the market reacts favorably to disclosure of environmental capital expenditures 
in annual reports of an S&P 500 sample of firms - vs. a control sample - for the first two-days 
following the disclosure. Using the market efficiency hypothesis, the author explains that such 
information would favorably affect the investor’s perceptions about the expected risk of the 
company as well as the discount factor applied.  
 Clarkson et al. (2004) study the valuation of environmental capital expenditures made by 
firms in the pulp and paper industry to improve their pollution abatement performance. 
Examining disclosures in 10-K reports, they find that investors view the expenditures made by 
low-polluting firms in a different light from those made by high-polluting firms. Expenditures in 
the pulp and paper industry are guided by the Best Available Technology (BAT); implying that 
low-polluting firms influence regulatory requirements; consequently they influence the 
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expenditures made by the high-polluting firms. Clarkson et al. (2004) find that investors 
positively value investments disclosed by low-polluting firms while they assign a value of zero 
to investments of high-polluting firms. In addition, investors assess a considerable liability 
associated with the low-environmental performance of these firms. 
Using 10-K disclosures, Johnston (2005) provides a model that separates environmental 
capital expenditures into mandatory investments - to make firms meet regulatory requirements - 
and voluntary investments - to allow firms to achieve performance levels beyond the regulatory 
thresholds. Using future stock prices and returns, Johnston (2005) finds that mandatory 
investments are negatively associated with the firm’s future financial performance implying that 
investors view these investments as liabilities rather than capital investments. In contrary to his 
prediction, Johnston (2005) could not establish an association between voluntary investments 
and future stock returns or stock prices. The findings of Johnston (2005) imply that investors 
value mandatory and voluntary environmental expenditures differently. While they value the 
mandatory investments negatively, the results imply that investors are still not able to assess the 
impact of voluntary environmental expenditures. 
Summary 
Prior research suggests that firms comply with SEC and FASB requirements regarding 
the disclosure of past expenditures as evidenced by the increased number of firms disclosing this 
information over the years (Alciatore et al., 2004). There is also evidence that investors value the 
information content in environmental capital expenditure disclosures and are able to differentiate 
between expenditures made by the high and low performing firms (Clarkson et al., 2004). 
However, prior research also suggests that investors are not able to value voluntary investments 
made to improve firms’ environmental performance beyond what is required by the regulator 
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(Johnston, 2005). This might be explained by the lack of evidence that spending would lead to 
improved future environmental performance (Cho et al., 2012). In brief, it appears that the 
majority of capital spending is made for the purpose of compliance with existing regulations and 
that firms do not have precise long-term plans to improve their future environmental 
performance beyond what is required by the regulator. These findings are also reflected in the 
low-accuracy of environmental capital expenditure forecasts (Patten, 2005). A summary of main 




Figure-2: Summary of Research on Environmental Expenditures Disclosures: 
Measurement and reporting: 
 The SEC requires firms to 
disclose past and future 
expenditures in 10-K reports.  
 Some past environmental 
disclosure research does not 
differentiate between past and 
future disclosure as two distinct 
disclosure themes. 
 Furthermore, a study by Johnston 
(2005) shows that there is a 
difference in value relevance 
between mandatory 
environmental capital  
expenditures – expenditures made 
to ensure compliance with 
environmental regulations - and 
voluntary capital expenditures 
made to improve firm’s 
environmental capital 
expenditures beyond regulatory 
requirements. 
 
Decision to disclose: 
 Increased disclosure regulation is 
positively associated with 
increased reporting of 
environmental expenditures over 
the years. Alciatore et al. (2014) 
find that during a period of 
increased disclosure regulation 
between 1989 and 1998, the 
number of firms disclosing their 
past and future capital 
expenditures increased as well. 
Furthermore, they find a decline 
in the average amounts of capital 
expenditures reported, indicating 
that firms with less material 
information disclosed their 
expenditures in response to 
increased regulations. 
 Using a sample of Fortune 500 
firms, Cho et al. (2012) find that 
the amount of environmental 
capital expenditures are mainly 
immaterial and are not associated 
with improved future 
environmental performance. 
These findings lead Cho et al. 
(2012) to conclude that the 
disclosure of such information is 
derived by firms’ need to 
legitimize their environmental 
operations by providing positive 
impressions about their 
environmental investments. 
Reliability of disclosures: 
 The study by Cho et al. (2012) 
also suggests a bias in reporting 
environmental capital 
expenditures as they find that 
firms with low-environmental 
performance are more inclined to 
disclose this type of information. 
The authors consider this finding 
as further evidence about firms’ 
legitimization incentives. 
 Patten (2005) finds a large 
discrepancy between forecasted 
environmental capital 
expenditures and the actual 
expenditures made later on. He 
also suggests that that firms use 
these forecasts as a legitimization 
rather than an accountability tool. 
Relevance of disclosures: 
 Albeit the reliability issues 
previously discussed, there is 
evidence that investors could 
distinguish the value of 
environmental investments made 
by firms. 
 Clarkson et al. (2004) find that 
investors value environmental 
expenditures of firms with high-
environmental performance but 
not those made by firms with low-
performance. 
 Johnston (2005) finds that 
investors negatively value 
mandatory investments made by 
firms to comply with 
environmental regulations. On the 
other hand, he could not find an 
association between voluntary 
investments and stock returns 
implying that investors could not 





Table-1: Overview of Environmental Expenditure Research 
Authors Topic Measure of Environmental Expenditure Findings 
Belkaoui (1976) Examines the impact of disclosure of 
pollution control expenditures on firms’ 
stock market performance. 
The disclosure of pollution control expenditures in 
annual reports. 
The author finds that the market reacts positively to 
the disclosure of pollution control expenditures. 
The market reaction lasts for a short period of time 
following the disclosure. 
Clarkson et al. (2004) Examines the value relevance of 
pollution abatement capital expenditures 
in the pulp and paper industry.  
The dollar value of environmental capital expenditure 
disclosed in 10-K reports.  
The authors find that the market values the 
environmental capital expenditures of firms with 
high environmental performance and books a 
liability for firms with low environmental 
performance. 
Alciatore et al. (2004) Examine the change in environmental 
disclosure in response to increased 
environmental reporting regulation. 
The authors examine the amount of: 
1. Past environmental capital expenditure.  
2. Future environmental capital expenditure. 
3. Environmental operating expenditure. 
The authors find an increase in the number of firms 
disclosing environmental capital expenditures and 
forecasted expenditures in response to increased 
regulation. 
Johnston (2005) Provides a model to decompose 
environmental capital expenditures in 
mandatory and voluntary expenditures 
and examines the value relevance of 
both types of expenditures. 
The author decomposes the environmental capital 
expenditures disclosed in 10-K reports using a 
regression model over the elements of the firm’s 
environmental performance. Mandatory 
environmental capital expenditures are estimated 
using the model while voluntary expenditures are 
represented using the residuals from the model. 
The author finds that the market value mandatory 
and voluntary environmental expenditures 
differently. They find that expenditures are 
negatively associated with abnormal return but did 
not find any significant association between 
abnormal returns and voluntary expenditures. 
Patten (2005) Studies the accuracy of environmental 
capital expenditures projections. 
The author examines the differences between the 
projected amounts of environmental capital 
expenditures and the subsequent actual amounts 
disclosed in 10-K reports. 
The study finds that actual spending is lower than 
the projected spending; suggesting that 
environmental reporting of environmental capital 
expenditures is misleading. 
Cho et al. (2012) Examines the determinants of disclosure 
of environmental capital expenditures. 
The dollar value of environmental capital expenditure 
disclosed in 10-K reports. 
The authors find that the disclosure of 
environmental capital expenditure is not associated 
with the materiality of the amount. They also find 
that the disclosure is not associated with improved 
future performance; concluding that firms disclose 
information to legitimize their actions. 
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3.3. Litigation and liabilities 
Measurement and reporting 
The disclosure of environmental liabilities is regulated by both the FASB and SEC. 
According to Gamble et al. (1995), the recognition of environmental liabilities is guided by 
FASB Statement No.5 – Accounting for Contingencies – which requires firms to record a 
liability if it is “probable” to occur and could be “reasonably estimated”. Regulatory bodies’ 
intervention provides a strong signal of the probability of occurrence which justifies the need for 
reporting (see Barth and McNichols, 1994; GAO report, 2004). Notification by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that the firm is nominated as potentially responsible 
party (PRP) is an example of such intervention. Meanwhile, the estimation test is more difficult 
to satisfy. SFAS 5 requires firms to disclose the “best” estimate of their liabilities. SFAS requires 
that, when the probability of occurrence of all estimates within a certain range is the same, the 
firm should disclose the lowest estimate   (Barth and McNichols, 1994).   
Furthermore, Gamble et al. (1995) state that the FASB Issue No. 93-5 requires firms to 
recognize environmental liabilities and allows them to record the liabilities on a discounted basis. 
It also requires firms to report environmental liabilities separately from any probably recovered 
amounts. The SEC’s Item 103 requires the disclosure of potential administrative and legislative 
proceedings in 10-K reports if these proceedings are material to the business, if they exceed ten 
percent of current assets, or if they exceed 100,000 dollars. According to Stanny (1998), the SEC 
Staff Accounting Bulletin No.92 (SAB 92) provides guidelines about the conditions for the firm 
to discount its environmental liabilities; the firm needs to have a reliable estimate about the total 
amount of the liability and timing of the cash payments. It also requires that firms do not offset 
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the probable liability with any probable insurance recovery. The bulletin requires firms to 
disclose all material liabilities for site restoration as well as any necessary exit cost (Alciatore et 
al., 2004). Finally, SAB 92 also requires the disclosure of reserved amounts and estimation of 
probable losses. 
According to the GAO Report (2004), stakeholders raised their concerns that these 
guidelines allow firms a lot of discretion over the disclosure process. Interviewed stakeholders 
stated that the SEC item 103 does not require the firm to disclose all costs related to the outcome 
of legislative proceedings; thus allowing firms to avoid disclosure if the fines are less than 
100,000 dollars. Furthermore, they claim that the SEC does not require firms to aggregate 
environmental liabilities which allow them to avoid the materiality test. Table-2 provides a 
summary of the different measures of environmental liabilities used by prior research. 
Decision to disclose environmental litigation and liabilities 
Li et al. (1997) develop an environmental liabilities disclosure model suggesting that 
firms resort to partial disclosure to reach the optimum equilibrium between the benefits and costs 
of disclosure. Using a sample of Canadian firms on the records of the Ontario Ministry for the 
Environment and Energy for violating environmental regulations, Li et al. (1997) examine the 
factors that induce firms to disclose or withhold environmental liabilities information. They find 
that disclosure of environmental liabilities is positively related to the firm’s pollution propensity 
and outsider’s information level about the firm’s environmental activities and negatively related 
to proprietary litigation costs. Their findings imply that the higher the stakeholder’s perception 
that firms are withholding private information, the more firms would disclose to avoid negative 
market reactions. It also implies that the higher the litigation cost associated with firms’ pollution 
activities, the more firms will withhold private information to mitigate the effect of litigation on 
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the firm’s cash flow. Li et al. (1997) reckon that neither full disclosure nor non-disclosure will 
provide the necessary equilibrium that optimizes the firm’s financial position; therefore, firms 
have the incentive to adopt a partial disclosure policy to maximize their market value net of any 
potential political cost. 
Barth et al. (1997) study the impact of increased regulation and enforcement by the SEC, 
insider information, market forces, and threat of litigation on the disclosure of environmental 
liabilities information generated from their involvement in Superfund sites in annual and 10-K 
reports. They find that firms meeting the SEC disclosure requirements
7
 are more likely to 
disclose their Superfund sites remediation cost estimates. They also find that the higher the 
firm’s ability to withstand the financial implication of litigation, the higher the level of disclosure 
of environmental liability information. In addition, they find that the higher the involvement of 
the firm in a larger number of Superfund sites, in comparison to the industry average, the lower 
the level of disclosure. This finding suggests that firms avoid the disclosure of negative news to 
prevent the reaction of the financial market.  
Stanny (1998) examines the impact of SEC issuance of “Staff Accounting Bulletin 92” 
(SAB 92) on the disclosure of environmental liability information and the recognition of 
reserved amounts for remediation in annual and 10-K reports. Effective of the fiscal year 1993, 
the SEC required firms to adopt SAB 92 which guides the disclosure and recognition of 
environmental liabilities and limits management discretion over that process. Stanny (1998) finds 
an increase in the disclosure of environmental liability information following the issuance of 
SAB 92. The results also show an increase in the number of firms recognizing reserves for 
                                                 
7
 SEC requires firms to disclose any liability that is higher than 5% of total liabilities. 
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environmental liabilities following the issuance of SAB 92. The study does not find a significant 
difference between the levels of reserved amounts recognized before and after the issuance of 
SAB 92 for firms that used to recognize their environmental liabilities prior to the issuance of the 
new regulation. However, the study finds that firms with lower levels of reserved amounts 
started to recognize these liabilities following the adoption of the new regulation.  
Alciatore et al. (2004) find similar results in their study examining the recognition and 
disclosure of environmental liabilities of 34 firms from the petroleum industry between 1989 and 
1998; a period including the issuance of SAB 92. They find that the number of firms disclosing 
their remediation liabilities increased from 4 firms in 1989 to 17 firms in 1998. The average 
amount of liabilities accrued during this period declined from $381 to $217 million dollars; 
suggesting that the introduction of SAB 92 might have induced more firms with smaller levels of 
remediation liabilities to disclose. Concerning the amount of dismantlement liabilities 
recognized, the study finds that the number of disclosing firms increased from 7 to 35 while the 
average amount recognized increased from $455 to $475 million dollars. The study confirms the 
effect of regulation on the disclosure and recognition of environmental liabilities. 
Reliability and Value Relevance 
 Barth & McNichols (1994) examine the ability of firms to estimate environmental 
liabilities associated with their involvement in Superfund sites. Based on the authors’ review of 
annual and 10-K reports, they find that the recognition and disclosure of information related to 
environmental liabilities associated with Superfund sites are limited. Using remediation cost 
estimates contained in the Record of Decision (ROD), they find that firms are able to estimate – 
and thus recognize – a minimum threshold of environmental liabilities based on the site hazard 
characteristics as described by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
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Using an equity valuation model, Barth & McNichols (1994) find that investors’ 
valuation of Superfund sites’ environmental liabilities is higher than the value of the liabilities 
recognized by the polluting firms. Barth & McNichols (1994) cast doubt about the reliability of 
information disclosed and the sufficiency of the environmental liabilities recognized by firms in 
their financial reports. First, they suggest that – despite the high level of uncertainty associated 
with Superfund sites environmental liabilities - firms still have the ability to estimate and 
recognize a minimum value of these liabilities based on available public information. Second, 
their findings also suggest that firms have been less conservative in recognizing and disclosing 
their environmental liabilities as evidenced by the fact that investors value an un-booked liability 
using public information of Superfund sites. Finally, the findings of Barth & McNichols (1994) 
also confirm that investors value environmental liabilities information.  
Also examining the reliability of disclosure and recognition of reserved amounts for 
remediation activities, Stanny (1998) finds that high polluting firms are associated with higher 
levels of disclosure of environmental liability information and recognition of reserved amounts 
for remediation activities in annual and 10-K reports. The author finds that there is significant 
positive association between some measures of disclosure of environmental information and the 
number of polluting facilities owned by the firm. The results also show that the reserved amounts 
for remediation activities are positively associated with the number of Superfund sites on which 
the firm is listed and the number of polluting facilities operated by the firm. The study also 
highlights the importance of regulation in reducing the discretion of firms with relatively higher 
levels of environmental performance; where firms with lower amounts of environmental 
liabilities increased the recognition of these reserves following the issuance of SAB 92. The 
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findings of Stanny (1998) are in accord with those of Li et al. (1997) who find that disclosure of 
environmental liabilities is positively related to the firm’s pollution propensity.  
Regarding the value relevance of environmental liability information, Campbell et al. 
(2003) find that the disclosure of firm’s environmental liabilities reduces the uncertainty in 
firm’s market valuation. Using a sample of chemical-manufacturing firms designated as 
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) in Superfund sites, they study whether the disclosure of 
environmental liabilities reduces site uncertainty and allocation uncertainty
8
. Using Barth & 
McNichols (1994) valuation model, Campbell et al. (2003) find that both site and allocation 
uncertainty are negatively associated with firm value implying that investors book a liability to 
firms involved in Superfund sites to account for site and allocation uncertainties. Campbell et al. 
(2003) find that disclosing private environmental liabilities’ information reduces the allocation 
uncertainty and, hence, improves the firm’s market valuation. They also find that financial 
statement disclosures detailing the firm’s involvement in Superfund sites reduce the value of the 
liability booked by investors in relation to site uncertainty. In brief, the findings of Campbell et 
al. (2003) suggest that disclosure of environmental liabilities reduces estimation risk and that in 
the absence of information about firms’ environmental accruals, investors will overvalue the 
firm’s liability to compensate for the uncertainty in determining firm’s involvement in Superfund 
sites.  
 
                                                 
8
 Site uncertainty is related to the level of ambiguity in determining the total clean-up cost of any PRP site while 
allocation uncertainty is related to difficulty of determining the portion of the site clean-up allocated to each firm 




Higher levels of reported environmental liabilities would discount firm’s value; therefore, 
there is evidence that firms carefully weigh their decision to disclose their environmental 
liabilities (Li et al., 2007). It is also evident that in the absence of information, investors would 
penalize the company by heavily discounting the firm’s value to compensate for uncertainties 
regarding its environmental liabilities (Campbell et al., 2003). Research shows that increased 
regulation has forced more polluting firms to provide an assessment of their environmental 
liabilities (Stanny, 1998; Alciatore et al., 2004); whether these assessments are accurate enough 
is an issue that needs more investigation. Reporting of environmental liabilities is engulfed with 
uncertainties about the existence of the liability at the first place and then by the amount to be 
recorded. Research shows that, using their private information, firms are able to measure the 
minimum threshold of these liabilities but are still reluctant to recognize any liabilities beyond 
this threshold. Several studies reflect this matter by showing that investors’ valuation of firms’ 
environmental liabilities exceeds the amounts recognized by firms (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Clarkson et al., 2004). A summary of research findings is presented in Figure-3.
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Figure-3: Summary of Research on Environmental Liabilities Disclosures: 
Measurement and reporting: 
 The SEC and FASB require firms 
to recognize their environmental 
liabilities if they are probable to 
occur and could be reasonably 
estimated. Although regulatory 
intervention is a strong signal 
about the probability of 
occurrence, the uncertainty about 
the value of their environmental 
obligations provide firms with the 
opportunity of not recognizing 
these liabilities. 
 Furthermore, firms are not 
required to aggregate their 
environmental liabilities, which 
allow firms to avoid the 
recognition or disclosure of their 
liabilities if they deem the 
outcome of certain events to be 
immaterial. 
 
Decision to disclose: 
 Li et al. (1997) research the 
economic costs and benefits of 
environmental disclosures, they 
find that firms increase their 
disclosure of environmental 
liabilities to avoid negative 
market reactions in case investors 
perceive the firm is withholding 
sensitive information. On the 
other hand, increased litigation 
risk due to the firm’s 
environmental performance will 
derive the firm to avoid the 
disclosure of such information. 
 Barth et al. (2004) find that firms 
with environmental liabilities 
equal to 5% of their total 
liabilities – an SEC disclosure 
requirement – are more likely to 
disclose such information. Barth 
et al. (1997) also find that the 
level of disclosure is associated 
with the firm’s ability to 
withstand the negative 
consequences of revealing such 
negative information to the 
market. 
 Alciatore et al. (2004) and Stanny 
(1998) find that increased 
disclosure regulations induced 
firms with smaller levels of 
environmental liabilities to 
recognize these liabilities 
following the issuance of SAB 92.  
 
Reliability of disclosures: 
 Barth & McNichols (1994) find 
that firms are able to estimate a 
minimum threshold of their 
environmental obligations 
thorough information provided in 
the Record of Decision issued by 
the Environmental Protection 
Association (EPA); however, they 
still find that the recognition and 
disclosure of such information in 
10-K reports is still limited. They 
also find that investors assessment 
of the firm’s environmental 
liabilities is higher than those 
recognized by the firm which 
casts the doubt about the 
reliability of the information 
disclosed. 
 Stanny (1998) find that firms with 
lower-environmental performance 
– higher number of polluting 
facilities – are associated with 
higher levels of disclosure. They 
find that firms with better 
performance only increased their 
disclosures following the issuance 
of SAB 92.  
Relevance of disclosures: 
 Campbell et al. (2003) finds that 
the disclosure of environmental 
liabilities reduces investors’ 
uncertainty about firms’ 
environmental liabilities; hence, 
disclosure of such information 






Table-2: Overview of Environmental Liabilities Research 
Authors Topic Measure of Environmental Liabilities Findings 
Barth and McNichols (1994) Examines if firms’ environmental 
liabilities related to Superfund sites could 
be estimated using sites characteristics: 
such as the hazard score assigned by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the type 
of contamination (soil or water), and site 
types and required remediation 
technologies. 
The cleanup cost estimate as measured in the 
Record of Decision (ROD) filed by 
Environmental Protection Agency. This 
estimate includes the initial capital incurred 
at the start-up of the cleanup operation and 
reoccurring expenditures for operation and 
maintenance. 
The authors find that site characteristics could help 
predicting a lower bound of cleanup costs of Superfund 
sites. 
Barth et al. (1997) Studies the impact of regulation and 
enforcement, insider information, 
litigation, and capital market forces on the 
disclosure of environmental liabilities 
information in annual and 10-K reports.  
The authors use a 13-item disclosure index 
that measures different types of information 
related to the firm’s environmental liabilities.  
The authors find that increased regulatory influence, 
litigation threat, and capital market demand for 
information explain the disclosure of environmental 
liabilities in annual and 10-K reports. 
Li et al. (1997) The authors provide a disclosure model 
predicting that partial disclosure of 
environmental liabilities maximizes the 
firm’s market value net of litigation and 
political costs. The authors also examine 
the validity of the model using the 
disclosure of environmental incidents for a 
sample of Canadian firms. 
A dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is 
disclosing environmental incidents – 
administrative orders to comply, 
prosecutions, or spills – in their annual 
reports, annual information forms, or 
management discussion and analysis, and 
zero otherwise.  
The authors find that firms’ likelihood of disclosing 
environmental liabilities information is positively 
associated with outsiders thinking that management has 
insider information and the firm’s pollution propensity. 
They also find that disclosure is negatively related to the 
level of political cost related to regulatory intolerance to 
pollution. 
Stanny (1998) Examines whether increased disclosure 
regulations is associated with increased 
disclosure of environmental liabilities 
information. 
A content index to measure firm’s disclosure 
of information related to accounting policy 
compliance, reserved amounts, and 
additional possible losses. The author also 
measures the dollar value of reserved 
amounts for remediation activities. 
The author finds that environmental disclosure increased 
following the issue of SAB 92 and also finds that firms 
increased the disclosure of reserved amounts following 
the issuance of the standard. 
Campbell et al. (2003) Studies the market valuation of 
environmental liabilities disclosure related 
to the firm’s involvement in Superfund 
sites and examines whether these 
disclosures reduce site and allocation 
uncertainties.  
There are two measures of environmental 
liabilities: the dollar value of accrued 
environmental liabilities reported by the firm 
and a disclosure index measuring site level 
information related to firm involvement in 
Superfund sites. 
The authors find that the disclosure of private 
environmental liabilities information is positively valued 
by the market since it reduces the level of site and 
allocation uncertainty. 
Alciatore et al. (2004) Examine the change in environmental 
disclosure in response to increased 
environmental reporting regulation. 
The authors examine the amount of: 
1. Remediation liabilities 
2. Dismantlement liabilities 
The authors find an increase in the number of firms 
disclosing environmental remediation and dismantlement 
liabilities following the issuance of SAB 92. 
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3.4. Pollution abatement 
Measurement and reporting 
 Disclosure of pollution abatement information is related to the description of incidents 
and remediation efforts made by firms that may result in environmental liabilities. According to 
Gamble et al. (1995), the SEC Item 303 requires firms to disclose any events or uncertainties that 
affect the firm’s future financial condition. Therefore, in such cases where firms could not 
recognize environmental liabilities related to certain events, Item 303 requires them to provide 
information about incidents that could affect the firm’s future financial position. Alciatore et al. 
(2004) also state that the SEC issued FRR No 36 in 1989 mandating firms to disclose the effects 
of PRP status and its impact on future financial results in MD&A. 
Prior research examines firms’ disclosure of remediation activities related to polluted 
sites; they mostly research firms’ disclosures about their involvement in Superfund sites as 
defined by CERCLA
9. Barth and McNichols (1994) find that firms’ private information about 
sites’ hazard and other qualitative information about their involvement in Superfund sites could 
help determine the lower boundary of their environmental liabilities; which highlights the 
importance of disclosing this type information. Pollution abatement activities involve a wide 
range of events that include major spills (such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska), polluted 
sites, or minor spills; however, the majority of research studies focus on disclosures related to 
firms’ involvement in Superfund sites. Table-3 provides a summary of all measures used in prior 
research to define firms’ pollution abatement activities.  
                                                 
9
 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
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Decision to disclose pollution abatement information 
Using economic theory, Freedman & Stagliano (2002) examine the disclosure of 
pollution abatement information for firms involved in first-time initial public offerings (IPO). On 
the one hand, Freedman & Stagliano (2002) suggest that IPO firms may not disclose pollution 
abatement information due to the negative news included in the disclosure which gives the 
impression that the firm is more risky. However, they argue that withholding such important 
information may be costly to the firm from an economic and social perspective; therefore, they 
envisage that the level pollution abatement disclosures would be higher for IPO firms in 
comparison to non-IPO firms. Using a five-theme content index, Freedman and Stagliano (2002) 
compare the disclosures of 26 IPO firms, named as potentially responsible parties (PRP) in 
Superfund sites, to those made by a control sample of PRP firms that were not involved in IPO. 
They find that, in general, the level of disclosure of pollution abatement information is very low 
despite the fact that the disclosure of such information is regulated by the SEC. Furthermore, 
they could not find a significant difference between the disclosures made by IPO and non-IPO 
firms. The findings of Freedman and Stagliano (2002) suggest that pollution abatement 
disclosures are not driven by investors’ need for information. 
On the contrary, Ely & Stanny (1999) suggest that the presence of sophisticated investors 
– able to analyze and draw conclusions – would increase the demand for pollution abatement 
information.  They study the disclosure determinants of firms named as Potentially Responsible 
Party (PRP) in Superfund sites and find that firms with higher level of user sophistication – 
proxied by analyst following and percentage of holding by institutional investors – are more 
likely to disclose information that the firm was named as a PRP. They also find that user 
sophistication is also related to the specificity of the disclosure; meaning that firms heavily 
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followed by analysts or held by institutional investors disclose greater details – in the form of 
more quantitative information - about their PRP sites. Ely & Stanny (1999) argue that 
sophisticated users - who are engaged in data gathering - are informed that the firm is named as a 
PRP from outside sources such as the Environmental Protection Agency fillings. Therefore, 
firms with higher levels of sophisticated users are more likely to provide more information to 
clarify their involvement in Superfund sites and alleviate any potentially detrimental views 
provided by external sources.  
There is also evidence that institutional factors heavily influence the disclosure of 
pollution abatement information. In their study of the relation between financial performance, 
environmental performance, and environmental disclosure, Al-Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) examine 
the disclosure of pollution abatement information in 10-K reports
10
. They find that institutional 
factors that proxy for the firm’s concerns about the environment11 are positively associated with 
environmental disclosure of pollution abatement information. Their findings suggest that firms 
establishing structures to manage their environmental operations are more likely to disclose 
pollution abatement information.  
Alciatore et al. (2004) find that the disclosure of firms’ involvement in PRP sites 
increased following the issuance of FRR 36 in 1989 and SAB 92 in 1993. Comparing the 
                                                 
10
 The disclosure index by Al-Tuwaijiri et el. (2004) measures (1) the amount of toxic waste generated by the firm 
(2) oil or chemical spills (3) the firm is designated as a Potential Responsible Party (PRP) and (4) the financial fines 
and penalties resulting from violating federal laws. 
11
 Firm’s environmental concern is measured using a factor analysis of (1) the presence of an environmental 
committee (2) the issuance of a sustainability report and (3) the number of voluntary EPA programs in which the 
firm is participating. 
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disclosure of 34 firms in the oil industry, they find that the number of disclosing firms increased 
from 4 firms in 1989 to 12 firms in 1998. They also find that the average number of PRP sites 
increased from 9 to 85 during the same period. The results imply that more firms with higher 
level of involvement in PRP sites started to disclose their information following the issuance of 
the regulation. 
Reliability and Value Relevance 
Early research by Rockness et al. (1986) suggests that firms in the chemical industry with 
higher levels of involvement in Superfund sites are less likely to disclose information about their 
nomination as Potentially Responsible Party. However, recent study by Ely & Stanny (1999) 
finds that firms with more PRP sites – according to EPA fillings - are more likely to disclose 
information about their involvement in these Superfund sites. Furthermore, these high-polluting 
firms are also more likely to disclose more specific information – quantitative information - 
about their Superfund sites. That shift in behavior might be explained by the issuance of FRR 36 
in 1989 and SAB 92 in 1993 which oblige firms involved in Superfund sites to disclose all 
relevant information about their involvement. 
The study by Al-Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) also provides evidence that there is a discrepancy 
in disclosing pollution abatement information. In contrast to Ely & Stanny (1999), they find that 
firms with higher environmental performance – measured by the percentage of recycled waste – 
are associated with higher levels of pollution abatement disclosures. The authors refer to 
Verrecchia’s (1983) voluntary disclosure theory to predict that the proprietary cost of disclosing 
pollution abatement information is lower for the sample of high performing firms.  
Testing the relevance of pollution abatement information, Al-Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) find 
a negative but insignificant relation between firms’ stock returns and environmental disclosures 
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of pollution abatement information over a period of three years. The results suggest that 
investors do not integrate pollution abatement information into their assessment of the firm’s 
future financial performance. The results hint that investors may also view these disclosures in a 
negative light which might explain why firms with low-environmental performance are less keen 
on disclosing this type of information. 
Using Barth and McNichols (1994) valuation model, Ely & Stanny (1999) find that the 
number of PRP sites is negatively associated with firms’ market value. However, they also find 
that disclosing information about firms’ involvement in Superfund sites mitigates this negative 
relation. These findings imply that due to the high level of uncertainty about firms’ involvement 
in Superfund sites, investors will heavily discount firms’ value. However, higher levels of 
Superfund disclosures help investors make a more informed investment decision which reflects 
in a better risk assessment and hence a higher market valuation of PRP firms. The findings of 
Hughes (2000) also confirm the negative association between the firm’s market value of equity 
and the number of Superfund sites for which the firm is designated as Potentially Responsible 
Party. 
Mobus (2005) studies the relevance of mandatory disclosure of legal enforcement action 
using the legitimacy theory framework. She examines the association between the disclosure of 
legal enforcement actions and future environmental performance. The author hypothesizes that 
mandatory disclosure of negative information – in this study the number of legal enforcements 
by environmental agencies in 10-K reports - will induce firms to change their subsequent 
performance to comply with society’s expectations regarding firms environmental performance. 
The author finds a negative association between the disclosure measure and subsequent 
environmental performance; implying that firms with higher numbers of legal enforcements 
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experience an improvement in their environmental performance. These findings suggest that 
mandating environmental disclosures plays a positive role in changing firms’ environmental 
performance.   
Summary 
In the absence of precise estimates of firms’ environmental liabilities, pollution 
abatement disclosures provide investors with information that could help them mitigate their 
investment risk (Ely & Stanny, 1999). Early studies show that firms have been offered high 
discretion over the disclosure of pollution abatement information which resulted in low levels of 
disclosure (Rockness et al., 2006; Freedman & Stagliano, 2002). Increased regulation by the 
SEC forced more firms to reveal their private information (Alciatore et al., 2004). However, 
there are concerns whether investors could interpret the information content of pollution 
abatement disclosures effectively. Evidence suggests that there is a lack of demand for this type 
of information by regular investors (Freedman and Stagliano, 2002); which may be due to their 
inability to translate the information into more robust financial implications. This matter is 
confirmed by the increased disclosure for firms with more sophisticated investors – i.e. 
institutional investors – (Ely & Stanny, 1999). More research is required on how investors 
integrate pollution abatement decision in their investment decision. A summary of pollution 
abatement research is presented in Firgure-4.
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Figure-4: Summary of Research on Pollution Abatement Disclosures: 
Measurement and reporting: 
 SEC require firms to disclose and 
describe any events that may raise 
uncertainties about future cash 
flow. FRR No 36 requires firms to 
disclose information about firms’ 
PRP status in specific. 
 
 Barth & McNichols (1994) find 
that such qualitative information 
could help investors assess the 
lower boundary of firm’s 
environmental liabilities. 
 
Decision to disclose: 
 The findings of Freedman & 
Stagliano (2002) suggest that the 
disclosure of pollution abatement 
information is not derived the 
financial market’ economic 
demand for such information. 
Using a sample of IPO firms, they 
could not find a significant 
difference between the levels of 
disclosure of IPO firms and those 
of non-IPO firms. 
 Ely & Stanny (1999) suggest that 
the presence of sophisticated 
investors – such as institutional 
investors – increases the demand 
and hence the supply for such 
information. They interpretation is 
that sophisticated investors are 
more able to analyze pollution 
abatement information.  
 Al-Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) find that 
institutional factors related to 
managing the firm’s 
environmental risk are associated 
with higher level of pollution 
abatement information. They find 
that firms with established 
environmental governance and 
management structures disclose 
more information. 
 Finally, Alciatore et al. (2004) 
find that increased regulation – 
issuance of FRR No 36 by the 
SEC – is associated with higher 
levels of pollution abatement 
disclosures. 
 
Reliability of disclosures: 
 Rockness et al. (1986) find that 
disclosure of information about 
the firm being named as 
potentially responsible party is 
associated with firms with lower 
number of Superfund sites. Their 
finding suggests a reporting bias 
of pollution abatement 
information exists. 
 
 However, a more recent study by 
Stanny (1998) find opposite 
results. They suggest that 
increased regulation – issuance of 
FRR No 36 and SAB 92 – may 
have led firms with lower-
environmental performance to 
disclose such information. 
Relevance of disclosures: 
 Al-Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) could 
not find a significant association 
between pollution abatement 
information disclosed in 10-K 
reports and firm’s stock returns; 
implying that investors could 
integrate such information in their 
investment decision. 
 On the contrary, Ely & Stanny 
(1999) find that the number of 
PRP sites is associated with lower 
market values. They also finds 
that firms disclosing more 
information about their PRP status 
help investors mitigate their risk 
which reflect positively in their 
market valuation. 
 Hughes et al. (2000) also find a 
negative association between the 
number of Superfund sites and 
firm’s market value. 
 Mobus (2005) finds that 
disclosure of pollution abatement 
information is associated with 
further improvement in the firm’s 
environmental performance. The 
author suggests that the disclosure 
of such information will induce 
firms to change their behavior to 




Table-3: Overview of Pollution Abatement Research 
Authors Topic Measure of Pollution Abatement Findings 
Rockness et al. (1986) Examine the disclosures of firms in the 
chemical industry about their 
management of hazardous waste in 
Superfund sites. The study also tests if 
there is an association between firms’ 
waste management and their financial 
performance. 
1. Corporate Communication Section 
Environmental information disclosure 
a. Monetary information. 
b. General Hazardous waste disposal 
information. 
c. Tonnage disposal measures. 
d. Superfund involvement. 
e. Regulatory compliance. 
2. Audited Financial Statements 
Contingent liability footnote 
a. Environmental information. 
b. Superfund information. 
The authors find that the high polluting firms 
involved in Superfund sites avoid the disclosure of 
hazardous waste information in their annual 
reports. They also find that firms waste generation 
is associated with lower financial performance and 
lower levels of solvency. 
Ely and Stanny (1999) Studies the association between user 
sophistication – high analyst following 
and high institutional holding – and the 
level of details about firms’ nomination 
as Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) 
in annual and 10-K disclosures. 
Statements about the number of PRP sites. The authors find that high analyst following results 
in firms disclosing more specific information about 
their nomination as Potentially Responsible Party.   
Freedman and Stagliano (2002) Examines environmental disclosure of 
IPO firms nominated as PRP in annual 
and 10-K reports. 
1. Disclosure that the company was nominated a 
PRP. 
2. Disclosure of the number of sites for which the 
company was named a PRP. 
3. Names of specific sites, with a description of the 
progress and problems of cleaning the site. 
4. Mention of whether the costs are, or are expected 
to be, material in their impact on the company’s 
financial statements. 
The authors could conclude that the there is a 
relation between firms’ involvement in IPO and 
disclosure of PRP information. 
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5. The dollar amount of Superfund liability 
exposure. 
Alciatore et al. (2004) Examine the change in environmental 
disclosure in response to increased 
environmental reporting regulation. 
The authors examine number of PRP sites disclosed. 
 
The authors find an increase in the number of firms 
disclosing the number of PRP sites following the 
issuance of FRR No 36 and SAB 92. 
Al-Tuwaijiri et al. (2004) The authors examine the association 
between environmental disclosure in 10-
K reports, environmental performance, 
and financial performance. 
The authors use a disclosure index to measure the 
disclosure of: 
1. PRP designation. 
2. Toxic waste. 
3. Oil or chemical spill. 
4. Environmental fines and penalties. 
The authors find that high environmental 
performance is positively associated with firms’ 
financial performance and with more specific 
disclosures about firms’ polluting activities. 
Mobus (2005) Using the legitimacy framework, the 
study examines the association between 
firms’ mandatory environmental 
disclosures and future environmental 
performance. 
The author measures mandatory disclosures using the 
number of legal enforcements by environmental 
agencies disclosed in 10-K reports. 
The author finds a negative association between 




3.5. Environmental performance indicators 
Measurement and reporting 
Since there is no regulation to determine which kind of environmental performance 
indicators should be reported to outside stakeholders, firms’ efforts to measure and disclose these 
indicators could be considered voluntary to a large extent. In general, firms adopt various 
reporting guidelines to communicate this type of information to their stakeholders; most notably 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or the ISO 14031 guidelines (Morhardt et al., 2002). The 
fourth generation of the GRI guideline requires firms to report on 34 environmental issues under 
different categories such as product sustainability, recycling, energy consumption, water 
consumption, emissions, effluents and waste, biodiversity and natural habitat, transportation, 
supply chain assessment and compliance with environmental regulations.   
A study by Rodrigue et al., (2013b) examines the determinants of firms’ selection of 
environmental performance indicators (EPI). Using series of interviews with key personnel in a 
firm with a proactive environmental strategy, the authors find that the firm’s environmental 
strategy, shareholders’ pressure, and outside stakeholders’ pressure all influence the choice of 
internal EPIs used by the firm. Most importantly, the study shows that some firms – such as the 
case firm - may actively seek to measure EPIs beyond what is required by the regulator with the 
aim of becoming environmental leaders. Another important finding of this study is that although 
the measurement and reporting of EPIs is voluntary, there is a relevant audience showing interest 
in this type of information (such as investors, governments, stock indices, industry associations, 
and local communities) which may increase the level of scrutiny over the information disclosed.  
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Azzone et al. (1996) present a general framework for environmental reporting including 
the reporting of environmental performance indicators for products and processes. They suggest 
that firms should report the amount of emissions, waste produced, energy consumed and 
transportation (details are provided in Table-4). An important issue they discuss in their study is 
whether these indicators should be aggregated (disclosure of firm-level environmental 
performance) or disaggregated (disclosure of site-level performance). While aggregated 
indicators are useful in comparing performance over time, the authors argue that aggregated 
measures may be used to hide sites where firms’ environmental performance is below acceptable 
levels.  
Several studies provide evidence that the level of reporting Environmental performance 
indicators is still very low. Henri & Journeault (2007) survey 1500 Canadian manufacturing 
firms over the use of environmental performance indicators. Although the sample firms 
responded that the use of EPIs is important to ensure compliance with environmental regulations 
and decision making, external reporting of these indicators was considered the least important 
use of EPIs. Other studies by Clarkson et al. (2008) and Morhardt et al. (2002) code firms’ 
environmental reports according to the GRI or ISO 14031 guidelines and provide empirical 
evidence that the level of information reported is lower than what is expected by these 
guidelines. Using a disclosure index based on the GRI guidelines, Clarkson et al. (2008) find that 
a sample of 122 firms reports an average score of 8.09 items out of a 60-item total score. 
Morhardt et al. (2002) find that firms report 36 items (out of 115 according to a GRI coding 
system) and 44 items (out of 132 according to an ISO 14031 coding system). A list of the 





Decision to disclose environmental performance indicators 
Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) examine the determinants of disclosing greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) information on their website for a sample of 50 firms from several countries
12
. 
They examine whether disclosure is related to the firm’s financial condition, supervision by debt-
holders, and the level of governmental involvement represented by the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The authors measure GHG disclosures using an index composed of quantitative 
measures of firms’ greenhouse emissions13 and general information related to the firm’s strategy 
and management of their greenhouse gas emissions. They find that the disclosure of GHG 
information is positively related to firms located in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
firm size, and industry membership. The authors suggest that firms located within countries that 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol are required to make higher levels of capital expenditures which 
explain the importance of GHG disclosures. However, the study of the disclosure decision of 
quantitative information – measured according to the GRI guidelines – shows that there is no 
significant association between the disclosures made and the firm’s leverage, financial condition, 
or the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Rankin et al. (2011) explore the link between internal and external institutional factors 
and environmental disclosure. They examine the association between Australian firms’ 
disclosures of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and organizational factors, and regulations. The 
                                                 
12
 The sample includes 50 Fortune 500 firms from the USA, Australia, Canada, and the European Union. 
13
 The authors use GRI (G3) guidelines EN16 to EN20 to measure disclosures related to firms’ environmental 
performance indicators.  
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authors suggest that the establishment of internal structures to proactively manage the firm’s 
environmental operations will have a positive impact on the disclosure of credible GHG 
information. They reckon that these structures not only serve as management tools that translate 
the firm’s commitment to enhance their environmental operations into actions, but also act as 
learning and communication tools. They also suggest that firms participating in voluntary 
governmental programs are more likely to disclose more credible information. They find that the 
decision to disclose GHG
14
 information is associated with the firm’s adoption of an 
environmental management system (EMS), the firm’s ISO 14001 certification of their EMS, the 
quality of the firm’s governance15, and the firm’s voluntary adherence to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP)
16
.  Examining the amount and credibility of GHG disclosures using a disclosure 
index for a subsample of 80 firms that disclosed GHG information, Rankin et al. (2011) find that 
the level of GHG disclosure is associated with the existence of a certified EMS, the adoption of 
the GRI, and the voluntary reporting to the CDP. The authors could not find a relation between 
the decision to disclose and the presence of an environmental committee or trading in the EU 
ETS. 
Freedman & Jaggi (2005) compare the disclosures of greenhouse gas emission 
information between firms located in Kyoto Protocol-ratifying countries and those in non-
                                                 
14
 The decision to disclose is measured using a binary variable equal 1 if the firm discloses GHG information and 0 
otherwise. 
15
 Firm’s governance is scored according to the Horwath (2008) report. 
16
 The authors found that firms with CDP reports publicly available are significantly associated with the decision to 





. They find that Kyoto firms are associated with higher levels of disclosure 
of greenhouse information in comparison to the non-Kyoto firms. The authors also find that 
firms with higher levels of CO2 emissions - and located in Kyoto ratifying countries - are 
associated with higher levels of disclosure. However, they could not find a significant 
association between the firm’s financial condition (measured by return on assets) or the level of 
supervision by debt-holders (measured by the level of debt to equity) and the level of greenhouse 
gas disclosures. Freedman & Jaggi (2005) suggest that the stakeholder theory predicts that firms 
disclose greenhouse gas information to satisfy the information needs of the different stakeholders 
including investors. However, the authors state that the stakeholders’ theory fails to explain the 
difference in disclosure between firms. Using legitimacy theory, they reckon that Kyoto-firms 
disclose more information about their greenhouse gas emissions to alleviate the public and 
political pressures emanating from ratifying the protocol.  
Reliability and Value Relevance 
 Cormier and Magnan (1997) find that pollution indicators are reflected in firms’ market 
valuation. Using a sample of Canadian firms in environmental sensitive industries, the authors 
find a negative association between firms’ market value of equity and their indicators of water 
pollution. The authors use a proxy of water pollution that measures the level of firm’s pollution 
in the flow-through of discharged water relative to the amount allowed by the regulator. This 
finding implies that the market uses these performance indicators to assess an un-booked liability 
                                                 
17
 The authors measure greenhouse gas disclosure using a five-item index measuring a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative information. The index measures the disclosure of (1) firm’s emissions (2) costs associated with 
greenhouse gas emissions and (3) firms’ plans to deal with global warming. 
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to these firms.  Another study by Cormier et al. (1993), using a similar valuation model, finds 
comparable results. Cormier et al. (1993) also find that investors assess a market premium 
(discount) to firms with high (low) environmental performance – using firms’ water pollution 
indicators.  
Hughes (2000) finds that nonfinancial pollution measures are reflected in the firm’s 
market valuation. The author examines the value relevance of SO2 information following the 
enactment of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment (CAAA). The phase one of the 1990 CAAA 
required a list of high-polluting firms in the electric-utility sector to reduce their SO2 emissions 
while obligations of the low-polluting firms were delayed for phase two. The author finds that - 
following the enactment of the act - the market value of equity is negatively associated with the 
amount of SO2 emissions for the sample of high-polluting firms; implying that investors are able 
to assess the amount of liabilities generated from the emissions of SO2 to the atmosphere. The 
study could not establish a similar association for the control sample of low-polluting firms; 
indicating that the market did not book any liabilities for these firms. In 1992, the cost of 
compliance with the 1990 CAAA was revised downward due to technological advancements. 
The author does not find any association between the market value of equity and the amount of 
SO2 emissions following the revision of compliance costs.  
Johnston et al. (2008) study the value relevance of SO2 emission allowances traded by 
US electric utilities. They argue that these allowances have an asset value since they allow firms 
to maintain their operation under the existing environmental conditions – or they could 
alternatively be sold – and they also have a real option value since they allow firms to defer 
capital spending in scrubbers to reduce their SO2 emissions. Using Ohlson (1995) valuation 
model, they find a positive relation between the market value of equity and the number of SO2 
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emission allowances held by firms; which indicates that investors value these allowances as 
assets of the firm. Furthermore, they examine the market reaction on the date of auction of SO2 
emission allowances and find positive abnormal returns for the purchasing firms. The authors 
suggest that investors value the purchase of SO2 emission allowances as real options since they 
help the firm to defer major capital expenditures. 
Finally, a study by Clarkson at al. (2011)a examine whether it pays to be green by 
studying whether there is an association between improvement of firms’ environmental 
performance and the change in the firm’s financial performance. The authors hypothesize that 
improving environmental performance is a signal of a proactive strategy that leads to improved 
financial performance by reducing environmental compliance cost or increased revenues from 
sales of green products. Clarkson at al. (2011)a find that a reduction in the level of Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) is associated with a subsequent improvement in the firm’s return on assets, firm 
value and cash flow. Similarly, using firms’ Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), King & Lenox 
(2001) find a negative association between firm’s pollution level and firm’s value using Tobin’s 
q. On the other hand, King & Lenox (2002) find that firm’s efforts for pollution prevention – 
estimated using firm’s TRI - are associated with higher firm’s value (Tobin’q) and higher levels 
of profitability (return on assets).
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Figure-5: Summary of Environmental Performance Indicators Research
Measurement and reporting: 
 Disclosure of Environmental 
Performance indicators (EPI) is 
unregulated. Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) and ISO 14031 
guidelines provide suggestions on 
how to report this information. 
 Azzone et al. (1996) discuss 
whether such information should 
be reported at firm or plant level. 
While aggregate EPI disclosures 
are useful in comparing 
performance over time, it could 
still serve to hide below-average 
performance at some plants. 
 Henri & Journeault (2007) find 
that firms collect EPI information 
for internal use but are reluctant to 
disclose the information to outside 
stakeholders. Clarkson et al. 
(2008) and Morhardt et al. (2002) 
confirm that the level of reported 
EPI information is very low in 
comparison to what is required by 
voluntary reporting guidelines 
(i.e. GRI and ISO 14031). 
 
 
Decision to disclose: 
 Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) find 
that disclosure of greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) information is 
related to the location of the firm 
in a Kyoto Protocol ratifying 
country, firm size, and industry 
membership. They could not find 
an association between the 
disclosures and the firm’s 
financial condition. Freedman & 
Jaggi (2005) also find similar 
results. 
 Rankin et al. (2011) find that the 
disclosure of GHG information is 
associated with the firm’s 
established structures to manage 
their environmental operations. 
They find that firms with who 
adopt an environmental 
management system, have an ISO 
14001 certification, have a higher 
quality governance structure, and 
voluntarily participate in the 
Carbon Disclosure Project are 
more likely to disclose GHG 
information. 
 Through interviews of key 
personnel in a firm with an active 
environmental strategy, Rodrigue 
et al. (2013)b find that the 
presence of an active 
environmental strategy, and 
pressure by shareholders and 
outside stakeholders influence the 
choice of EPI to be measured and 
reported by the firm. 
 
 
Relevance of disclosures: 
 There is empirical evidence that 
investors integrate EPI 
information in their investment 
decisions. 
 Cormier & Magnan (1997) find a 
negative association between 
firm’s measures of water-
pollution and a sample of 
Canadian firms’ market value of 
equity. 
 Hughes (2000) finds a negative 
association between the amount of 
SO2 emissions and firms’ market 
value of equity for a sample of 
high-polluting firms following the 
enactment of 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendment. The author could not 
find any association between the 
pollution measure and firm value 
for the sample of low-polluting 
firms. 
 Using Ohlson (1995) valuation 
model, Johnston et al. (2008) find 
that SO2 emission allowances 
have a real asset value. They also 
find positive abnormal returns 
around the purchase date of these 
allowances. 
 Clarkson et al. (2011)a find that 
the reduction of Toxic release 
inventory is associated with an 
improved financial performance.  
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Table-4: Overview of Environmental Performance Indicators Research 
Authors Topic Measure of Environmental Performance Indicators Findings 
Cormier and Magnan (1993) Examine the association between firm’s 
market valuation and its level of water 
pollution. The aim of the study is to 
understand whether water pollution 
indicators provide investors with 
information about the firm’s expected 
environmental liabilities. 
The actual level of suspend solids, average 
concentration of sulfuric anhydride, biochemical 
oxygen demand (BOD), and other substances in the 
plant water discharges; relative to the amounts 
allowed by the Pollution Standard set by the 
Environment Ministries in Canada. 
The authors find a negative and significant 
association between the firm’s market valuation 
and its water pollution performance. It indicates 
that investors integrate non-financial pollution 
performance information in their assessment of the 
firm’s liabilities. 
Azzone et al. (1996) Presents a framework for presenting 
corporate environmental indicators. 
The authors measure firms’ environmental 
performance indicators as: 
1. Emissions: Quantity of Sox, NOx, VOCs, CO, 
NH3, and CO2 released, and quantity of CFCs 
and halons consumed. 
2. Waste: 
a. Amount of non-hazardous waste 
generated and disposed (Total, by 
category and by destination type). 
b. Amount of hazardous waste generated 
and disposed (Total, by category, 
transported, treated and by destination 
type). 
c. Recycling recovery rates. 
3. Energy:  
a. Amount of energy consumed by type 
(solid fuel, petroleum, gas, electricity, 
and heat). 
b. Total amount of energy consumed. 
4. Transportation: 
a. Number of cars and/or distances. 
b. Number of passenger transport vehicles 
and/or distances. 
c. Number of goods vehicles and/or 
distances. 
d. Number of aircraft and/or distances. 
 
Cormier and Magnan (1997) Study how investors evaluate the water 
pollution performance of Canadian 
firms. 
Same measure as Cormier et Magnan (1993) The authors find that the market valuation of firms 
is negatively associated with the firm’s pollution 
performance. Additionally, they find that this 
assessment differs by the firm’s industry 
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membership. Firms in the pulp and paper, chemical 
and oil industries were more negatively evaluated 
in comparison to firms in the steel, metal and 
mining industries. The authors suggest that political 
scrutiny over the firm’s environmental performance 
could explain the difference in the market valuation 
of their environmental performance. 
Hughes (2000) Study the association between pollution 
indicators and firm’s market value of 
equity using a sample of utility firms 
affected by Phase One of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act. The author attempts to find 
whether non-financial pollution 
measures are good indicators of 
environmental liabilities. 
Percentage of SO2 emissions relative to the firm’s 
total emissions of SO2, NOx, and CO2. 
The author finds that a negative association 
between market value of equity and firms’ level of 
SO2 emissions for firms affected by Phase One of 
the Clean Air Act after the inaction of the act. The 
author could not find a similar association for the 
control sample of firms that were not affected by 
the act. 
Freedman and Jaggi (2005) Study the impact of ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol and firms’ disclosure of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
information. 
The authors use a 5-item index to measure disclosure 
of GHG information: 
1. Mention of global warming or of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
2. Firm’s plans to deal with global warming and the 
objective to control global warming. 
3. Potential costs to achieve the global warming 
objectives. 
4. Current costs to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
5. Information on the extent of greenhouse-gas 
emissions. 
The authors find that firms located in countries that 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol are more likely to 
disclose GHG information in comparison to firms 
located in non-ratifying countries. 
Johnston et al. (2008) Examine the value relevance of sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) emissions allowances. 
The number of SO2 emission allowances held by the 
firm at the end of the year. 
The market positively value the firm’s holding of 
SO2 emission allowances in accordance with the 
authors’ hypothesis that these allowances have an 
asset value. 
Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) Study the determinants of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions disclosures. 
The authors use the GRI indicators to create a GHG 
disclosure index: 
1. Total direct and indirect gas emissions by 
weight. 
2. Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions 
by weight. 
3. Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and reductions achieved. 
4. Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by 
weight. 
The authors find that GHG disclosures are 
associated with firm size, industry membership, 
and the location of the company’s head-quarter in a 
country that ratifies the Kyoto protocol. They also 
found that the disclosure of environmental 
performance indicators – as defined by the GRI 




5. NO, SO and other significant air emissions by 
type and weight. 
Rankin et al. (2011) Examine the disclosure of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission disclosures. 
The authors use two measures to proxy for GHG 
disclosures: 
1. A dichotomous measure equal 1if firms disclose 
GHG information and 0 otherwise. 
2.  A 20-item disclosure index based on the ISO 
14064-1 requirements. 
The authors find that firms with an Environmental 
Management System (EMS) certified by ISO 
14001, using the GRI for reporting environmental 
information, and providing information to the 
Carbon Disclosure Project are more likely to 
disclose GHG information. 
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3.6. Governance structure and management system 
Measurement and reporting 
Similar to the reporting of environmental performance indicators, disclosures related to 
the governance and management of the firm’s environmental operations is completely voluntary. 
There is an ambiguity in defining what is the most effective governance structure to oversee 
firms’ environmental operations and what are the elements of an environmental management 
system that would lead to improved levels of environmental performance. Firms voluntarily 
adopting the GRI guidelines are required to provide some information about issues related to the 
governance and management of firm’s sustainability such as the firm’s strategy, involvement in 
external initiatives, stakeholder engagement, reporting assurances, governance structure and 
composition, remuneration and incentives, and management approach. Meanwhile, studies by 
Clarkson et al. (2008) and Morhardt et al. (2002) code firms’ environmental reports according to 
the GRI guidelines and conclude that the reporting of environmental governance and 
management information is substantially lower than what is demanded by the GRI.    
A study by Pondeville et al. (2013), examines the development of corporate 
environmental management system. Pondeville et al. (2013) propose three main elements 
defining an environmental management system. The first element is the formal management 
control system composed of rules and procedures to manage the firm’s environmental 
operations. The second element is the informal management control system made by employees 
and managers’ involvement in solving the firm’s environmental problems. The third element is 
the management information system that stores information about the firm’s environmental 
operations that could be further used for decision making and control.  
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Another study by Rodrigue et al. (2013a) examines the association between the firm’s 
environmental governance and its environmental performance. The authors define three 
mechanisms of environmental governance: (1) the existence of an environmental committee (2) 
the percentage of directors knowledgeable about their industries’ environmental issues (3) the 
existence of environmental performance incentives in executive compensation. The results of 
Rodrigue et al. (2013a) show that the sample firms
18
 reported in their proxy statements and their 
10-K reports that 51% of boards have an environmental committee, 10% of directors have prior 
environmental experience, and 33% of firms include environmental related incentives in their 
executive compensation.  
Perez et al. (2007) provide a tentative framework of what could constitute a successful 
environmental management system, by conducting field interviews with environmental managers 
in a sample of Spanish firms. They examine the link between the firm’s environmental strategy 
and its environmental management system to understand its impact on the firm’s environmental 
performance. They define four pillars for the firm’s environmental management system: training 
and awareness building, continuous improvement, integrating stakeholders’ interests, and 
organizational learning. They argue that the presence of such a management system would lead 
firms to develop intangible assets that improve their environmental performance.  
Perez et al. (2007) define the first pillar – training and awareness – as the environmental 
training programs provided to employees at different sites. They find that these programs 
improve employee’s awareness, knowledge, skills, and expertise vis-à-vis carrying their 
                                                 
18
 Rodrigue et al. (2013)a examine 219 firm-year observations between 2003 and 2008 for firms between SIC codes 
10XX and 39XX. 
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environmental duties. They reckon that forming environmental committees and participation 
programs is effective catalyst of awareness-building among employees.  
As for the second pillar, continuous improvement of the firm’s environmental 
performance relies on the organization’s willingness to acquire latest technologies. The authors 
find that some organizations are ready to improve their environmental performance beyond what 
is legally required. They argue that spending for continuous improvement will help them avoid 
large capital expenditures if future regulations become more stringent. Therefore, the authors 
find that continuous improvement goals should be imbedded in the firm’s capital planning.  
Perez et al. (2007) also suggest that there are many tools to integrate stakeholder’s 
interests into organizational strategy. Sponsoring environmental activities is a tool to reduce the 
tension between firms and their local communities. Though these initiatives help firms 
improving their reputations, the authors express their concern that they might be tools for 
stakeholders’ management rather than measures of accountability. Other tools of integration 
include participation in voluntary environmental initiatives such as industry related working 
groups.  
Furthermore, the authors highlight the importance of considering customers’ 
environmental demands as well as environmental performance of their suppliers. For example, 
some firms require their suppliers to obtain certain environmental certifications to assure that 
their products are manufactured in compliance with regulatory requirements. The authors also 
require the integration of employee feedback by forming internal committees that help assessing 
and controlling the firm’s environmental management system. 
Finally, Perez et al. (2007) define organization learning as “the process of improving 
actions through better knowledge and understating, implying changes to internal values, routines 
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and rules” (page 415). They emphasize the role of employee training, forming of cross-
functional environmental committees, use of information systems, and integration of 
environmental issues into accounting systems and budgets as important tools of developing 
organization learning. 
Reliability and value relevance 
Prior research provides evidence that the financial market values superior environmental 
governance and management systems. Using a survey of 297 firms traded on the London Stock 
Exchange, Thomas (2001) finds that the adoption of an environmental policy is associated with 
positive excess returns. Thomas (2001) also finds that positive returns persist for adopting firms 
that are members of polluting industries which are normally associated with negative excess 
returns.  Meanwhile, the study could not find an association between firms that adopt training for 
staff in environmental protocols and excess stock returns. In general, the findings of Thomas 
(2001) suggest that the stock market considers the adoption of an environmental policy as a long-
term investment rather than a short-term expense. 
Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) study whether a strong environmental management is 
reflected in a positive financial performance. The authors use third party environmental awards 
as an output measure that aggregates the different dimensions of the firm’s environmental 
management. Using a sample of firms listed on NYSE/AMEX, they find positive abnormal 
returns around the dates when the awards are announced signaling that the market reacts 
positively to the recognition of firms’ environmental management. By measuring firms’ Tobin’s 
q, Hibiki et al. (2003) find that firms with ISO14001 certification are associated with higher 
levels of market valuation. Tobin’s q of firms with ISO14001 certification is 11% to 14% higher 
than that of firms without the certification. 
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Rodrigue et al. (2013a) examine if environmental governance mechanisms are associated 
with higher levels of environmental performance. They study the relation between three 
governance mechanisms – the existence of an environmental committee, the level of 
environmental awareness among board directors, and the existence of environmental incentives 
in executive compensation – and different measures of the firm’s environmental performance. 
Rodrigue et al. (2013a) could not find significant association between the three environmental 
governance mechanisms and the level of environmental regulatory performance or the level of 
environmental capital expenditures. The study only finds a positive association between the level 
of environmental incentives in executive compensation and the level of environmental 
performance related to pollution prevention activities. Rodrigue et al. (2013)a conclude that the 
existing governance mechanisms do not have a substantial impact on the firm’s environmental 
performance. They argue that firms embrace these mechanisms to portray an image of 
responsible environmental management. 
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Figure-6: Summary of Research on Environmental Governance Structure and Management System Disclosures: 
Measurement and reporting: 
 Reporting of information about 
environmental management 
systems and government 
structures is not mandated by 
regulatory bodies. Most recently 
the GRI has been providing 
guidelines on how to report this 
type of information. Research by 
Clarkson et al. (2008) and 
Morhardt et al. (2002) show that 
the level of information reported 
is still below what is required by 
the GRI guideline. 
 Pondeville et al. (2013) suggest 
that the environmental 
management system is composed 
of three main elements (1) formal 
system (made of rules, 
procedures, etc…) (2) informal 
system (formed by the interaction 
between employees) (3) the 
information system that supports 
the decision making process. 
 Rodrigue et al. (2013) suggest that 
an effective environmental 
governance system is made of (1) 
the existence of a separate 
environmental committee (2) the 
percentage of directors with 
knowledge about environmental 
issues (3) the existence of an 




Measurement and reporting: 
 Perez et al. (2007) define four 
pillars for the firm’s 
environmental management 
system: (1) training and 
awareness building, (2) 
continuous improvement, (3) 
integrating stakeholders’ interests, 
and (4) organizational learning. 
They suggest that these pillars 
could be considered as intangible 




Relevance of disclosures: 
  Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) 
find that a superior environmental 
management is positively 
reflected in firm’s valuation. They 
find that firm’s environmental 
awards – an output measure of the 
excellence in environmental 
management – are associated with 
positive stock returns around the 
announcement dates of the 
awards. 
 Rodrigue et al. (2013) study the 
association between an effective 
environmental management 
system and firm environmental 
performance. They only find a 
positive association between the 
existence of environmental 
incentives in executive 
compensation and a measure of 
voluntary performance related to 
the firm’s pollution prevention 
activities. They conclude that 
established governance structures 
are inefficient and that firms use 
these structures to portray an 




Table-5: Overview of Research on Environmental Governance Structure and Management system Disclosures: 
Authors Topic Measure of Governance Structure and Management 
system 
Findings 
Klassen and McLaughlin 
(1996) 
Study the value relevance of external 
environmental awards – a output proxy 
for firms’ environmental management. 
The authors use external environmental awards as a 
measure of the firm’s management system. 
The authors find positive returns around the 
announcement dates of the awards.  
Perez et al. (2007) Using field research, the authors study 
the interaction between strategy and 
environmental management system and 
their impact on the firm’s environmental 
performance. 
The authors define the firm’s environmental 
management system based on four pillars: 
(1) Training and awareness building. 
(2) Continuous improvement. 
(3) Integrating stakeholders’ interests. 
(4) Organizational learning. 
 
The authors provide a structure for firms’ 
environmental management system and link it to 
the different levels of environmental performance. 
Pondeville et al. (2013) Study the contextual and strategic 
factors that contribute to the formation 
of the firm’s environmental management 
system. 
The authors identify three elements that define the 
firm’s environmental management system: 
(1) Formal management system: rules, 
procedures, etc… 
(2) Informal management system: formed by 
employees’ interaction to solve 
environmental issues. 
(3) Information system to support decision 
making. 
The authors could not find a significant association 
between ecological risk and the development of an 
environmental management system. On the other 
hand, they find that the development of an active 
environmental strategy and a management system 
are associated with pressures from market, 
community, and organizational stakeholders.  
Rodrigue et al. (2013) Examine whether established 
governance structures are associated 
with improved environmental 
performance. 
The authors use three measure to proxy for the firm’s 
environmental governance structure: 
1. The existence of an environmental 
committee. 
2. The percentage of directors with 
environmental management experience. 
3. The presence of environmental incentives in 
executive compensation. 
They only find an association between the presence 
of environmental incentives in executive 




4. The dimensions of environmental disclosure 
Total environmental disclosure is a construct that has many dimensions that researchers 
need to consider (Ingram & Frazier, 1980; Walden & Stagliano, 2004)
19
. Environmental reports 
should not be assessed based only on the amount of information disclosed but also on the 
comprehensiveness and the quality of the information. Therefore, based on previous research, I 
suggest that environmental reporting should satisfy or provide a balance along four dimensions 
that I discuss in this section: past vs. forward-looking, positive vs. negative, qualitative vs. 
quantitative, and voluntary vs. mandatory disclosures. By attentively designing environmental 
reports along these dimensions, firms could provide their stakeholders with a set of 
comprehensive and relevant disclosures. 
4.1. The time dimension of disclosure: Past vs. future disclosures 
Measurement and reporting 
In their definition of disclosure, Gamble et al. (1995) set the time-frame dimension to 
have a significant importance. According to (Gamble et al., 1995), stakeholders need past, and 
forward looking information: 
“The objective of environmental disclosure is to provide stakeholders with information 
that will allow them to evaluate the long and short-term environmental concerns of an 
entity in terms of risk, current and perspective cash flow requirements, and consistency 
with societal environmental concerns.” 
                                                 
19
 (Ingram & Frazier, 1980) present four dimensions of environmental disclosure: the theme, the specificity, the 
time, and the evidence of disclosure. 
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The GAO report (2004) also highlights that forward-looking information is mandated by 
the SEC. 
 “In addition, under item 303 companies are “encouraged” to include in their filings 
forward-looking information, which SEC guidance defines as anticipating a future trend 
or event, or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend, or 
uncertainty”(p.10). 
Some scholars attempt to include this time dimension in their research of environmental 
disclosure. In their content index, Ingram & Frazier (1980) use the time dimension to 
differentiate between past and future oriented statements; however, they fail to find any 
correlation between this dimension and environmental performance. According to Ingram & 
Frazier (1980), the decomposition of the disclosure into its different constituents may land more 
significant results for different research questions. However, their failure to find any significant 
results could be attributed to the fact that there is no clear guideline on how to classify 
information as past or future oriented since the literature does not fully exploit this dimension of 
disclosure.  
Marshall & Brown (2003) classify environmental reporting in terms of leading or lagging 
disclosures. They use the definitions provided by the European Environment Agency (EEA) and 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) for this purpose. According to the EEA, 
firms’ disclosures falls under three categories:  (1) descriptive indicators explaining what is 
happening to the environment, (2) efficiency indicators explaining how resources are utilized to 
produce consumer goods, and (3) performance indicators showing firm’s commitment to a 
certain targeted objectives. Similarly, ISO standards define three indicators: (1) environmental 
indicators describing the state of the environment, (2) operational indicators showing how firms’ 
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operations have impacted the environment and (3) management indicators providing information 
on management efforts to meet their environmental goals. Marshall & Brown (2003) consider 
performance indicators (under EAA classification) and management indicators (under ISO 
standards) to be leading indicators providing more relevant and valuable information to 
stakeholders about the firms’ commitment to improving their future environmental performance. 
Meanwhile, they consider the other types of disclosures as less relevant since they only indicate 
firms’ prior performance. 
Marshall & Brown (2003) examine the disclosures of 150 listed firms listed, they find 
that the majority of firms’ environmental reporting is composed of lagging indicators (82.3% 
could be classified as EEA Descriptive indicators or 86.2% could be classified as ISO 
Operational indicators) in comparison to the amount of leading disclosures (13.3% EEA 
Performance indicators or 11.7% ISO Management indicator). They also find that only 32.9% of 
firms reported at least one metric related to EEA Performance indicators and only 50.6% of firms 
reported at least one ISO Management indicators. The authors argue that this low level of 
forward looking information might provide a negative signal about firms’ commitment and 
efforts to improve their future environmental performance. 
Decision to disclose forward-looking information 
Marshall and Brown (2003) examine the factors that may influence firms’ disclosure of 
leading information. They find that ISO compliant firms, large firms, and manufacturing firms 
tend to disclose more forward- looking information in comparison to non-ISO compliant firms, 
small firms, and natural resources or service firms. They argue that ISO compliant firms are 
obliged to establish an environmental management system (EMS); hence, they become more 
committed to enhancing their environmental performance. Furthermore, large firms are more 
69 
 
visible to external stakeholders and possess the necessary resources to invest in pollution 
abatement and prevention technologies; therefore, they are keen to adopt a behavior that portrays 
them as environmental leaders. Finally, they argue that firms belonging to some manufacturing 
industries (for example, the chemical industry) have a history that could be best described by 
high levels of pollution; meaning that these firms would attempt to improve their environmental 
performance to signal a change in their behavior and enhance their negative public image.  
4.2. The objectivity of environmental disclosures: Positive vs. Negative Disclosures 
Measurement and reporting 
Classifying environmental disclosure as negative news is ambiguous since there is a lack 
of event studies to inform us how the market reacts to the different disclosure themes. Patten & 
Crampton (2004) rely on the definition of Deegan & Rankin (1997) who describe negative 
disclosures as “disclosures that present the company as operating to the detriment of the natural 
environment”. Table-6 provides a list of themes classified as negative disclosures in different 
research studies. 
Reliability of disclosing negative information 
Research on environmental disclosure motivation examines the avoidance of negative 
disclosures or counterbalancing negative information using positive or neutral disclosures (see 
Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Hughes et al., 2000; Patten & Crampton, 
2004; Rockness et al., 1986). Although conservatism is a major attribute of financial reporting 
(Ball, et al., 2000; Basu, 1997), research findings suggest that environmental reporting is more 
biased towards the disclosure of good news. Proponents of the legitimacy theory are concerned 
that firms are using environmental disclosure as a self-laudatory tool.  
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Patten & Crampton (2004) explore the motivation of firms to disclose environmental 
information using a content index that examines the amount of negative and positive disclosures 
in annual reports and corporate websites. They find that there is a positive association between 
the amount of positive and negative environmental disclosures in both media meaning that firms 
try to offset the impact of negative disclosures by providing more positive information. These 
findings contribute to the argument that firms try to legitimize their operations using 
environmental disclosures.   
Deegan & Gordon (1996) show that Australian firms are biased towards reporting good 
news. They examine the objectivity of annual report disclosures made by 197 firms during the 
period ranging from 1980 to 1991. They first find that only 71 firms make any kind of 
environmental disclosure. Most importantly, they find that the amount of positive disclosures 
outweigh the negative ones in the annual reports. By examining the trend, they conclude that 
firms increase the amount of negative disclosures in their 1991 reports compared to their 1988 
disclosures. However, they observe that the amount of positive disclosures have exponentially 
increased over the same period. Deegan & Gordon (1996) find that the increase in environmental 
disclosure during the period from 1988 to 1991 coincides with increased membership in 
environmental groups. Therefore, it appears that firms increase the amount of negative news in 
their annual reports following scrutiny from environmental groups; meanwhile, they also 
increase the amount of positive disclosures in order to counterbalance the effect of negative 
disclosures. 
Deegan & Rankin (1996) examine the objectivity of Australian reporting for a list of 
twenty firms that are prosecuted for violating environmental laws. Their findings show that firms 
that have negative news to disclose are still biased towards the disclosure of positive 
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information. Only six firms reported negative information in their annual reports and the mean 
number of words related to positive information outweighs that of negative information 
disclosed. Deegan & Rankin (1996) suggest that firms attempt to counter the negative 
environmental disclosures with more positive ones.  
Hughes et al. (2000) examine the 1992 annual report disclosures of firms classified by 
Fortune magazine as environmental leaders and laggards. They find that both types of firms 
provide negative information like litigation or fines in the mandatory sections of the annual 
report such as the footnotes or the MD&A; meanwhile, they use the voluntary disclosure sections 
of the report, narrative section and president letter, to provide positive disclosures about the 
firm’s environmental policies and efforts. These findings imply that firms disclose negative news 
because they are compelled to do so; however, they attempt to counterbalance the negative 
disclosures by portraying an environmentally friendly image of the company in less- regulated 
sections.  
Rockness et al. (1986) suggest that firms avoid the disclosure of negative environmental 
information. They examine the disclosures of 21 chemical companies involved in Superfund 
sites during the period from 1980 to 1983. Rockness et al. (1986) find that the sample firms 
avoid mentioning their involvement in Superfund sites in their annual reports. From a sample of 
21 firms, only 13 firms disclosed any environmental information in their 1980 annual reports and 
11 firms did so in their 1983 reports. Among the firms who chose to disclose environmental 
information, only three firms with the least number of sites stated their involvement in Superfund 
sites. A firm like DuPont who is involved in 21 Superfund sites did not mention this fact in its 
annual report. Surprisingly, in their footnote about contingent liabilities, which is a mandatory 
form of disclosure, no firm reported a contingent liability related to Superfund sites. On the other 
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hand, most of the firms emphasized their environmental efforts by disclosing their environmental 
capital expenditures. Finally, Meng et al. (2014) finds that Chinese firms with poor 
environmental performance refrain from disclosing negative information such as their exposure 
to environmental penalties, violating environmental standards, or the existence of environmental 
risks. 
Summary  
Increasing disclosure per se is not the sole purpose of reporting as long as the information 
disclosed is biased. Therefore, based on the findings of prior research, the balance between 
negative and positive disclosure is a dimension to consider in future research since it provides an 
indication about firm’s incentives to disclose. Previous research suggests that firms disclose 
negative information only when they are mandated to do so and that they use positive disclosures 
to offset the effect of negative information.  
Table 6 – List of Themes Classified as Negative Disclosures 
Authors Themes 
(Deegan & Gordon, 
1996) 
 Company in conflict with the 
government view on its 
environmental activities. 
 Admission of causing 
environmental, including health-
related, problems for residents 
through the company’s 
environmental activities. 
 Explicit admission of excessive 
polluting emissions. 
 Company encountering waste 
disposal problems. 
 Government investigation into, and court 
action concerning, the company’s 
environmental activities. 
 Acknowledgment of detrimental effects of 
activities on the land. 
 Admission of environmentally based 
community or media sensitivity to the 
industry or firm. 
 Non-compliance with regulations. 
 Admission of past problems with the 
company’s environmental activities. 
(Deegan & Rankin, 
1996) 
 The buildup of a restricted 
chemical compound  
 Inability to rehabilitate mine sites 
following closure. 
 Admittance that environmental performance 
is less than acceptable. 
 Adverse publicity relating to plant 
malfunctions or human errors which have 
potentially harmed the environment. 
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(Hughes et al., 2000) Economic factors 
 Past and current expenditure for 
environmental equipment, 
facilities, and remediation and 
operating costs. 
 Future estimates of expenditures 
environmental equipment, 
facilities, and remediation and 
operating costs. 
 Accrued liabilities for future 
environmental expenditures. 
 Mentioned with other items. 
Litigation 
 Pending litigation. 
 Litigation settlement. 
 PRP status cited. 
 Number of sites. 
 Number of other PRPs. 
 Estimated costs. 
(Patten & Crampton, 
2004) 
 Discussion of exposures due to 
past or present remediation 
problems. 
 Specific disclosure that the 
company has been named as a 
potentially responsible party. 
 Disclosure of monetary accruals and/or 
expenses incurred for remediation. 
 Discussion of exposures due to other, non-
remediation-related environmental problems 
 
4.3. The specificity of environmental disclosures: Quantitative vs. qualitative disclosures. 
Ingram & Frazier (1980) classify environmental disclosures according to the specificity 
of the information disclosed. Furthermore, many researchers put more weight on numeric 
information (whether quantitative or economic information) since this type of information is 
easier to integrate into investment decisions; which makes it more relevant to investors 
(Wiseman, 1982; Cho & Patten, 2007; Aerts & Cormier, 2009). Prior research mainly focuses on 
comparing the disclosure of economic information to that of non-economic information. Aerts & 
Cormier (2009) examine the determinants of annual report environmental disclosures for a 
sample of US and Canadian firms. The authors distinguish between two categories of 
disclosures: economic and social based information. They find that industry membership is 
positively associated with disclosure where firms in environmentally sensitive industries disclose 
more economic and social information than those in non-environmentally sensitive industries. 
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They also find that firms’ news exposure – measured by the number of articles about the firm’s 
environmental performance - is positively associated with both types of disclosure. They find 
that Canadian firms disclose less economic information in comparison to US firms. This finding 
suggests that the difference between the regulatory environment in Canada and the US contribute 
to the disclosure practices in both countries. 
Relevance and reliability of quantitative and qualitative disclosures 
Using a sample of US and Canadian firms, Aerts & Cormier (2009) find that firms with 
low-environmental performance disclose more social information but not economic information. 
In contrast, Cho & Patten (2007) examine the disclosure of monetary vs. non-monetary 
information in 10-K reports. The authors suggest that the disclosure of monetary information is 
associated with higher levels of proprietary costs in comparison to non-monetary information; 
therefore, firms will only disclose monetary information if the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
costs. They find that – for the sample of firms in environmentally sensitive industries – the 
average disclosure of monetary information of the low-performers is higher than that of the high 
performers. They return their findings to the benefits of disclosing sensitive information in 
legitimizing the firm’s operations. They claim that the incentive is higher for the low-performers 
in comparison to the high-performers.  However, the authors could not find a difference between 
the samples of low and high performers when examining their disclosure of non-monetary 
information. They claim that the proprietary cost of disclosure for this type of information is low 
inducing the low and high performers to disclose. 
Moneva & Cuellar (2009) examine the value relevance of financial and non-financial 
environmental information for a sample of listed Spanish companies. Using Ohlson (1995) 
market valuation model, they find that the market integrates the disclosures of financial 
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information in their assessment of the firm’s market value of equity. Meanwhile, they also 
conclude that there is no association between the disclosure of non-financial information – such 
as the disclosure of information about the firm’s environmental policy or environmental 
management system - and the firm’s market valuation. Moneva & Cuellar (2009) also find that 
tightening of regulation – following the introduction of the 2002 standards for disclosure of 
environmental information increased the value relevance of financial disclosures.  
Aerts & Cormier (2009) examine whether the disclosure of economic and social 
information has an impact on the firm’s media legitimacy. Environmental media legitimacy 
measures whether firms are perceived positively or negatively by the media; therefore, it could 
be considered as a measure of acceptance of the firm’s environmental performance or – 
alternatively – a measure of the threat to the firm’s legitimacy. The authors posit that enhanced 
environmental disclosure is an antecedent to higher media legitimacy. The authors find that the 
disclosure of economic information positively impacts the firm’s media legitimacy but could not 
find a similar association between social disclosures and media legitimacy. These findings are 
aligned with the findings of Cho and Patten (2007) suggesting that firms disclose more sensitive 
information to restore their legitimacy. 
Using the economic and legitimacy frameworks, Cormier & Magnan (2013) examine the 
impact of firms’ environmental disclosures on analyst forecasts and firms’ media legitimacy. 
They regroup firms’ disclosures into two categories: economic related disclosures and 
sustainable development and environmental management disclosures. They find that both 
economic and sustainability disclosures improve analysts’ forecast and reduce their uncertainty. 
They also find that both types of disclosures reduce analyst consensus for firms with low 
environmental performance and firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries. Their 
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latest findings imply that the financial market perceives disclosures made by firms with high 
levels of performance or firms operating in environmentally less-sensitive industries as more 
indicative of their environmental performance. Furthermore, Cormier & Magnan (2013) also find 
that both economic and sustainability disclosures improve firms’ media legitimacy – measured 
by the Janis-Fadner coefficient – which subsequently increases analyst consensus and reduces 
forecast uncertainty. The findings of Cormier & Magnan (2013) suggest that firms’ 
environmental legitimacy has an impact on firm value and provides reconciliation between two 
views – economic and legitimacy theories – explaining firms’ disclosure decision. 
4.4. Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosures 
Berthelot et al. (2003) provide a thorough review of mandatory and voluntary 
environmental disclosures. Their study suggests that both types of disclosures were relevant to 
the financial markets but the authors cast their concern over the reliability of the information 
disclosed. The different measures of mandatory and voluntary disclosures are presented in 
previous section and will be discussed further here. 
This study provides a review of the main measures of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. The study shows the extent to which the disclosure of environmental expenditures, 
liabilities and litigations, and pollution abatement information is regulated by the SEC and 
FASB. As mentioned earlier, there are concerns that firms have a lot of discretion over the 
reporting of mandatory information by applying their judgment of whether the information is 
deemed relevant enough to be reported or not (GAO report, 2004).  On the other hand, the study 
reviews two measures of voluntary disclosures – environmental performance indicators and 
governance and environmental management information – which are primarily disclosed in 
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standalone reports. With the issuance of reporting guidelines –such as the GRI- the question is 
whether firms complied with the requirements of these guidelines or not. 
The study shows that – with the evolution of disclosure regulations – firms have 
continuously attempted to comply. For example, recent studies (Cho et al., 2012; Alciatore et al., 
2004) report cases where firms over-complied with regulations and disclosed immaterial 
information.  On the other hand, there is evidence that the voluntary disclosure of environmental 
information in standalone reports is still very low in comparison to the requirements under the 
reporting guidelines such as the GRI (Clarkson et al., 2008; Mordhart et al., 2002). 
Berthelot et al. (2003) conclude that both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are not 
reliable enough based on the association between disclosure and firm environmental 
performance. The Berthelot et al. (2003) review did not include the impact of reporting 
guidelines such as the GRI guideline issued in 2002. Following the issuance of the GRI guideline 
many firms adopted the guideline to design their environmental reports. Clarkson et al. (2008) 
examine the reliability of environmental information disclosed in standalone sustainability 
reports and finds that firms with high levels of environmental performance disclose more 
information than the low-performing firms. The results suggest the low-performing firms may 
not want to reveal their true environmental performance beyond what is required by regulatory 
requirements. 
On the contrary, using a sample of Australian firms, Clarkson et al. (2011b) find a 
negative association between firms’ environmental disclosures in GRI reports and firms’ 
environmental disclosures. They suggest that these findings are consistent with socio-political 
theories that predict that firms with low-environmental performance will use their environmental 
disclosures to legitimize their operations. They also find that the amount of hard disclosures 
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(verifiable information) included in low-performers’ reports are higher than those disclosed by 
the sample of high-performing firms. The results of Clarkson et al. (2011b) fuel the debate 
between proponents of economic theory and those of legitimacy theory about firms’ incentives to 
disclose environmental information. It also provides opportunities for research on the differences 
in voluntary disclosure practices at country level. 
Finally, Berthelot et al. (2003) provide evidence that both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures are value relevant. Recent research by Cormier & Magnan (2013) finds that both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are valued by the financial market as they increase 
analysts’ consensus and reduces forecast’s uncertainty. However, they also find that both 
measures of voluntary and mandatory disclosures reduce analysts’ consensus for firms with low-
environmental performance or firms located in environmentally sensitive industries implying 
these disclosures are not representative of firms’ environmental performance.    
In this review, I also extend the relevance of environmental disclosures to matters beyond 
financial relevance. Prior research shows that environmental disclosure is associated with 
subsequent environmental performance. For example, Mobus (2005) finds that the disclosure of 
mandatory information – mostly negative information in nature - is associated with improved 
future environmental performance. Using the legitimacy framework, Mobus (2005) explains that 
the fact that firms are obliged to disclosure induces these firms to improve their performance to 
comply with societal expectations. These findings suggest that mandatory environmental 
information is also relevant to different stakeholders who are mainly concerned about the levels 




This review contributes to our knowledge of the different types of environmental 
information disclosed, as well as the regulation and the guidelines that shaped these disclosures. 
It also provides researchers with a list of the different measures of environmental disclosure used 
in prior studies. The study provides a review of five environmental themes: environmental 
capital expenditures, environmental liabilities, pollution abatement, environmental performance 
indicators, and governance and management systems. It also provides a review of four 
dimensions that could be utilized to assess the comprehensiveness of disclosure. There are other 
themes of environmental disclosure – not included in this study - that provide opportunities for 
future research. For example, there is still a need for more research on how to measure and report 
compliance with environmental regulation and whether the information disclosed is value 
relevant. For example, a study by Bhat (1998) finds that compliance with environmental 
regulations – measured by the amount of environmental penalties - is associated with higher 
levels of profits, negating suggestions that stringent environmental regulations would lead to a 
decline in firms’ profitability. Similarly, there is also a need for more research on many types of 
environmental information such as firms’ vision and strategy (Clarkson et al., 2008) and firms’ 
environmental profile including an assessment of industry’s environmental performance 
(Clarkson et al., 2008; Marshall & Brown, 2003). Although, these themes were included in 
different content indexes, there is no research to inform us about what information needs to be 
disclosed, how the stakeholders value these disclosures, and whether firms report this 
information objectively.   
The main theoretical contribution of this review study is that it reconciles the tension 
between two theories – legitimacy and economic theories – that explain the disclosure decision 
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of environmental information and shows that disclosure of environmental information could not 
be attributed to one single theory. Over the years, environmental regulation (Alciatore et al., 
2004; Stanny, 1998; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo et., 2009), internal institutional 
factors such as the adoption of an environmental management system (Rankin et al., 2011), 
economic demand for environmental information (Li et al., 1997) and firms’ need to legitimize 
their environmental operations (Cho et al., 2012) have all played roles in firms’ disclosure 
decision and influenced the amount and type of information disclosed. The study shows that any 
assessment of corporate environmental disclosures should not be performed in a comprehensive 
manner; otherwise, it may lead to doubtful conclusions on why firms release their proprietary 
information.  
In fact, different types of environmental information could be disclosed to achieve 
different goals. For example, a review of research on the disclosure of environmental liabilities 
shows that economic factors are main determinants of firms’ disclosure decision. As found by Li 
et al. (1997), the importance of the information – based on the firm’s propensity to pollute – and 
the perceptions of shareholders about the amount of information withheld by the firm lead firms 
to disclose more information. The firm’s exposure to higher litigation cost lowers the disclosure 
threshold which explains why firms avoid full disclosure. However, it seems that partial 
disclosure is not an effective legitimization tool since investors are actively engaged in searching 
this type of information and that they usually overvalue the firm’s environmental liabilities than 
that disclosed by the firm (Barth & McNichols, 1994; Campbell et al., 2003). There is evidence 
that partial disclosure of firms’ environmental liabilities is still an effective tool to reduce 
investment risk (Campbell et al., 2003). 
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In comparison, prior research does not provide an economic model to explains why firms 
disclose environmental expenditure information albeit the fact that this information is valued by 
the financial market (Clarkson et al., 2004; Johnston, 2005).  However, the low reliability of 
forecasted capital expenditures - high spread between forecasted and actual amounts - (Patten, 
2005) and the lack of significant association between actual environmental expenditures and 
future environmental performance (Cho et al., 2012) suggest that the disclosure of environmental 
capital expenditures is used as a legitimization tool to provide the impression that firms are 
allocating funds to improve their environmental performance. Nevertheless, there is a lack of 
research on the effect of disclosing environmental expenditures on firms’ legitimacy and whether 
this type of disclosure is an effective legitimization tool. 
Meanwhile, there is no model to examine the determinants of environmental governance 
and management system disclosures. There is little or no evidence that the existence of these 
structures has improved environmental performance or that investors are able to integrate this 
type of information in their investment decisions. On the contrary, the few studies about this type 
of disclosure suggest that firms disclose environmental governance and management information 
to portray an image that the firm is concerned with corporate social and environmental 
responsibilities (Rodrigue et al., 2013). There is still a need for more research on this type of 
disclosure to confirm whether it is used by firms as an impression management tool or whether 
the information disclosed has real economic value. 
In brief, legitimacy and economic theories both play a role in explaining the disclosure of 
different types of environmental information. The extent to which each theory explains the 
corporate disclosure of environmental information depends on the type of information disclosed. 
On one hand, research shows that market demand for environmental liabilities motivates the 
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disclosure of such information and that this type of disclosure could not be used as an effective 
impression management tool since, in the absence of disclosure, investors will engage in active 
search for information. On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that the disclosure of 
firm’s governance and management system information has an economic value which may 
suggest that the disclosure of such information is mainly influenced by legitimacy factors.   
I would also like to highlight that regulation has played a major role in shaping the 
disclosure of environmental information (see Stanny, 1998; Alciatore et al., 2004; Moneva & 
Cuellar, 2009). The SEC and FASB have continuously issued new regulations to enhance the 
reporting of financial implications resulting from firms’ environmental performances such as the 
disclosure of environmental liabilities, fines and litigation, environmental capital expenditure, 
and descriptive information related to the firm’s environmental risk. Research shows that 
regulations increase the value relevance of environmental disclosures since it provides a signal 
that these disclosures contain information about the firm’s future cash flow. Moreover, firms 
have a lot of discretion over the assessment of whether the information is deemed relevant 
enough to be reported or not. Previous studies show that new regulations resulted in reducing this 
discretion. For example, Alciatore et al. (2004) find that firms with lower levels of 
environmental liabilities and capital expenditures started to disclose their private information 
following the issuance of SAB 92 and FRR 36.  
Furthermore, many studies suggest that regulation of firms’ environmental performance 
has also increased the value relevance of voluntarily disclosure. For example, Prado-Lorenzo et 
al. (2009) and Freedman and Jaggi (2005) find that the disclosure of GHG information was 
higher in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol in comparison to non-ratifying countries; 
83 
 
implying that firms realize that the information is more relevant when they become subject to 
higher threat of litigation.  
The study shows that there are still concerns over the measurement and reporting of 
quantitative disclosures like firms’ discretion vis-à-vis the aggregation or disaggregation of these 
measures; an issue that firms have been using to manipulate the information reported and present 
the firm’s environmental performance in a positive light. For example, firms may choose to 
disaggregate their environmental liabilities in order to avoid the thresholds at which reporting 
becomes mandatory (GAO report, 2004). Meanwhile, firms may choose to aggregate their 
environmental performance indicators at the firm-level rather than the site-level to avoid 
reporting incidents where performance is not meeting expectations. Therefore, there is a need for 
more guidelines or regulations about the required level of aggregation/disaggregation to prevent 
firms from manipulating the information disclosed. 
Another issue that could be of interest to academics is the difference in value relevance 
between the different disclosure themes and how it impacts environmental disclosure research 
that use content indexes. For example, Clarkson et al. (2004) show that the market positively 
values the disclosure of environmental capital expenditures for low-polluting firms while 
environmental liabilities are found to be negatively associated with firm value (Campbell et al., 
2003). These findings cast doubt about the usefulness of content indexes in valuation studies and 
how to interpret their findings knowing that the index is composed of themes that may be valued 
differently by the market. 
There are many issues to be addressed in future research to improve our understanding of 
environmental disclosures. In general, environmental disclosures could either be classified as 
output measures of the firm’s environmental performance - such as financial and non-financial 
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indicators - or input measures to this performance - such as the firm’s governance and 
management systems in place. This review of environmental disclosure studies shows that there 
is a shift from early research of financial indicators (environmental liabilities, expenditures, etc.), 
followed by research of non-financial indicators, to research of how firms internally manage 
their environmental operations. This development suggests that, over time, stakeholders have 
been demanding more information - beyond financial and non-financial disclosures – about 
firms’ management. The study indicates that there is an ambiguity in defining firms’ 
environmental governance and management structures and the link between these structures and 
firms’ environmental performance. There is also a need to understand how stakeholders process 
information about firms’ environmental management and how it impacts their assessment of 
firms’ environmental performance.  
Finally, there is a need for more research of the time dimension of environmental 
disclosures. First, researchers need to be able to classify disclosures according to their time 
orientation and whether the disclosure is a reflection of past performance or an indication of 
future performance. Second, research studies need to examine the reliability of future-oriented 
environmental disclosures and whether these disclosures are reflected in an improved 
performance or not. Third, valuation studies need to separate past and future oriented disclosures 
and to examine the value relevance of each component separately since the risks associated with 
those two types are different. 
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Chapter 3 – Reexamining the Association between Environmental 
Disclosure and Environmental Performance 
1. Introduction 
Whether firms’ environmental disclosures are informative and reliable or elusive and 
opportunistic is an unresolved question in accounting research. Researchers attempt to answer 
that question by investigating the association between a firm’s environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance and by assessing the motivations of firms to disclose such 
information. Finding an association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance casts doubt on the reliability of environmental reporting (Berthelot et al, 2003) and 
provides support for increased regulation and higher level of reporting standards’ enforcement.   
Previous studies find contrasting results about the incentives of firms to disclose 
environmental information and whether the information disclosed is representative of this 
performance.  Some studies suggest that firms with high environmental performance disclose 
more environmental information due to the economic benefits emanating from the positive news 
integrated in their disclosures (Al-Tuwaijiri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). Other studies find 
that firms with low-environmental performance disclose more information to mitigate the 
scrutiny from outside stakeholders and maintain the legitimacy of their operations
20
. These 
findings suggest that we cannot determine firm’s environmental performance based on the 
disclosure magnitude. Alternatively, research finds that firms’ size and industry membership 
                                                 
20
 See Cho & Patten (2007), Fekrat et al. (1996), Guthrie & Parker (1989), Hughes et al. (2000), Hughes et al. 
(2001), Patten (2002), Rockness et al. (1986), Rockness (1985). 
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explain firms’ environmental disclosure; whereas large firms and firms operating in 
environmentally sensitive industries disclose more information (Patten, 2002; Cho et al., 2012). I 
reckon that prior research involves some theoretical and methodological issues that lead to the 
controversy. Therefore, I reexamine the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance
21
 to determine if firms’ environmental disclosures are biased and 
understand the reasons behind partial reporting. 
1.1. Motivation for examining the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance 
In this essay, I suggest that the contrasting findings of prior research are due to two main 
reasons: 
1. There is a lack of understanding about the motivations of the high and low-performers to 
disclose environmental information; which is fundamental to assess the credibility of the 
information disclosed.  
2. Prior research, examining environmental disclosure in different media such as annual, 10-K, 
or sustainability reports, disregards the disclosure requirements and the level of enforcement 
associated with these media; thus, rendering the findings of prior research incomparable. 
From a theoretical point of view, previous studies present two polarizing views of firms’ 
incentives to disclose environmental information. Using a legitimacy theory framework, some 
studies suggest that low-performers disclose more environmental information to legitimize their 
                                                 
21
 For the purpose of this study, I used the KLD ratings as a measure of environmental performance. KLD ratings 
provide a general assessment of the firm’s environmental operations, recycling activities, energy consumption, 
emissions, products, environmental strategy and management, and others. 
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actions in response to public pressures (Fekrat et al., 1996; Hughes et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 
2001; Neu et al., 1998; Patten, 2002; Walden & Stagliano, 2004). On the other hand, Al-Tuwaijri 
et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2008) find that economic benefits of disclosure drive high 
performing firms to disclose more information. For now, research is still inconclusive on what 
are the main drivers of environmental disclosure. None of these studies provide empirical 
evidence about the determinants of environmental disclosure for the high and low performing 
firms; they use the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance to infer firms’ motivation to disclose.  
These polarized views contradict the findings of other studies showing that both 
economic and legitimacy incentives explain the environmental disclosures of firms (see Aerts & 
Cormier, 2009; Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008; Cormier et al., 2005; Cormier & Magnan, 
1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Neu et al., 1998). In this study, I attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature about the association between disclosure and performance by studying the motivation 
of firms with low and high environmental performance to disclose their proprietary 
environmental information. This study also extends the work by (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; 
Cormier et al., 2005; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Neu et al., 1998) by 
testing their environmental disclosure models using samples of firms with different levels of 
environmental performance. 
Second, the contradicting findings of previous studies may be due to measuring 
environmental disclosure in different media (Cho et al., 2012). There is little consensus between 
researchers about the importance of each media in disclosing environmental information. While 
some scholars focus on annual reports as the primary source of environmental information (see 
Neu et al., 1998); others consider disclosures made in 10-K reports or sustainability reports (Al-
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Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). There are differences between the disclosure 
requirements and the level of enforcement associated with these media – as shown in Appendix 
A. Hope (2003) emphasizes the importance of enforcing accounting standards and states that 
enforcement is equally important to the standards themselves. He finds that enforcement leads to 
firms respecting accounting rules. Previous studies on the association between disclosure and 
performance measure environmental disclosures in either annual, 10-K, or sustainability reports; 
thus; rendering their results difficult to compare  In this study, I investigate the association 
between disclosure and performance in each disclosure media to understand how the different 
disclosure requirements and different levels of standards’ enforcement influence the firm’s 
disclosure decision and hence reflect on the relation between disclosure and performance. By 
comparing disclosures in different media, I believe that this study contributes to the ongoing 
debate about whether more regulatory requirements and higher levels of enforcement are 
required or not. 
In an attempt to explain the association between disclosure incentives, environmental 
performance, disclosure channels, and environmental disclosure, Figure-1 presents a proposed 
disclosure model. Firms’ environmental disclosures are motivated by the economic and 
legitimacy incentives of disclosure (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Cormier et al., 2005; Cormier & 
Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Neu et al., 1998). Verrecchia (1983) suggests that 
economic incentives – or costs-and-benefits of disclosure - are derived by demand for 
environmental disclosure from the firm’s financial stakeholders such as investors, creditors, or 
other stakeholders who require information on how the firm’s environmental performance 
impacts its cash flow. In other words, low demand for environmental information implies that the 
costs of disclosure would outweigh its benefits and the firm may decide to refrain from the 
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disclosure of its private information. I suggest that both the economic and legitimacy incentives 
are moderated by the firm’s environmental performance. In other words, the level of 
performance would determine the sensitivity of the information and hence the benefit and cost of 
disclosure. Furthermore, the level of environmental performance would determine firms’ need to 
defend the legitimacy of their operations if it becomes questioned by non-financial stakeholders 
(stakeholders interested in understanding the harm caused by firms’ operations to the 
environment such as environmentalist groups, the general public, or regulators). Hence, based on 
its economic and legitimacy incentives, firms make a careful decision whether to disclose or not 
(the amount of disclosure) and what to disclose (the amount of proprietary information 
disclosed).  
To communicate its environmental information to the financial and non-financial 
stakeholders, firms use the available communication media (annual reports, 10-K reports, 
sustainability reports, websites, or others). Some of these media are guided by disclosure 
requirements (for example annual reports, 10-K reports, or GRI guided sustainability reports) 
and different levels of enforcement of shareholders’ protection laws. The disclosure guidelines 
and enforcement levels provide further moderation to the disclosure decision and determine the 
outcome environmental disclosure (Hope, 2003; Kothari, 2000). In this case, the outcome 
disclosure could be measured by the amount of disclosure and the level of disclosure of 
proprietary information. Therefore, the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance captures the level of bias in the low and high performing firms’ 
disclosures due to the effects of economic and legitimacy factors. 
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1.2. Objective of this study 
In this study, I examine the motivation of firms with low and high environmental 
performance to disclose – or retain - their proprietary environmental information. I also 
reexamine the association between disclosure and performance to assess the credibility of 
environmental disclosures and whether they are representative of the firm’s environmental 
performance. To achieve this objective I conduct three levels of analysis. 
First, I study the information disclosed in annual reports, 10-K reports, and sustainability 
reports over the period from 1997 to 2010. The objective of this analysis is to understand the 
type of information disclosed in each medium and to determine if it is necessary to consider the 
disclosures made in the three media when studying the association between disclosure and 
performance – the results of this analysis are presented in Appendix E. 
Second, I reexamine the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance in a setting that addresses previous methodological shortcomings in measuring 
environmental disclosure. For a better definition of environmental disclosure, I use a multi-
dimensional disclosure index that combines the different disclosure themes in prominent studies 
by Aerts et al. (2008), Clarkson et al. (2008), Patten & Crampton (2004), Walden & Stagliano 
(2004) and Wiseman (1982). This disclosure index measures the amount of disclosure by the 
number of environmental topics disclosed (defined as total disclosure). Since total disclosure is 
an aggregate measure, I use additional measures to proxy for the level of proprietary and non-
proprietary information in total disclosure. These measures include the disclosure of verifiable 
versus non-verifiable information (hard vs. soft information), the disclosure of negative versus 
positive information, and the disclosure of quantitative versus qualitative information.   In 
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addition, I consider the disclosure of economic information; a type of disclosure that should be 
relevant to the firm’s investors. The study considers environmental disclosures made by a sample 
of 78 firms during the period from 1997 to 2010 to capture the continuous variation in 
disclosure. I conduct this analysis on the information disclosed in annual, 10-K, and 
sustainability reports separately and on the information disclosed in the three reports combined. 
Third, I examine whether firms’ incentives to disclose environmental information differ 
between groups of firms with low and high environmental performance. In other words, prior 
research shows that economic costs and benefits and legitimacy incentives influence the 
disclosure decision of firms. However, the question remains whether these factors have the same 
influence on the disclosure decision of both low and high environmental performers. To answer 
this question, I extend previous analysis and study how economic and legitimacy factors 
influence environmental disclosures of low and high performing firms using a disclosure model 
based on the findings of previous research (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Aerts et al., 2008; Cormier 
& Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Neu et al., 1998).  
1.3. The importance of this research question 
Environmental information is valued by investors since low-environmental performance 
entails large costs for firms to comply with regulations (Belkaoui, 1976; Ingram, 1978; Jaggi & 
Freedman, 1982; Jaggi & Freedman, 1992; Clarkson et al., 2004; Johnston, 2005; Spicer, 1978). 
Therefore, environmental disclosures should be indicative of the firm’s environmental 
performance making the association between disclosure and performance indispensable for 
financial markets to remain efficient.  
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More specifically, mapping between environmental disclosure and performance is 
fundamental for the growth and survival of the relatively new socially responsible investment 
(SRI) market with many investors mulling over channeling their funds into sustainable firms 
(Lewis, 2001). Listed firms in that market need to show commitment to sustainability issues to 
avoid higher financing costs (Heinkel, Kraus, & Zechner, 2001). The SRI market is still at an 
early growth stage and there are difficulties understanding the basis of inclusion of firms into 
these stock indices. Ziegler & Schröder (2010) suggest that the Dow Jones sustainability indices 
rely on financial indicators in order to qualify firms for inclusion. If true, it may cast doubt about 
the performance of social indices and whether listed firms exhibit the desired social and 
environmental performance. Environmental disclosure may provide an assurance to investors 
that these firms are more committed to sustainability issues. Understanding the association 
between a firm’s environmental disclosure and its environmental performance – as well as 
understanding firms’ disclosure incentives - provides assurance to shareholders that investments 
are efficiently channeled; such investment efficiency is important to sustain the growth of that 
market and help firms avoid under-pricing (Akerlof, 1970).  
1.4. Contributions 
This study contributes to the environmental disclosure literature in many ways. First, it 
fills a gap in the literature by extending previous economic-based disclosure models (e.g. 
Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003) to understand whether they explain the 
incentives of the low and high performing firms to disclose environmental information. There 
has been a continuous debate between proponents of economic theory who suggest that corporate 
environmental disclosure is fuelled by shareholders’ demand for information and advocates of 
legitimacy theory who believe that it is an opportunistic practice adopted by firms that aim for 
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maintaining their legitimacy by providing a colorful picture of their environmental operations 
(Cormier & Magnan, 2011).  To contribute to the debate, this research examines the incentives of 
firms with high and low environmental performance to disclose their proprietary environmental 
information.  The findings of this research do not support the cynical view that environmental 
reporting is an opportunistic practice that is solely meant to portray firms’ environmental 
activities in a positive light. In contrast, it provides assurances over the integrity of the disclosure 
process and suggests that – at least – mandatory disclosures are free of bias.  
In brief, the results of this study provides investors and regulators with empirical 
evidence that environmental disclosures of low-performing firms comply with regulatory 
disclosure requirements; however, they have less propensity to voluntarily disclose information 
about their environmental operations. The findings of this study also show that the presence of 
environmental guidelines encourages firms with high-environmental performance to voluntarily 
reveal proprietary information; thus, regulators should increase the adoption of these guidelines 
to eliminate discrepancies between the disclosures of high and low-performing firms.  
  Second, the study provides a thorough analysis of environmental disclosures over a 
period of fourteen years - from 1997 to 2010. During this period, the environmental disclosure 
process witnessed many changes including an increase in the publication of stand-alone 
environmental reports and the adoption of voluntary reporting guidelines (e.g. Global Reporting 
Initiative – GRI). Furthermore, this is the first study to examine and compare disclosures in 
annual reports, 10-K reports and sustainability reports. The findings of this research show that 
annual reports are not the primary media of disclosure environmental information; thus, future 
research should embody disclosures in 10-K reports and sustainability reports. It also raises 
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questions for future research about the role of annual reports and whether it is still an important 
source of environmental information.  
Furthermore, the results of this study highlight the importance of regulatory enforcement 
of disclosure guidelines in reducing firms’ discretion over the reporting process. For example, 
the lack of significant difference between the 10-K reports’ disclosures of firms with high and 
low environmental performance suggesting that increased SEC scrutiny may lead to a reduction 
in firms’ discretion over information reported. 
Finally, Hausman & Taylor (1981) emphasize the importance of controlling for 
unobservable effects such as firm or time specific effects; which is a shortcoming of cross-
sectional and longitudinal analysis. By controlling for some of a firm’s specific effect such as 
industry membership, Patten (2002) was able to achieve different results from those presented by 
early research on the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance. However, I argue that Patten (2002) neither provides full control of all firms’ 
unobservable effects – due to a lack of required degrees of freedom to control for each firm - nor 
does he control for time specific effects which is also a shortcoming of cross sectional studies. 
The results of the panel data analysis – employed by this study – shows that there are significant 
firm and time specific effects. By controlling for these effects, this study provides more credible 
results about the association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance. 
1.5. Structure of the study 
Section 2 is a literature review of prior studies that examine the association between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance. In this review, I present the conflict 
between the results of the different studies and analyze the shortcomings that led to this 
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controversy. In this section, I also provide the hypothesis development. In section 3, I present the 
disclosure model used to examine the association between disclosure and performance and the 
methodology employed. In section 4, I show the results of this study. I present a descriptive 
study of the information disclosed in annual reports, 10-K reports, and sustainability reports as 
well as the development of environmental disclosures during the fourteen years between 1997 
and 2010 (details are presented in Appendix E). I also present the results of studying the 
association between environmental disclosure – in all three reports – and environmental 
performance. Finally, I present the results of studying the incentives of the two groups of firms to 
disclose their information to understand whether the drivers of disclosure differ between the low 
and high performers. Section 5 discusses the results and provides recommendations. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Disclosure of environmental information 
According to previous research on the determinants of environmental disclosure, firms’ 
decision to disclose their proprietary environmental information is better explained by economic 
and legitimacy theories. Firms need to simultaneously satisfy the information needs of their 
financial shareholders – who demand to know how the firms’ environmental performances affect 
future cash flows - while maintaining the legitimacy of their operations in the eyes of the non-
financial stakeholders who are primarily interested in understanding the impact of firms’ 
operations on the environment (Cormier & Magnan, 2013).  
Economic theory suggests that the demand for environmental information originates from 
the firm’s current and potential investors and from its outside stakeholders.  Investors demand 
the disclosure of all relevant information that affects their investment decision. To determine 
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their disclosure policy, firms evaluate the costs and benefits of that disclosure. Diamond (1985) 
suggests that in the absence of information, traders will get involved in private information 
gathering which increases the cost of trading. Therefore, by releasing its private information, 
firms benefit from reducing the cost of information gathering for all traders, increase their 
marginal utility and improve the trading process. Similarly, Botosan (1997) finds that higher 
levels of voluntary disclosure are associated with lower levels of cost of capital. She suggests 
that voluntary disclosure reduces the transaction cost related to private information gathering 
which increases the demand for the security; thus, increasing the price of the security and 
reducing its cost of capital.  
On the other hand, Verrecchia (1983) associates the disclosure of proprietary information 
with the cost of disclosing proprietary information that is potentially threatening to the firm’s 
competitive position. In that case, the market may react less-negatively to the withholding of the 
proprietary information which will induce the firm to adopt a non-disclosure policy. For 
example, Scott (1994) finds that disclosure of pension plan information is negatively associated 
with costs associated with increased scrutiny from labor unions.  
Most importantly, Verracchia (1983) suggests that the firm’s disclosure policy – decided 
by the costs and benefits of disclosure - is determined simultaneously with the investor’s demand 
for information. For example, Botosan (1997) finds that there is no association between 
disclosure and cost of capital for firms with higher analyst following. This finding may imply 
that higher analyst following provides a substitute for the firm’s disclosure; thus, reducing the 
demand for the disclosure of private information. In the case of environmental disclosure, it is 
difficult to determine the level of demand for each type of information disclosed. However, it 
could be assumed that firms with low-environmental performance possess more proprietary 
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information than the high-performing firms since the disclosure of this information could entail 
negative reaction from regulatory bodies; which could affect the firm’s competing position and 
cash-flow. 
From a different perspective, environmental performance of firms from environmentally 
sensitive industries may draw the attention of non-financial stakeholders; which include 
members of the society concerned about firms’ environmental performances, environmentalists, 
or regulatory bodies (Neu, 1998). Pressures-to-conform from non-financial stakeholders may 
represent a threat to the legitimacy of the firm’s operation. Proponents of the stakeholder theory 
assert that, depending on the level of pressure from the non-financial stakeholders, firms adopt a 
disclosure policy to mitigate the effect of that threat (Gray et al., 1995). Lindblom (1994) 
suggests that firms adopt one of three disclosure strategies to legitimize their actions. Firms may 
attempt (1) to inform the public, (2) to change its perceptions, or (3) to divert stakeholders’ 
attention from its corporate actions. In the context of environmental disclosures and using the 
legitimacy framework, O’Donovan (2002) finds that firms may resort to four different disclosure 
tactics in response to strong threats to their legitimacy. They may avoid the disclosure of 
sensitive information, alter the perceptions of the public, alter the social values, or conform to 
social values and reveal their private information. In brief, legitimacy theory predicts that firms 
may revert to different sets of disclosure decisions to maintain the legitimacy of their operations.  
These different disclosure strategies were demonstrated by Falconbridge – a Canadian company 
working in the mining and smelting of nickel – in response to tightening of government 
regulations for the emissions of sulfur dioxide during the period from 1964 to 1991 (Buhr,1998).  
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2.2. Previous literature on the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance 
Empirical research on the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance provide contrasting results. Proponents of legitimacy theory predict 
that firms disclose environmental information to maintain the legitimacy of their social contract 
which mandates them to provide valuable services and to operate according to accepted social 
norms (Deegan, 2002; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995a; Gray, 
Javad, Power, & Sinclair, 2001). This group of studies finds that social and political pressures 
are associated with the level of environmental information disclosed (Neu et al., 1998). The 
second school of thoughts relies on economic theories to explain firms’ incentives to disclose 
environmental information. They find that environmental disclosures are motivated by market 
forces meaning that the disclosure process is subject to economic cost and benefit analysis 
(Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Gordon, 2001; Cormier & Magnan, 2003).  
By examining the amount of information disclosed, previous studies try to infer whether 
the incentives to disclose environmental information differ between groups of low-performers 
and high-performers. Early studies (e.g. Fekrat et al., 1996; Freedman & Wasley, 1990; Ingram 
& Frazier, 1980; Rockness et al., 1986; Wiseman, 1982) do not provide conclusive results since 
they find very weak or almost no association between the level of environmental performance 
and environmental disclosures of firms by examining annual report disclosures. Patten (2002) 
points out some shortcomings in these studies which fail to control for firm size and industry 
effects.  
Results of environmental disclosure research fall into three distinct categories. The first 
set of results suggests that disclosures of low-performing firms are elusive and aim at portraying 
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them the way they would like to be seen rather than what they are. Firms adopt different 
disclosure strategies to gain or maintain legitimacy. According to Lindblom (1994), changing 
perceptions of the relevant public without changing a firm’s performance is among these 
strategies. Hughes et al. (2001) label this process as “legitimization” in contrast to “legitimacy”. 
The latter describes a situation where the firm discloses information that reflects its true 
performance. For instance, Rockness et al. (1986) examine the disclosures of chemical firms 
involved in Superfund sites. They find that these firms refrain from disclosing information about 
their low-environmental performance. Only 13 firms out of 21 make annual report disclosures 
about the environmental waste disposal and no firms disclose their involvement in Superfund 
Sites. Only three firms with better environmental performance (involved in 1 or 2 Superfund 
sites) disclose general information about the amount of waste disposed. These findings echo 
those of Deegan & Gordon (1996) and Deegan & Rankin (1996) who, using a sample of 
Australian firms prosecuted by the environmental protection authorities, find that these firms are 
biased towards the disclosure of positive information about their environmental performance 
while concealing negative ones. Following an examination of annual report disclosures, Hughes 
et al. (2000) find that firms with low-environmental performance to voluntarily disclose more 
positive information to offset the effect of negative disclosures made in mandatory sections. 
Finally, Rockness (1985) finds that participants in a field experiment are not able to rank firms 
according to their environmental disclosures in annual reports meaning that low-performing 
firms were successful in altering the participants’ perceptions about their performance. 
The second literature relies on the notion that social pressures and the firm’s need to 
maintain its legitimacy encourage low-performing firms to disclose more proprietary 
information. Patten (2002) examines the annual reports of 131 companies. Using the Toxic 
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Release Inventory (TRI) as a surrogate for environmental performance, Patten (2002) finds that 
annual report disclosure for 131 firms - using the Wiseman (1982) index and a line count - is 
negatively related to the level of environmental performance meaning that the low-performers 
tend to disclose more information about their environmental activities. Using a single disclosure 
score, Patten (2002) does not provide enough evidence about the level of proprietary information 
disclosed. Cho & Patten (2007) observe managerial actions and the decision to disclose monetary 
information. They find that in the sample of non-environmentally sensitive firms, i.e. those 
subject to less scrutiny, the low-performers tend to disclose more non-monetary information than 
their matched sample of high performers. Meanwhile low-performers in sensitive industries 
would disclose more monetary information than do the high-performers to deter public attention 
since monetary information is valued by the market.  
The third group of studies supports the proposition that environmental disclosures are 
motivated by economic cost and benefit analysis. Proponents of economic theories suggest that 
high-performing firms gain economic benefits from disclosing information about their 
environmental performance that offsets the costs associated with the disclosure of such 
proprietary information; assuming that the cost of disclosure is lower in the case of high-
performing firms (Scott, 1994; Verrecchia, 1983). Hence, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) find that 
firms with high-environmental performance disclose more negative information about their 
waste disposal and Potentially Responsible Party designation (PRP) in their 10-K reports. 
Similarly, Clarkson et al. (2008) find that a sample of high-performing firms discloses more 
verifiable information –described as hard disclosures – in their sustainability reports and on their 
websites. Proponents of economic theory ignore the non-disclosure cost associated with the low-
performers. Non-disclosure of relevant environmental information may expose the low-
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performing firms to high financial costs due to the creation of information asymmetry gap 
between management and the market and the cost of information gathering on the part of the 
investor (Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Diamond, 1985). 
In brief, one string of research suggests that firms’ disclosures are motivated by their 
incentives to legitimize their actions and casts the doubts about the reliability of the information 
disclosed in terms of portraying an accurate image of the firm’s environmental operations. The 
findings of this literature suggest that low-performing firms will only disclose more positive and 
less-proprietary information (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Hughes et al., 
2000). The second string of research agrees that legitimacy incentives are the main drivers of 
environmental disclosures for low-performing firms; however, this literature is still inconclusive 
how these incentives impact the level of proprietary information disclosed. The findings of Cho 
& Patten (2007) suggest that the need to legitimize their actions may in fact derive the low-
performing firms to disclose more proprietary information – monetary information in that case. 
The third literature adopts a view that economic costs and benefits are the main determinants 
environmental disclosures. They argue that the benefits of disclosure are higher and the costs are 
lower for high-performing firms. They find that the high-performing firms are willing to disclose 
more negative information (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) and more verifiable information (Clarkson 
et al., 2008). 
These findings raise two important issues about firms’ environmental disclosures. First, 
Prior research does not provide empirical evidence about the determinants of environmental 
disclosures of low and high environmental performers. Therefore, there is a need to understand 
the disclosure motivation of each group. Second, research on the association between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance is based on the amount of information 
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disclosed. The interpretation that low-environmental performers disclose more information to 
legitimize their actions does not fully conform to the broad legitimacy theory framework. 
According to this framework, O'Donovan (2002) shows that firms adopt different disclosure 
strategies including disclosure avoidance, disclosure of self-serving information that shapes 
social values and perceptions, and disclosure of information that shows compliance with public 
values. As a result, legitimacy theory does not necessarily predict more disclosure but sometimes 
less disclosure of sensitive or negative information that could threaten the firm’s legitimacy (see 
also de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). Therefore, there is a need to assess environmental 
disclosure beyond the current metrics that focus on the amount of information disclosed. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
The association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance 
Although the association between firms’ environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance has been previously examined, the results of previous studies find conflicting 
results to whether the low or the high-environmental performers provide more disclosures; 
hence, creating a debate about the incentives of each group of firms to disclose their proprietary 
information (see Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; Al-Tuwaijiri et al., 2004; Clakson et al., 
2008). As previously discussed, there are two main theories that explain the disclosure 
motivation of firms. Economic theory predicts whether firms would disclose or withhold 
proprietary information based on the cost-and-benefit of disclosure (Diamond, 1985; Verrecchia, 
1983; Botosan, 1997). The legitimacy theory also predicts that firms would adopt a disclosure 
strategy to defend any threats to the legitimacy of its operations (Lindblom, 1994). Prior 
empirical research confirms that both economic and legitimacy incentives influence the 
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disclosure strategy of firms (see Neu et. Al, 1998; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003; Aerts et al., 2008; Aerts & Cormier, 2009). How these incentives affect the 
disclosures of the low and high performers is still debatable. Empirical research on the 
association between disclosure and performance land contrasting results. Al-Tuwaijiri et al. 
(2004) finds that firms with high environmental performance disclose more information in their 
10-K reports about their remediation efforts. They suggest that the high-performers receive 
economic benefits from disclosing their proprietary information which bears good news to the 
market. Clarkson et al. (2008) find similar results in their examination of firms’ sustainability 
reports.  
A second string of research finds that low-performers disclose more information maintain 
the legitimacy of their operations (Patten, 2002). Cho & Patten (2007) suggest that - under 
pressures to legitimize their actions – firms disclose more proprietary information about their 
environmental performance. The third line of research suggests that disclosures of low-
performers are elusive and attempt to portray a positive image of the firms’ environmental 
performance. Some studies suggest that low-performers withhold negative information about 
their environmental activities (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996) and other 
studies suggest that low-performers would only disclose information that portrays a favorable 
image of the firm’s environmental profile and enhances their reputation (Rockness, 1986; Cho et 
al., 2012). In summary, research provides confounding results about the amount and quality 
(level of proprietary information) of disclosure of low and high performers. 
Firms’ disclosure motivations are affected by economic and legitimacy incentives. 
Environmental performance moderates the effect of these incentives. Based on the information 
content determined by the firm’s performance and the level of demand for information, firms 
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would assess the costs-and-benefits of disclosure and adopt a disclosure policy that would 
maximize its economic gains (Li et al., 1997). On the other hand, the level of performance 
determines the level of threat to the firm’s legitimacy which in return would define the firm’s 
disclosure policy. I suggest that the association between disclosure and performance represents 
the level of bias resulting from the firm’s disclosure policy that is mutually determined by the 
interaction of the economic and legitimacy incentives. Therefore, I hypothesize that there is an 
association between disclosure and performance; though, it is difficult to determine the outcome 
of the disclosure policy of the low and high performers.  
H1: there is an association between the level of environmental disclosure and the level of 
environmental performance. 
Enforcement and the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance 
Firms release their private environmental information through three disclosure channels: 
annual, 10-K, or sustainability reports. There are differences between these disclosure channels 
in terms of disclosure requirements and the level of enforcement associated with each disclosure 
channel. Kothari (2000, p. 95) explains the role of enforcement of shareholders protection laws 
and threat of litigation on the quality of disclosure. He emphasizes that enforcement is equally 
important to the quality of the accounting standards. Although there is little empirical research 
on the impact of enforcement of shareholders rights on disclosure, Hope (2003) finds that higher 
levels of enforcement of shareholder protection laws are associated with higher quality reporting 
which is translated into higher forecast accuracy. In terms of environmental disclosures, there is 
a general agreement that there is lax enforcement of environmental disclosure requirements; 
providing firms with discretion over the disclosure decision (Government Accounting Office 
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(GAO), 2004). Gamble et al. (1995) suggest that there is little guidance and no evidence of 
enforcement from the FASB towards the disclosure of environmental information in annual 
reports. In comparison, they suggest that the SEC mandate more detailed disclosures in 10-K 
reports. The 2004 GAO report shows that the SEC conducts a random review of annual 10-K 
filings (SEC reviews 8% to 18% of all filings). In case of non-compliance with disclosure 
requirements, the SEC opens communication channels with the firm that could lead to the 
Division of Enforcement if the firm fails to comply (Government Accounting Office (GAO), 
2004; pages 24-25). In comparison to annual or sustainability reports, the level of enforcing the 
disclosure requirements is higher in 10-K reports. Therefore, I suggest that due to threat of legal 
actions, the low and high performing firms will comply with disclosure requirements in 10-K 
reports. Hence, there will be less significant differences between the disclosures of low and high 
environmental performers in 10-K reports. 
H2: there is less significant association between firms’ environmental disclosures in 10-
K reports and environmental performance. 
The incentives to disclose environmental information of high and low environmental performers 
Research on the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance is subject to a polarizing theoretical debate about firms’ incentives to disclose 
environmental information. However, there is no empirical evidence that the factors that 
motivate firms to disclose environmental information differ between groups of firms with low 
and high environmental performance. Prior research suggests that firms’ environmental 
disclosures are motivated by both economic and legitimacy incentives. Research on the 
economic cost-and-benefit of disclosure shows that firms benefit from disclosing environmental 
information by reducing the cost of information gathering for all traders; thus, improve the 
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trading process (Diamond, 1985; Botosan, 1997).  Verrecchia (1983) argues that the higher the 
level of proprietary information, the higher the cost of disclosure. Scott (1994) finds that firms 
subject to scrutiny from labor unions disclose less pension plan information due to the cost 
associated with the disclosure with that information. Low environmental performance entails 
more regulatory costs in the form of penalties, liabilities or more capital expenditures to remedy 
that performance. Therefore, it could be argued that the market is more interested in 
environmental information of low-performers than the high-performers. In other words, the low-
performers possess more proprietary information than the high-performance which makes both 
the costs and benefits of disclosure of the low-performers higher than those of the high 
performers. Therefore, based on the balance between disclosure costs and benefits and the 
demand for information, I suggest there are differences between the economic incentives of 
disclosures of the low and high performers; which leads to different disclosure outcomes.  
H3: The association between environmental disclosure and the economic incentives to 
disclose is different between the groups of low and high-performers. 
Neu et al. (1998) find that political and social pressures are determinants of firms’ 
environmental disclosures in annual reports. Examining disclosures made by European firms, 
Cormier & Magnan (2003) find that media visibility increases pressures upon firms to disclose 
more information. These findings suggest that firms use their disclosure strategy to mitigate 
legitimacy threats generated from the scrutiny of environmentalists, society, or the regulatory 
bodies. Lindblom (1994) suggests that firms adopt different strategies to legitimize their actions: 
inform the public, change its perceptions, or divert its attention. To legitimize their actions, 
O’Donovan (2002) finds that firms adopt four different disclosure tactics: avoid the disclosure, 
alter the perceptions, alter the social values, or comply with social norms. Based on their 
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environmental performance, I suggest that the level of threat to the low-performers’ legitimacy is 
higher than that of the high-performers. Hence, I suggest that the high and low performers may 
adopt different disclosure strategies in response to the different incentives to disclose.  
H4: The association between environmental disclosure and the legitimacy incentives to 
disclose is different between the groups of low and high-performers. 
In this study, I suggest that both economic and legitimacy incentives influence 
environmental disclosures of the two groups of firms – firms with high and low environmental 
performance - differently. Therefore, I explore the extent to which economic and legitimacy 
theories would explain the disclosures of firms with high and low environmental performance. 
4. Methodology 
There are some methodological issues that affect the statistical association between 
disclosure and performance and the interpretation of previous research findings. First, prior 
research employs cross-sectional analyses of environmental disclosures, a methodology that 
ignores the continuous development and growth in that field (see Cormier & Magnan, 2003; 
Deegan et al., 2002; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995a; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995b). During the 
last two decades, the role of sustainability reports as an important media to disclose 
environmental information continue to grow. These reports are subject to continuous 
evolvement; such as increased disclosure regulation and the development of guidelines for 
voluntary disclosure. Cross-sectional studies provide a snapshot of environmental disclosures 




Another problem associated with cross-sectional studies is the lack of control for firm 
specific unobservable variables that may be associated with other dependent variables (Hausman 
& Taylor, 1981). Patten (2002) attempts to measure these unobservable variables by controlling 
for industry fixed-effects; which proxies for similarities among firms within the same industries. 
Though he finds a significant association between industry controls and environmental 
disclosure; I suggest that these industry controls do not fully reflect the unobserved heterogeneity 
in these firms. Therefore, in this study I perform a panel data analysis of firms’ environmental 
disclosures to control for the continuous change in environmental reporting over-time and the 
unobserved heterogeneity in the cross-sections. The results of this study confirm the existence of 
a cross-section and period effects. 
Thirdly, understanding the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance is undermined by the definition of environmental disclosure in prior 
research. Several studies (see Fekrat et al., 1996; Hughes et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 2001; 
Patten, 2002; and Wiseman, 1982) rely on the amount of information to proxy for environmental 
disclosure and to explain firms’ incentives to disclose environmental information22. 
Consequently, these studies report that low-performing firms disclose more environmental 
information as they need to legitimize their actions (refer to Patten, 2002; Hughes et al., 2000; 
                                                 
22
 The Wiseman (1982) index relies on a single score to evaluate environmental disclosure. The reliance on single 
score does not indicate the level of proprietary information disclosed within that index. Aerts & Cormier (2009), 
Walden & Stagliano (2004), and Clarkson et al. (2008) use disclosure metrics that proxy for different aspects of 
disclosure that differentiate between the proprietary and less-proprietary information. For example, Aerts & Cormier 
(2009) differentiate between economic disclosures and social related disclosures. Clarkson et al. (2008) define two 
metrics – hard and soft disclosures - to assess the level of proprietary information in environmental disclosures. 
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Hughes et al., 2001). This assessment is not completely in accordance with the legitimacy theory 
framework which predicts that firms would adopt different disclosure strategies in response to 
the different threats to their legitimacy. For example, de Villiers & van Staden, (2006) and 
O'Donovan (2002) show that withholding sensitive information – or reduction in disclosure – has 
also a legitimizing effect. Therefore, in this study I develop parameters to measure the level of 
proprietary information disclosed - rather than the amount of information disclosed - to assess 
the firm’s incentives to disclose23. 
To shed more light on the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance, I conduct three different analyses. First, I study firms’ 
environmental disclosures in three disclosure media to assess whether or not to consider the 
information in 10-K and sustainability reports next to the one in annual reports. Second, I 
research the association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance using 
measures of disclosure that separate between the amount of information disclosed and some 
properties of this information. Third, I examine the incentives of low and high performers to 
disclose environmental information to understand differences in motivation to disclose between 
the two groups of firms.  
4.1. Examination of annual reports, 10-K reports and sustainability reports’ 
environmental disclosure 
Annual reports, 10-K reports and sustainability reports are three different media that 
firms use to communicate environmental information to the public. To the best of my 
                                                 
23
 Scott (2006) defines proprietary information as the information that directly affects the firm’s cash-flow, while 
non-proprietary information is information that has indirect impact on the cash-flow (page 384). 
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knowledge, the relative importance of each of these media and the information included in each 
of them has not been studied yet. I examine environmental information included in each media – 
during the period from 1997 to 2010 - using a comprehensive disclosure index that combines 
previous work by (Aerts et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Patten & Crampton, 2004; Walden & 
Stagliano, 2004; Wiseman, 1982).  
The disclosure index is an extension of Clarkson et al. (2008) index; which is inspired by 
GRI guidelines. However, the Clarkson et al. (2008) index is not comprehensive since it 
emphasizes specific elements of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, I complement it with themes 
from other indexes. For example, I include themes about the firm’s contamination and 
remediation efforts from Aerts et al. (2008) and Patten & Crampton (2004), and expand the 
measurement of the firm’s pollution abatement efforts to include descriptions of equipment 
installed and processes developed according to Wiseman (1982). The disclosure of economic 
indicators is one of the weaknesses of the Clarkson et al. (2008) index since it does not 
differentiate between the disclosure of past and future capital and operational expenditures. 
Therefore, I borrow these themes from the Wiseman (1982) index. Furthermore, I include themes 
about environmental litigation and liabilities from the Aerts et al. (2008) and Wiseman (1982) 
indexes. Finally, I add themes related to the discussion of current and potential environmental 
laws that are necessary to assess the firm’s environmental risk using themes from the Aerts et al. 
(2008) and Wiseman (1982) indexes.     
In brief, the index includes 63 environmental disclosure themes under 10 different 
categories: governance and management systems, credibility, contamination and remediation 
efforts, pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators, economic factors, 
litigation and liabilities, vision and strategy claims, laws and regulations conformity, 
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environmental profile, and environmental initiatives. There are 18 themes from Aerts et al. 
(2008) and Wiseman (1982) indexes and 45 themes from the Clarkson et al. (2008) index. A 
score of 1 is assigned if the theme exists in one of these reports and 0 otherwise.  
Furthermore, I examine the different properties of these disclosures. In accordance with 
Clarkson et al. (2008), I examine the disclosure of hard versus soft information. I define hard 
disclosures as verifiable disclosures indicative of the firm’s environmental performance. Soft 
disclosures are environmental information not related to the firm performance or non-verifiable 
statements about the firm’s progress in that domain. I also study the disclosure of negative versus 
positive or neutral information since research by Deegan & Gordon (1996) and Deegan & 
Rankin (1996) points out at firms’ reluctance to disclose negative information. I rely on Patten & 
Crampton (2004) definition of negative disclosure to classify the different environmental themes. 
Finally, I examine another aspect of environmental information that is the specificity of the 
information disclosed. Specifically, I examine whether firms disclose specific information about 
their operations or just general statements. I use three levels of specificity according to Wiseman 
(1982): quantitative information, firm specific qualitative information, and general information. 
According to Ingram & Frazier (1980), the first two items could be grouped into one category 
since they refer to the firm specific activities. Meanwhile, the third item represent a different 
category since it refers to general statements that are not significantly related to the company’s 
environmental efforts. Additionally, I examine the disclosure of economic information; a type of 
relevant information for the stock market. The disclosure index is presented in details in 
Appendix C and an example of how firms’ disclosures are classified is presented in Appendix D. 
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4.2. The association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance 
To study the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance, I conduct a panel data analysis of environmental disclosure over a 10 year period 
from 1997 to 2010. Cormier & Magnan (1999) present a disclosure model to explain how the 
economic costs and benefits of disclosure affect the amount of environmental information 
disclosed. I extend this model to include legitimacy factors that also influence environmental 
disclosure of firms as suggested by Neu et al. (1998). The proposed model is the following: 
Disclosure = 0 + 1 * performance + 2 * beta+ 3 * Trading Volume+ 4 * Debt to Equity 
Change+ 5 * Common Stock Change+ 6 * Block_Insider+ 7 * Block_Highest+8 * ROA+ 
9 * Debt to Assets+ 10 * Return+ 11 * Negative News+12 * Total News13 * Media 
Legitimacy+14 * Size 
Where: 
Definition of variables: 
1. Environmental disclosure (Disclosure):  
The definition of environmental disclosure is fundamental for this study. Environmental 
disclosure is a multi-construct variable (Ingram & Frazier, 1980); therefore, it is important to 
have a content index that captures all the major dimensions of that variable: I measure the total 
number of disclosure themes made by the firm (Total Disclosure), the disclosure of hard versus 
soft information (Hard Disclosure, Soft Disclosure) (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Clarkson et al., 
2008), the good news versus bad news disclosure (Positive Disclosure, Negative Disclosure) 
(Deegan & Rankin, 1996), the general versus specific information disclosure (Quantitative 
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Disclosure, Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure, Qualitative Disclosure) (Cho & Patten, 2007; 
Wiseman, 1982), and finally I also use a proxy for economic disclosures.  
2. Independent variables: 
a. Environmental performance (performance):  
There are two types of proxies for environmental performance. Cho & Patten, (2007), 
Fekrat et al. (1996), Ingram & Frazier (1980) and Wiseman (1982) use general surrogates of 
performance that proxy for many of the firm’s environmental activities. Meanwhile, Al-Tuwaijri 
et al. (2004), Clarkson et al. (2008) and Patten (2002) use specific measures of pollution control 
such as the level of TRI or the ratio of recycled toxic waste to total waste to proxy for the firm’s 
performance. These specific measures – although more objective – do not provide a complete 
picture of the firm’s overall performance (Berthelot et al., 2003). More general measures – such 
as the CEP and KLD ratings – provide a comprehensive picture of the firm’s environmental 
performance that maps the items in the different content indices. Patten (2002) criticizes CEP 
rankings because the performance evaluation criteria differ from one industry to the other. I 
reckon that KLD ratings are a good surrogate for environmental performance and have been used 
in prior studies by Cho, et al., (2006), Cho & Patten (2007), and Dhaliwal et al. (2011). Further, 
Ziegler & Schröder (2010) underline the use of KLD ratings as a basis of firms’ inclusion in the 




                                                 
24
 Using KLD ratings, I develop a proxy for environmental disclosure that includes 5 environmental strengths and 6 
environmental concerns (performance = number of strengths + (6 – number of concerns)). The environmental 
strengths included are (1) Beneficial Products and Services (2) Pollution Prevention (3) Recycling (4) Clean Energy, 
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b. Measures of information cost gathering: 
The following measures proxy for the need for information and the asymmetry gap 
between the insiders and the outside shareholders (Cormier & Magnan, 1999): 
i. Risk (beta): measured using the firm beta. Firms’ beta is calculated using the five 
year monthly returns. 
ii. Trading volume (Trading Volume): using the firm trading volumes divided by the 
outstanding number of shares. Trading volumes are provided by the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
iii. Reliance on the capital market (Debt to Equity Change; Common Stock Change): 
using the change in the firm’s debt to equity and the change in the firm’s common 
stock. Data is provided by Compustat database. 
iv. Insider holdings (Block_Insider): measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
firm’s officers and directors. Information is gathered from firms’ proxy statements. 
v.  Outsider holdings (Block_Highest): measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
highest shareholder. Information is gathered from firms’ proxy statements. 
According to Cormier & Magnan (1999), firm’s beta, trading volume, reliance on the capital 
market are proxies for the demand for information from investors. Hence, these measures are 
positively associated with environmental disclosure since disclosure would reduce the cost of 
information gathering for the outside shareholders. Meanwhile, significant holdings by insider 
                                                                                                                                                             
and (6) Other Strengths. The environmental concerns included are (1) Hazardous Waste (2) Regulatory Problems (3) 
Ozone Depleting Chemicals (4) Substantial Emissions (5) Agricultural Chemicals, and (6) Other Concern. 
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and outsider owners attenuate the cost of information gathering and hence are associated with 
lower levels of disclosure.  
c. Measures of financial condition: 
i. Accounting performance measured by the firm’s return on assets (ROA). 
ii. Market performance measured by the firm’s return (Return). 
iii. Leverage measured using the firm’s debt to assets (Debt to Assets). 
Cormier & Magnan (1999) suggest that strong financial condition would enable firms to 
withstand the cost of disclosing proprietary information. Hence, higher return on assets and 
market return are associated with higher levels of disclosure, while higher levels of debt to assets 
would be associated with lower levels of disclosure.  
d. Measures of firm’s legitimacy 
i. Media legitimacy (Media Legitimacy): is a measure of the media’s perception of the 
firm’s environmental performance. According to Aerts & Cormier (2009) media 
legitimacy is measured using the Janis-Fadner Coefficient. 
ii. Environnementalistes’ pressure (Negative News) : Neu et al. (1998) account for 
environmentalists’ concerns by measuring the number of negative articles containing 
negative criticism of the firm’s environmental performance. They find that firms 
subject to negative criticism reduce their environmental disclosure. 
iii. Society awareness (Total News): news exposure has been used in prior research as a 
proxy for society awareness and concern about the firm environmental performance 
(Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Neu et al., 1998) 
e. Control Variables: 
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i. Size (Size): larger firms are more visible to the public and more followed by analysts 
(Aerts & Cormier, 2009). Therefore, I assume that the level of environmental 
performance will depend on the firm’s size which proxies for the visibility of the firm 
within its society. 
4.3. The incentives to disclose environmental information in samples of firms with low 
and high performance 
In order to test the difference between the incentives of low and high performers to 
disclose environmental information, I use the following disclosure model based on prior research 
by Cormier & Magnan (1999), Cormier & Magnan (2003), and Neu et al. (1998). This disclosure 
model combines factors that represent economic costs and benefits with factors that affect firms’ 
legitimacy: 
Disclosure = 0 + 2 * beta+ 3 * beta * Low+ 4 * Trading Volume+ 5 * Trading Volume * 
Low+ 6 * Debt to Equity Change+ 7 * Debt to Equity Change * Low + 8 * Common Stock 
Change+ 9 * Common Stock Change* Low+ 10 * Block_Insider+11 * Block_Insider * Low+  
12 * Block_Highest+13 * Block_Highest * Low 13 * ROA14 * ROA * Low + 14 * Debt 
to Assets + 15 * Debt to Assets * Low+ 16 * Return+ 17 * Return * Low+ 18 * Negative 
News + 19 * Negative News * Low+ 20 * Total News + 21 * Total News * Low + 22 * Media 
Legitimacy+23 * Media Legitimacy * Low +24 * Size 
Where: 
Low: is a dummy variable equal 1 if the firm is classified as a low performer and 0 if the firm is 
classified as a higher performer. A firm is classified as low performer if its average performance 
over the period from 1997 to 2010 is below the median of the average performance of all firms. 
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Therefore, there are 39 firms classified as low performers and 39 firms classified as high 
performers.  
To test whether or not there are differences between the disclosure incentives of the high 
and low performers, I examine the significance of the interaction terms between the different 
dependent variables and the dummy variable (Low). 
4.4. Sample selection 
 KLD ratings for environmental performance are available for firms between the years 
1997 and 2010. The following criteria are used to select the firms: 
1. The firm should be available on Compustat. 
2. The firm should have a ten year KLD rating between 1997 and 2010. 
3. The firm belongs to an environmentally-sensitive industry. 
The selection criteria lead to the identification of  78 firms distributed as following: 2 firms in 
SIC 10xx (metal mining), 7 firms in SIC 13xx (oil exploration), 13 firms in SIC 20xx (food 
manufacturing), 8 firms in SIC 26xx (paper), 18 firms in SIC 28xx (chemical and allied 
products), 2 firms in SIC 29xx (petroleum refining), 5 firms in SIC 30xx (rubber and plastic 
manufacturing) 3 firms in SIC 33xx (metals), and 22 firms in SIC 49xx (electric and gas 
services). With 14 years of KLD ratings, the final sample comprises 1092 firm-years. The list of 




5.1. Analysis of information disclosed in annual reports, 10-K reports, and sustainability 
reports 
In this section, I discuss the results of descriptive analysis of 78 firms’ environmental 
disclosure over the period of fourteen years (from 1997 to 2010) in annual reports, 10-K reports, 
and sustainability reports. The detailed results are provided in tables 1 to 16 and the detailed 
analysis is provided in Appendix E. The objective of this analysis is to (1) assess and understand 
the type of information disclosed in each of these media, and (2) understand the importance of 
each media in conveying environmental information. The analysis comprises of two different 
steps: 
1. Analyze the information disclosed in annual report, 10-K report, and sustainability reports. 
2. A pair-wise comparison between the information disclosed in each report and an analysis of 
information that is disclosed in one media but not the other ones. 
The analysis of environmental disclosures in annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports 
provides some insights about firms’ disclosure activities. First, environmental disclosures have 
continuously increased during the period from 1997 to 2010. This increase is mainly due to the 
widespread adoption of standalone sustainability reports as disclosures in 10-K reports remained 
constant and disclosures in annual reports declined during the same period. Second, annual 
reports are not the main source of environmental information since the level of disclosure in 
these reports is lower than that in 10-K or in sustainability reports. In general, firms use annual 
reports to provide a general overview about their environmental performances with little details 
about the different categories describing that performance. Furthermore, there is little 
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incremental information in annual reports over those made in 10-K reports. Third, in comparison 
to annual or sustainability reports, 10-K reports include more details about the firm’s economic 
factors and litigation & liabilities. Therefore, analysis relying on annual report disclosures may 
result in misleading findings about the firm’s propensity to disclose negative information or 
quantitative financial information. Fourth, the analysis shows that sustainability reports are 
annexes to annual and 10-K reports. In other words, they include a large amount of information 
that is not disclosed in both media such as pollution abatement, governance and management, 
credibility, and vision & strategy information. Sustainability reports are not the main medium to 
disclose negative information about the firm’s litigation & liabilities or financial information. 
Therefore, research studies that examine sustainability reports are not conclusive on firms’ 
environmental disclosures since they exclude important information disclosed in the other media. 
Fifth, the adoption of reporting guidelines (mostly the GRI guideline) improves disclosure in 
sustainability reports by increasing the level of information disclosed and reducing the dispersion 
in disclosures made by the different firms. Finally, the aggregated disclosure in the three reports 
is higher than the disclosure in each report separately. These findings implies that combining 
information from the different reports provides a more comprehensive understanding of the 
firm’s environmental operations than considering each report individually.  
5.2. The association between environmental disclosures and environmental 
performance: an analysis of aggregate information disclosed in annual reports, 10-K 
reports, and sustainability reports 
In order to better assess firms’ environmental disclosures; I consider all public 
disclosures made by a firm in the three types of media – annual reports, 10-K reports, and 
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sustainability reports. The objective of this section is to determine if there is an association 
between firms’ environmental disclosures and firm’s environmental performance.  
Correlation between environmental disclosure measures, environmental performance, and the 
other independent variables. 
Table-1 shows the correlation between the different disclosure variables, environmental 
performance and the other independent variables. There is a significant negative association 
between the different disclosure measures and the firm’s environmental performance. High 
levels of trading volume, debt-to-assets, total news, and negative news are positively associated 
with measures of environmental disclosure. Higher levels of return on assets, debt to assets, 
percentage holding by insiders, and percentage holding by the largest shareholder are negatively 


























Multivariate analysis of the association between aggregate disclosure – in annual, 10-K, and 
sustainability reports – and environmental performance 
In this section, I examine the association between aggregate disclosure – those made in 
annual, 10K, and sustainability reports – and the firm’s environmental performance. The panel 
data analysis presented in Table-2 shows that there is a positive association between  7 measures 
of environmental disclosure (total, hard, soft, positive, quantitative, firm-specific, and qualitative 
information) and firms environmental performance (support for H1); suggesting evidence for a 
reporting bias between firms according to their environmental performance. There is no 
association between negative or economic disclosures and firm’s environmental performance. 
The association between disclosure measures and performance presented in Table-2 are the 
opposite of the correlation between these variables presented in Table-1. In fact, the correlation 
analysis does not control for all factors affecting firms’ environmental disclosure including firm 
and time specific unobservable effects. Table-2 shows that both the firm (cross-section) and time 
(period) effects are significant which may explain the contradiction between the results of the 
correlation and the multivariate analysis which provides more evidence about the importance of 
the panel data analysis when examining the association between disclosure and performance. 
Contrary to predictions, high trading volumes are associated with lower levels of 
disclosure except for the disclosure of negative or qualitative information; two measures that are 
not associated with the firm’s trading volume.  Reliance on the capital market (change in debt to 
equity or change in common stock) is positively related to the different measures of disclosure 
except for the disclosure of negative and economic information. Higher levels of holding by 
insiders are also associated with higher levels of disclosure (except for measures of economic 
and negative disclosures). The level of holdings by the highest shareholder is associated with 
124 
 
lower levels of quantitative disclosures. Society awareness about the firm’s environmental 
activities (Total News) is positively associated with measures of total, hard, positive, negative, 
quantitative, firm specific qualitative and economic disclosures. Environmentalists pressures 
(Negative News) is associated with lower levels of negative disclosures suggesting that firms 
attempt to hide negative information about their environmental performance when they face real 
threat to legitimacy. Further, higher levels of media legitimacy are associated with lower levels 
of negative disclosures; it may also imply that firms with higher levels of media legitimacy 
attempt to preserve their positive image. 
125 
 
Table-2: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in All Reports (to be continued) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -6.0393  0.101 -6.0494 ** 0.040 0.0101  0.992 -4.0251  0.205 -2.0237 *** 0.008
Performance 0.7474 *** 0.001 0.5110 *** 0.002 0.2364 *** 0.003 0.8340 *** 0.000 -0.0837  0.124
Beta -0.9204  0.124 -0.7388  0.107 -0.1816  0.392 -0.7036  0.189 -0.2073  0.160
Trading Volume -0.0300 *** 0.002 -0.0227 *** 0.001 -0.0074 * 0.064 -0.0335 *** 0.000 0.0037  0.324
Debt to Equity Change 0.0007 *** 0.006 0.0004 ** 0.044 0.0003 *** 0.008 0.0008 *** 0.001 -0.0001  0.131
Common Stock Change 0.0014 *** 0.000 0.0012 *** 0.000 0.0003 *** 0.010 0.0015 *** 0.000 -0.0001  0.281
Block_Insider 0.1670 *** 0.005 0.0925 ** 0.045 0.0745 *** 0.000 0.1669 *** 0.002 0.0003  0.982
Block_Highest -0.0362  0.293 -0.0245  0.349 -0.0117  0.299 -0.0480  0.148 0.0119  0.242
ROA 0.8872  0.840 0.9916  0.790 -0.1044  0.934 0.2188  0.950 0.6599  0.636
Debt to Assets -4.0409 ** 0.039 -2.2943  0.125 -1.7466 *** 0.010 -4.0755 ** 0.019 0.0200  0.970
Return -0.5742  0.323 -0.4194  0.328 -0.1548  0.453 -0.6006  0.260 0.0346  0.815
Negative News -0.2168  0.558 -0.3099  0.275 0.0930  0.483 -0.0591  0.866 -0.1572 * 0.059
Total News 0.4321 ** 0.028 0.4106 *** 0.007 0.0215  0.742 0.3624 ** 0.037 0.0691 * 0.065
Media Legitimacy -0.0084  0.988 -0.0897  0.829 0.0813  0.683 0.2091  0.694 -0.2243 * 0.061
Size 4.3177 *** 0.000 3.5743 *** 0.000 0.7434 *** 0.003 2.7389 *** 0.001 1.5765 *** 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.672 0.700 0.505 0.597 0.775
F-statistic 22.488 25.501 11.785 16.526 37.173
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 11.986 8.863 3.124 8.290 3.692
S.D. dependent var 9.363 7.267 2.584 7.691 2.720
Durbin-Watson stat 1.423 1.372 1.519 1.471 1.037
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Negative Disclosure
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects




Table-2: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in All Reports (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -2.3712  0.221 -4.0748 *** 0.007 0.3972  0.517 -0.4525  0.687
Performance 0.2355 ** 0.016 0.3774 *** 0.000 0.1375 ** 0.015 -0.0185  0.604
Beta -0.2085  0.440 -0.5813 ** 0.047 -0.1212  0.429 -0.0503  0.618
Trading Volume -0.0155 *** 0.000 -0.0116 *** 0.009 -0.0027  0.367 -0.0038 * 0.069
Debt to Equity Change 0.0004 *** 0.000 0.0000  0.704 0.0002 ** 0.012 0.0000  0.701
Common Stock Change 0.0007 *** 0.000 0.0005 *** 0.000 0.0002 *** 0.003 0.0000  0.589
Block_Insider 0.0541 * 0.059 0.0611 ** 0.013 0.0520 *** 0.000 -0.0009  0.929
Block_Highest -0.0282 * 0.092 0.0019  0.894 -0.0099  0.228 0.0019  0.798
ROA 1.7349  0.442 0.2409  0.899 -1.0970  0.223 1.2322  0.197
Debt to Assets -0.7973  0.370 -1.3275  0.137 -1.9308 *** 0.000 0.3868  0.317
Return -0.2673  0.302 -0.1773  0.501 -0.1214  0.428 0.0730  0.510
Negative News -0.1691  0.330 -0.1155  0.480 0.0684  0.425 -0.1010  0.127
Total News 0.2163 ** 0.022 0.2220 *** 0.010 -0.0067  0.877 0.0616 * 0.100
Media Legitimacy 0.0197  0.937 -0.0428  0.866 0.0079  0.955 -0.1011  0.248
Size 1.6633 *** 0.001 1.9937 *** 0.000 0.6584 *** 0.000 0.7706 *** 0.004
Adjusted R-squared 0.675 0.639 0.529 0.813
F-statistic 22.785 19.576 12.783 46.692
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 4.643 4.907 2.433 2.658
S.D. dependent var 4.249 3.998 1.941 2.168
Durbin-Watson stat 1.423 1.420 1.512 1.012
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
 
Furthermore, I examine reaction of the low and high performers to the different 
disclosure incentives – results are presented in Table-3- using the interaction between these 
incentives and the firm’s environmental performance (Low = 1 if the firm is classified as a low 
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performer and 0 otherwise). High performers with high trading volume disclose less 
environmental information (see the association with total, hard, soft, positive, and firm specific 
qualitative disclosures). The same association exists for the sample of low-performers but the 
relation is less than that with the sample of high-performers. In the sample of low-performers, 
the higher the level of insider-holding, the higher the level of disclosure (see the association with 
total, hard, negative, quantitative, and firm specific qualitative disclosures). This may be due to 
the fact that insiders may be held legally responsible for withholding relevant information and 
more so in the sample of low-performers. For the sample of high-performers, higher levels of 
debt-to-assets are associated with lower levels of disclosures. Meanwhile, higher levels of debt-
to-assets are associated with higher levels of disclosures for the sample of low-performers. The 
results imply that the supervisory role of debt--holders is stronger in the case of low-performing 
firms making these firms disclose more information. In contrast, the high-performers with high 
levels of debt find the cost of disclosure very high in the absence of demand for information 
from debt-holders. In general, the results provide support for H3 stating that the economic 
incentives to disclose environmental information differ between the firms with low and high 
environmental performance. 
Higher levels of environmentalist pressures (negative news) are associated with lower 
levels of disclosure (especially economic disclosures) in the sample of high-performing firms; 
meanwhile, the negative association is lower in the case of the low performers. Similar results 
are found when examining the association between media legitimacy and both negative and 
economic disclosures. These results suggest that firms with high levels of media legitimacy tend 
to preserve their positive image by disclosing less negative information and less proprietary 
information. The high performing firms are more successful in doing so in comparison to the 
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low-performing firms. This may be due to the high level of regulation associated with the 
disclosure of negative information. 
It is to be noticed that increased pressures from environmentalist groups (Negative News) 
is associated with an increase in soft and qualitative disclosures for the sample of high-
performers. For the sample of low-performers, the results show almost no association between 
the disclosure of soft and qualitative disclosures and the amount of negative news. These 
findings are in contrast to the assumptions made by other research studies that suggest that low-
performing firms will respond to legitimacy threats by increasing their soft disclosures that serve 
to portray a positive image about the firm’s environmental performance. In general, the results 
support H4 stating that legitimacy incentives to disclose environmental information differ 
between groups of firms with low and high environmental performance. 
It is also to be noticed that the analysis provided in Table-3 uses a dummy variable to 
proxy for firm’s environmental performance (1 for firms with low performance over 14 years 
and 0 for firms with high performance). The reason there is no main effect (dummy variable) for 
environmental performance is that any invariable characteristic will create a perfect correlation 
with the firm control employed by the panel data analysis. In theory, the firm control proxies for 
these characteristics that do not vary with time (industry membership, definition of the firm as 




Table-3: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in All Reports – Low vs. high Performers (to be continued)  
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 3.0747  0.346 0.2368  0.927 2.8379 *** 0.002 5.1880 * 0.072 -2.0972 *** 0.003
Beta -0.3231  0.678 -0.3083  0.595 -0.0149  0.952 -0.1433  0.831 -0.1704  0.360
Beta*Low -0.6201  0.518 -0.5352  0.458 -0.0849  0.802 -0.5184  0.544 -0.1010  0.671
Trading Volume -0.1036 *** 0.003 -0.0763 *** 0.003 -0.0273 ** 0.015 -0.1075 *** 0.000 0.0039  0.680
Trading Volume*Low 0.0801 ** 0.019 0.0587 ** 0.020 0.0214 * 0.055 0.0792 *** 0.009 0.0011  0.907
Debt to Equity Change 0.0014  0.610 0.0004  0.833 0.0010  0.334 0.0010  0.708 0.0004  0.487
Debt to Equity Change*Low -0.0006  0.813 0.0000  0.994 -0.0007  0.518 -0.0001  0.968 -0.0005  0.358
Common Stock Change 0.0010 *** 0.000 0.0009 *** 0.000 0.0001  0.348 0.0011 *** 0.000 0.0000  0.410
Common Stock Change*Low 0.0031  0.782 0.0039  0.627 -0.0008  0.818 0.0017  0.860 0.0015  0.535
Block_Insider 0.0091  0.918 -0.0530  0.393 0.0621 ** 0.048 0.0591  0.482 -0.0500 *** 0.006
Block_Insider*Low 0.2407 * 0.058 0.2359 ** 0.015 0.0048  0.905 0.1612  0.164 0.0803 *** 0.004
Block_Highest -0.0881 * 0.083 -0.0343  0.381 -0.0538 *** 0.001 -0.1122 ** 0.016 0.0242 ** 0.039
Block_Highest*Low 0.0483  0.484 -0.0151  0.779 0.0634 *** 0.005 0.0731  0.261 -0.0246  0.169
ROA 1.3003  0.829 2.4537  0.607 -1.1534  0.530 -2.2939  0.671 3.5750 ** 0.021
ROA*Low 3.5415  0.674 0.5152  0.940 3.0262  0.214 7.5323  0.289 -3.9819 * 0.098
Debt to Assets -9.6721 *** 0.000 -5.8953 *** 0.000 -3.7768 *** 0.000 -8.7732 *** 0.000 -0.8962  0.131
Debt to Assets*Low 14.6886 *** 0.001 9.2934 *** 0.007 5.3951 *** 0.000 13.0573 *** 0.001 1.5910  0.175
Return -0.5492  0.487 -0.4034  0.492 -0.1457  0.577 -0.6218  0.373 0.0743  0.708
Return*Low 0.1560  0.876 0.0925  0.900 0.0635  0.853 0.2629  0.772 -0.0964  0.711
Negative News 0.6924  0.271 0.0862  0.860 0.6062 *** 0.008 0.9772  0.106 -0.2840 *** 0.009
Negative News*Low -1.0374  0.180 -0.4373  0.466 -0.6001 ** 0.023 -1.2006 * 0.099 0.1629  0.263
Total News 0.3601  0.216 0.3790  0.144 -0.0189  0.824 0.2758  0.316 0.0839 * 0.055
Total News*Low 0.0424  0.913 0.0220  0.944 0.0204  0.865 0.0489  0.890 -0.0069  0.918
Media Legitimacy -0.6119  0.502 -0.6864  0.285 0.0745  0.828 -0.1255  0.888 -0.4848 *** 0.002
Media Legitimacy*Low 0.9549  0.410 0.8908  0.286 0.0641  0.877 0.5753  0.603 0.3667 * 0.095
Size 2.8819 *** 0.002 2.5873 *** 0.001 0.2946  0.276 1.4092 * 0.083 1.4686 *** 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.674 0.701 0.511 0.597 0.776
F-statistic -3318.934 23.281 10.932 15.064 33.901
Prob(F-statistic) 20.604 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 11.986 8.863 3.124 8.290 3.692
S.D. dependent var 9.363 7.267 2.584 7.691 2.720
Durbin-Watson stat 1.423 1.372 1.541 1.461 1.056
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Positive/Neutral Soft DisclosureHard DisclosureTotal Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)





Table-3: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in All Reports – Low vs. high Performers (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 0.3140  0.857 0.7894  0.534 1.9875 *** 0.001 -0.3986  0.686
Beta -0.0663  0.825 -0.2032  0.621 -0.0441  0.802 -0.1223  0.282
Beta*Low -0.1803  0.657 -0.4485  0.360 0.0094  0.969 0.1324  0.408
Trading Volume -0.0351 ** 0.015 -0.0568 *** 0.001 -0.0117  0.162 0.0034  0.579
Trading Volume*Low 0.0216  0.129 0.0495 *** 0.002 0.0092  0.273 -0.0071  0.240
Debt to Equity Change 0.0001  0.917 0.0003  0.810 0.0009  0.200 0.0001  0.920
Debt to Equity Change*Low 0.0003  0.774 -0.0002  0.854 -0.0007  0.330 0.0000  0.987
Common Stock Change 0.0006 *** 0.000 0.0003 ** 0.031 0.0001  0.291 0.0000  0.659
Common Stock Change*Low 0.0008  0.863 0.0010  0.823 0.0014  0.645 0.0003  0.882
Block_Insider -0.0098  0.797 -0.0407  0.284 0.0596 *** 0.005 -0.0119  0.303
Block_Insider*Low 0.1015 * 0.085 0.1627 *** 0.003 -0.0227  0.412 0.0158  0.403
Block_Highest -0.0189  0.421 -0.0245  0.275 -0.0446 *** 0.000 0.0053  0.663
Block_Highest*Low -0.0309  0.366 0.0247  0.402 0.0547 *** 0.001 -0.0049  0.755
ROA 3.3491  0.192 0.2088  0.943 -2.2768  0.156 2.1333  0.106
ROA*Low -1.0369  0.794 2.0335  0.588 2.5538  0.193 -1.1715  0.513
Debt to Assets -2.4711 ** 0.010 -4.1158 *** 0.000 -3.0824 *** 0.000 -0.1870  0.674
Debt to Assets*Low 4.4870 ** 0.026 7.0233 *** 0.001 3.1381 *** 0.005 1.0366  0.241
Return -0.3478  0.283 -0.1218  0.747 -0.0778  0.710 0.0219  0.871
Return*Low 0.1857  0.663 0.0224  0.961 -0.0416  0.875 0.0514  0.779
Negative News 0.0012  0.997 0.2596  0.450 0.4325 *** 0.000 -0.2556 ** 0.012
Negative News*Low -0.2006  0.570 -0.3942  0.318 -0.4429 *** 0.004 0.2119 * 0.091
Total News 0.1852  0.216 0.2353 * 0.083 -0.0608  0.278 0.1460 *** 0.007
Total News*Low 0.0433  0.819 -0.0622  0.721 0.0609  0.448 -0.1178 * 0.088
Media Legitimacy -0.1230  0.748 -0.5072  0.229 0.0199  0.936 -0.3174 *** 0.006
Media Legitimacy*Low 0.2281  0.648 0.7103  0.179 0.0036  0.990 0.3089 * 0.056
Size 1.2301 ** 0.010 1.2388 *** 0.001 0.4090 ** 0.037 0.7174 *** 0.004
Adjusted R-squared 0.674 0.646 0.534 0.813
F-statistic 20.574 18.281 11.854 42.220
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 4.643 4.907 2.433 2.658
S.D. dependent var 4.249 3.998 1.941 2.168
Durbin-Watson stat 1.417 1.439 1.538 1.028
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)




5.3. The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance 
in annual reports, 10-K reports, and sustainability reports. 
The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in annual 
reports 
Table-4 shows the association between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance in annual reports. In general, the low-performers disclose more information in 
annual reports as shown by the negative and significant coefficient of total disclosure. The 
results suggest that disclosures of the low-performers are of higher quality since the low-
performers make more hard, negative, quantitative, and economic disclosures. Though the low-
performers disclose more soft-information; there is no difference between the high and low-
performers in terms of disclosing qualitative information in annual reports.  
Table-4 also shows that there is a negative and significant relation between trading 
volumes and the different measures of disclosure which suggests that highly traded firms find it 
less beneficial to disclose environmental information in annual reports. However, the issuance of 
new shares is associated with higher levels of disclosures (there is a positive and significant 
association between common stock change and measures of total, hard, positive, negative, 
quantitative, and firm specific qualitative disclosures). As expected, a higher level of holding by 
the highest block-holder is associated with less disclosure. The findings suggest that firms with a 
higher level of inside or outside holdings attempt to reduce the amount of negative information 
released. Higher levels of debt to assets are associated with higher level of quantitative and 
economic disclosures (economic disclosure is only significant at 11%). Total news following of 
the firm’s environmental activities is associated with higher levels of hard, quantitative and 
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economic disclosures. Further, the amount of negative news about the firm’s environmental 
activities is associated with lower levels of economic disclosures. 
Table-4: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Annual Reports (to be continued) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 1.5733  0.331 0.5316  0.717 1.0416 ** 0.023 1.2500  0.209 0.3126  0.698
Performance -0.2905 *** 0.009 -0.2299 ** 0.013 -0.0606  0.127 -0.1203  0.113 -0.1665 *** 0.003
Beta -0.2376  0.434 -0.1475  0.569 -0.0902  0.415 -0.2589  0.210 0.0302  0.852
Trading Volume -0.0420 *** 0.000 -0.0343 *** 0.000 -0.0078 *** 0.002 -0.0263 *** 0.000 -0.0156 *** 0.000
Debt to Equity Change 0.0001  0.618 0.0000  0.858 0.0000  0.312 0.0001  0.354 0.0000  0.852
Common Stock Change 0.0012 *** 0.000 0.0011 *** 0.000 0.0001  0.121 0.0007 *** 0.000 0.0005 *** 0.000
Block_Insider -0.0534  0.227 -0.0656  0.102 0.0122  0.222 -0.0096  0.717 -0.0435 ** 0.034
Block_Highest -0.0418 ** 0.016 -0.0336 ** 0.028 -0.0081  0.174 -0.0182  0.105 -0.0235 *** 0.009
ROA -1.3437  0.487 0.2639  0.879 -1.6076 *** 0.006 -0.5611  0.698 -0.7998  0.379
Debt to Assets 1.0577  0.266 1.2660  0.124 -0.2083  0.523 0.3580  0.587 0.6924  0.139
Return 0.0091  0.979 0.0218  0.939 -0.0127  0.908 0.0288  0.893 -0.0119  0.946
Negative News -0.0891  0.590 -0.1022  0.405 0.0131  0.879 0.0371  0.776 -0.1253  0.128
Total News 0.1536  0.110 0.1467 ** 0.037 0.0069  0.892 0.0873  0.267 0.0651  0.137
Media Legitimacy 0.1893  0.504 0.1408  0.530 0.0485  0.669 0.0873  0.670 0.0942  0.463
Size 1.1493 *** 0.003 0.9743 *** 0.007 0.1750  0.101 0.5618 ** 0.021 0.5840 *** 0.004
Adjusted R-squared 0.547 0.527 0.433 0.548 0.515
F-statistic 13.661 12.707 9.022 13.740 12.157
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 3.682 2.698 0.984 2.322 1.357
S.D. dependent var 4.144 3.369 1.253 2.804 2.027
Durbin-Watson stat 1.081 0.979 1.551 1.299 0.839
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.101 0.000
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.059 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Positive/Neutral Soft DisclosureHard DisclosureTotal Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)






Table-4: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Annual Reports (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 0.1777  0.815 0.6043  0.449 0.7806 ** 0.044 0.4154  0.547
Performance -0.1081 ** 0.038 -0.1401 ** 0.011 -0.0386  0.237 -0.1002 ** 0.021
Beta -0.0810  0.582 -0.0696  0.644 -0.0781  0.422 -0.0350  0.786
Trading Volume -0.0178 *** 0.000 -0.0186 *** 0.000 -0.0055 *** 0.008 -0.0144 *** 0.000
Debt to Equity Change 0.0000  0.641 0.0000  0.829 0.0000  0.610 0.0000  0.996
Common Stock Change 0.0003 *** 0.000 0.0008 *** 0.000 0.0000  0.428 0.0001  0.137
Block_Insider -0.0343  0.121 -0.0237  0.225 0.0049  0.540 -0.0306  0.106
Block_Highest -0.0133  0.112 -0.0208 ** 0.019 -0.0077  0.122 -0.0138 * 0.060
ROA 0.3481  0.738 -0.1169  0.894 -1.5920 *** 0.002 0.5929  0.511
Debt to Assets 1.2550 *** 0.008 0.2581  0.574 -0.4627 * 0.086 0.6720  0.110
Return 0.1272  0.418 -0.1024  0.523 -0.0080  0.934 0.0555  0.700
Negative News -0.1044  0.130 0.0540  0.526 -0.0377  0.590 -0.1281 ** 0.046
Total News 0.1051 *** 0.005 0.0390  0.397 0.0083  0.853 0.0899 *** 0.004
Media Legitimacy 0.0320  0.799 0.1753  0.185 -0.0257  0.779 0.0624  0.569
Size 0.3530 * 0.064 0.5923 *** 0.003 0.2004 ** 0.029 0.3119 * 0.079
Adjusted R-squared 0.493 0.543 0.425 0.538
F-statistic 11.185 13.461 8.762 13.231
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 1.238 1.664 0.777 1.046
S.D. dependent var 1.817 1.973 1.067 1.649
Durbin-Watson stat 1.052 1.160 1.422 0.850
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.007 0.000 0.038 0.000
Period Chi-square 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)




The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in 10-K 
reports 
Table-5 shows that there is no association between disclosures and firms’ environmental 
performance except for the disclosure of less proprietary information where the higher levels of 
performance are associated with the disclosure of soft, positive or qualitative information 
(support for H2). Unlike annual reports, higher trading volumes are associated with higher levels 
of disclosure including the disclosure of more proprietary information such as hard, negative, 
and economic information. Further, highest level of holdings by the largest outside block-holder 
is associated with higher levels of disclosures. Similar to annual reports, higher levels of debt to 
assets are associated with higher levels of quantitative and economic disclosure. Finally, firms 
that are subject to higher levels of negative news following are associated with lower levels of 
proprietary disclosures such as hard, negative, and economic disclosure. Meanwhile, the higher 
levels of negative news following are associated with higher levels of disclosure of less 
proprietary information such as soft and qualitative disclosures. The high level of total news 
following is associated with high levels of negative disclosures while high levels of media 









Table-5: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in 10-K Reports (to be continued) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -2.2872 * 0.091 -2.7777 ** 0.035 0.4905  0.191 0.2302  0.800 -2.6312 *** 0.000
Performance 0.0215  0.791 -0.0462  0.507 0.0677 ** 0.029 0.0900 * 0.071 -0.0809  0.147
Beta 0.0681  0.758 -0.0078  0.968 0.0758  0.394 0.2361  0.104 -0.1450  0.351
Trading Volume 0.0241 *** 0.008 0.0180 ** 0.027 0.0061 *** 0.002 0.0075  0.153 0.0165 *** 0.003
Debt to Equity Change 0.0000  0.883 0.0000  0.835 0.0000  0.882 0.0000  0.551 -0.0001  0.449
Common Stock Change 0.0000  0.726 -0.0001  0.513 0.0000  0.763 0.0000  0.922 0.0000  0.423
Block_Insider 0.0389 * 0.056 0.0234  0.220 0.0155 * 0.065 0.0327 ** 0.029 0.0058  0.670
Block_Highest 0.0532 *** 0.000 0.0465 *** 0.001 0.0068  0.225 0.0346 *** 0.001 0.0204 * 0.070
ROA 0.8039  0.614 -0.1646  0.919 0.9686 * 0.079 1.3068  0.122 -0.6182  0.637
Debt to Assets 0.4027  0.577 0.9451  0.144 -0.5424 * 0.065 -0.0140  0.977 0.4472  0.393
Return 0.1057  0.676 0.2260  0.291 -0.1203  0.217 -0.0809  0.616 0.2069  0.190
Negative News -0.0252  0.807 -0.1586 * 0.074 0.1334 *** 0.002 0.1877 ** 0.016 -0.2148 *** 0.004
Total News 0.0677  0.261 0.1028 ** 0.045 -0.0351  0.140 -0.0362  0.341 0.1050 *** 0.010
Media Legitimacy -0.0165  0.931 -0.1520  0.350 0.1355 * 0.052 0.1748  0.148 -0.2350 * 0.062
Size 1.8332 *** 0.000 1.7106 *** 0.000 0.1226  0.196 0.3988 * 0.069 1.4765 *** 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.761 0.783 0.501 0.687 0.732
F-statistic 34.447 38.831 11.520 23.974 29.605
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 6.197 4.919 1.277 2.924 3.277
S.D. dependent var 4.257 3.827 1.089 2.328 2.653
Durbin-Watson stat 1.023 1.001 1.276 1.164 0.969
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.559 0.770 0.303 0.934 0.266
Period Chi-square 0.464 0.699 0.219 0.906 0.188
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Negative Disclosure
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects








Table-5: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in 10-K Reports (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -0.8404  0.366 -1.9959 *** 0.001 0.4353  0.157 -0.8199  0.368
Performance -0.0397  0.280 -0.0205  0.668 0.0692 ** 0.015 -0.0420  0.207
Beta 0.0916  0.396 -0.0496  0.704 0.0491  0.525 0.0666  0.492
Trading Volume 0.0071  0.115 0.0102 ** 0.016 0.0067 *** 0.000 0.0085 * 0.054
Debt to Equity Change 0.0000  0.595 -0.0001  0.241 0.0000  0.907 0.0000  0.544
Common Stock Change 0.0000  0.709 0.0000  0.333 0.0000  0.646 0.0000  0.838
Block_Insider 0.0169  0.112 0.0025  0.848 0.0191 *** 0.002 0.0104  0.296
Block_Highest 0.0130  0.101 0.0373 *** 0.000 0.0046  0.314 0.0110  0.137
ROA 0.6682  0.454 -0.7960  0.394 0.8164  0.111 0.5888  0.527
Debt to Assets 0.8791 ** 0.023 0.0852  0.838 -0.5311 ** 0.026 0.7270 ** 0.050
Return 0.1576  0.198 0.0744  0.613 -0.1060  0.180 0.1733  0.127
Negative News -0.0649  0.231 -0.0708  0.247 0.1086 *** 0.003 -0.0892 * 0.088
Total News 0.0340  0.247 0.0667 * 0.057 -0.0319  0.122 0.0412  0.154
Media Legitimacy -0.0684  0.431 -0.0949  0.384 0.1030 * 0.086 -0.1106  0.163
Size 0.6555 *** 0.003 1.1188 *** 0.000 0.1009  0.195 0.6655 *** 0.002
0.781 0.693 0.547 0.802
Adjusted R-squared 38.472 24.637 13.674 43.599
F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob(F-statistic) 2.372 2.680 1.149 2.292
Mean dependent var 2.107 2.153 0.968 2.032
S.D. dependent var 0.968 1.144 1.245 0.927
Durbin-Watson stat
Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Effects Test
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.646 0.269 0.114 0.367
Period F 0.557 0.190 0.069 0.276
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 





The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in 
sustainability reports 
To examine the association between sustainability reports’ disclosures and environmental 
performance, I conduct four different analyses: 
1. Examine the association between disclosure and performance for all 78 firms (the analysis 
includes firms that did not issue sustainability reports). 
2. Examine the association between disclosure and performance in sustainability reports (the 
analysis includes only observations where firms issued sustainability reports). 
3. Examine the association between disclosure and performance in sustainability reports issued 
according a reporting guideline (GRI guideline). 
4. Examine the association between disclosure and performance in sustainability reports issued 
without adopting a reporting guideline. 
The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in 
sustainability reports – all 78 firms. 
Unlike the results of previous analysis of annual and 10-K reports’ disclosures, Table-6 
shows that there is a positive association between performance and disclosure (see measures of 
total, hard, soft, positive, quantitative, firm specific, qualitative, and economic disclosures)
25
. 
The results imply that high performing firms are more inclined to voluntarily disclose more 
information in sustainability reports. Firms with high risk and high trading volume disclose less 
information. Reliance on the capital market (higher levels of debt to equity change and common 
stock change) is associated with higher levels of disclosure. Increase in insider-holding is 
                                                 
25
 Due to software package Tobit analysis is not available for panel data. 
138 
 
associated with higher level of environmental disclosure while higher levels of outside-holdings 
are associated with lower levels of disclosures. Higher levels of debt to assets are associated with 
lower levels of disclosure. Finally, total news following is associated with higher level of 
disclosure. 
Table-6: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports – All Firms (Balanced Panel) - (to be continued) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -6.8004 ** 0.049 -5.9729 ** 0.014 -0.8274  0.489 -5.7585 * 0.065 -1.0603 ** 0.039
Performance 0.9588 *** 0.000 0.6843 *** 0.000 0.2745 *** 0.001 0.9039 *** 0.000 0.0583  0.124
Beta -1.0627 * 0.100 -0.7735  0.103 -0.2891  0.178 -0.8738  0.138 -0.1850 * 0.052
Trading Volume -0.0228 ** 0.027 -0.0127  0.107 -0.0101 *** 0.004 -0.0254 *** 0.005 0.0025  0.260
Debt to Equity Change 0.0007 ** 0.021 0.0004 * 0.054 0.0003 ** 0.018 0.0008 *** 0.006 -0.0001  0.185
Common Stock Change 0.0012 *** 0.000 0.0009 *** 0.000 0.0003 *** 0.006 0.0013 *** 0.000 -0.0001  0.138
Block_Insider 0.1843 *** 0.007 0.1300 ** 0.012 0.0543 *** 0.008 0.1745 *** 0.004 0.0095  0.433
Block_Highest -0.0716 * 0.055 -0.0532 ** 0.049 -0.0185  0.109 -0.0735 ** 0.032 0.0027  0.602
ROA 1.0767  0.806 -0.1030  0.977 1.1797  0.381 1.6984  0.640 -0.5690  0.597
Debt to Assets -4.4521 ** 0.036 -2.9337 * 0.061 -1.5183 ** 0.024 -3.9739 ** 0.034 -0.4827  0.234
Return -0.8053  0.198 -0.7246  0.109 -0.0806  0.698 -0.6729  0.228 -0.1354  0.267
Negative News -0.3797  0.383 -0.3249  0.312 -0.0548  0.687 -0.2970  0.456 -0.0765  0.289
Total News 0.4981 ** 0.026 0.4267 ** 0.011 0.0714  0.272 0.4331 ** 0.031 0.0599 * 0.095
Media Legitimacy -0.0640  0.921 -0.0720  0.880 0.0079  0.968 0.1097  0.850 -0.1477  0.178
Size 2.5588 *** 0.004 2.0740 *** 0.001 0.4848 * 0.099 2.1641 *** 0.005 0.3947 *** 0.010
Adjusted R-squared 0.500 0.505 0.429 0.492 0.445
F-statistic 11.483 11.701 8.891 11.160 9.427
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 5.345 3.797 1.549 4.837 0.512
S.D. dependent var 8.244 6.059 2.420 7.375 1.220
Durbin-Watson stat 1.450 1.409 1.572 1.487 1.388
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Positive/Neutral Soft DisclosureHard DisclosureTotal Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)





Table-6: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports – All Firms (Balanced Panel) - (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -3.3431 ** 0.029 -3.2687 ** 0.020 -0.2069  0.785 -1.6835 *** 0.002
Performance 0.3248 *** 0.002 0.4927 *** 0.000 0.1447 *** 0.009 0.0893 *** 0.005
Beta -0.3741  0.204 -0.4840 * 0.084 -0.2007  0.177 -0.1108  0.210
Trading Volume -0.0078  0.107 -0.0080 * 0.066 -0.0070 *** 0.004 0.0009  0.596
Debt to Equity Change 0.0004 *** 0.003 0.0001  0.471 0.0002 ** 0.017 0.0000  0.627
Common Stock Change 0.0006 *** 0.000 0.0003 ** 0.011 0.0003 *** 0.000 0.0000  0.647
Block_Insider 0.0771 ** 0.019 0.0745 *** 0.006 0.0323 ** 0.016 0.0211  0.127
Block_Highest -0.0327 * 0.051 -0.0245  0.106 -0.0136 * 0.082 0.0006  0.900
ROA 0.6634  0.761 -0.0054  0.998 0.4715  0.600 0.1037  0.878
Debt to Assets -1.8033 ** 0.050 -1.2192  0.182 -1.4340 *** 0.004 -0.4040  0.232
Return -0.4694 * 0.092 -0.2487  0.323 -0.0901  0.549 -0.0887  0.370
Negative News -0.1626  0.395 -0.1789  0.324 -0.0321  0.739 -0.0676  0.298
Total News 0.2272 ** 0.026 0.2266 ** 0.015 0.0392  0.372 0.0839 ** 0.023
Media Legitimacy 0.0294  0.917 -0.0472  0.863 -0.0202  0.889 -0.0998  0.291
Size 1.3228 *** 0.001 0.8455 ** 0.017 0.3905 ** 0.047 0.4704 *** 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 0.447 0.430 0.429
F-statistic 12.026 9.493 8.902 8.874
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 2.330 1.936 1.083 0.482
S.D. dependent var 3.728 3.242 1.714 1.101
Durbin-Watson stat 1.431 1.448 1.597 1.167
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 78
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1092
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Economic  
 
The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in 
sustainability reports – case of firms that issued sustainability reports 
Among the 1092 firm-year observation, there are 376 cases where firms issued 
sustainability reports. The findings of an unbalanced panel data analysis of these 376 
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observations are presented in Table-7. I control for firms using the GRI guidelines using a 
dummy variable “GRI” equal 1 if the firm reports according to the GRI guideline and 0 if 
otherwise. The results show that there is no significant association between the disclosures and 
the level of environmental performance. Adopting the GRI guideline is associated with higher 
levels of disclosures. High trading volumes and high levels of debt-to-assets are associated with 
higher levels of environmental disclosures. High returns are associated with lower levels of hard 
and quantitative disclosures. Society awareness (Total News) is associated with higher levels of 
disclosures.   
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Table-7: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports – Firms with Sustainability Reports (Un-Balanced 
Panel) – (to be continued) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 18.5479 * 0.081 0.6510  0.937 17.8969 *** 0.000 21.3465 ** 0.016 -2.7807  0.452
Performance -0.1482  0.631 0.0446  0.849 -0.1928 * 0.085 -0.1915  0.467 0.0592  0.463
GRI 5.7774 *** 0.000 5.0116 *** 0.000 0.7658 *** 0.001 5.3181 *** 0.000 0.4263 ** 0.014
Beta -1.1519  0.194 -0.9147  0.206 -0.2372  0.519 -0.7726  0.311 -0.3735  0.110
Trading Volume 0.0207  0.475 0.0455 ** 0.043 -0.0249 ** 0.022 -0.0084  0.722 0.0288 *** 0.008
Debt to Equity Change -0.0106 * 0.099 -0.0082  0.118 -0.0024  0.368 -0.0073  0.185 -0.0033 ** 0.026
Common Stock Change 0.0001  0.576 0.0002  0.266 -0.0001  0.503 0.0003  0.217 -0.0001 * 0.063
Block_Insider -0.2127  0.111 -0.1177  0.223 -0.0950 * 0.098 -0.1248  0.272 -0.0915 ** 0.023
Block_Highest -0.0202  0.781 -0.0227  0.677 0.0025  0.931 -0.0509  0.417 0.0334 * 0.086
ROA -2.6282  0.679 -1.8760  0.705 -0.7523  0.744 -0.6257  0.899 -1.9078  0.318
Debt to Assets 7.9209 * 0.058 8.7656 *** 0.010 -0.8447  0.559 5.5606 * 0.098 2.3234 * 0.080
Return -1.1279  0.224 -1.4683 ** 0.033 0.3404  0.339 -0.7492  0.332 -0.3892  0.246
Negative News -0.0756  0.817 -0.1731  0.481 0.0975  0.413 -0.0207  0.945 -0.0359  0.683
Total News 0.3540 ** 0.010 0.4028 *** 0.000 -0.0488  0.352 0.2666 ** 0.018 0.0743  0.132
Media Legitimacy -0.7766  0.167 -0.6322  0.158 -0.1444  0.472 -0.5333  0.268 -0.1759  0.330
Size -2.4251  0.316 0.3533  0.848 -2.7785 *** 0.002 -2.8716  0.141 0.4326  0.619
Adjusted R-squared 0.511 0.550 0.272 0.515 0.453
F-statistic 5.257 5.982 2.519 5.326 4.381
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 15.524 11.027 4.497 14.048 1.487
S.D. dependent var 6.270 5.182 1.934 5.338 1.695
Durbin-Watson stat 1.648 1.561 1.957 1.704 1.566
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.844 0.391 0.870 0.821 0.076
Period Chi-square 0.658 0.160 0.704 0.621 0.012
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 65
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 376
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Positive/Neutral Soft DisclosureHard DisclosureTotal Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)





Table-7: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports – Firms with Sustainability Reports (Un-Balanced 
Panel) – (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 4.2937  0.398 3.5659  0.525 10.7061 *** 0.000 -1.0133  0.709
Performance -0.0877  0.522 0.1533  0.357 -0.1979 *** 0.006 0.0738  0.235
GRI 2.7032 0.000 2.7227 *** 0.000 0.3184 * 0.075 0.4139 *** 0.006
Beta -0.0067  0.990 -0.9884 ** 0.028 -0.1511  0.569 -0.0591  0.774
Trading Volume 0.0213  0.118 0.0166  0.291 -0.0175 ** 0.041 0.0157 * 0.082
Debt to Equity Change -0.0023  0.445 -0.0064 ** 0.035 -0.0019  0.364 -0.0008  0.513
Common Stock Change 0.0002  0.105 -0.0001  0.576 0.0000  0.623 -0.0001  0.312
Block_Insider -0.0796  0.174 -0.0875  0.247 -0.0492  0.174 -0.0904 *** 0.005
Block_Highest -0.0586  0.109 0.0535  0.150 -0.0124  0.537 0.0174  0.320
ROA -0.2014  0.950 -1.5055  0.603 -0.8266  0.604 -0.5363  0.701
Debt to Assets 3.4191 * 0.093 5.3145 ** 0.019 -0.8496  0.462 1.2952  0.228
Return -0.9266 ** 0.029 -0.3392  0.444 0.1275  0.647 -0.2652  0.296
Negative News -0.1091  0.462 -0.0328  0.839 0.0852  0.318 -0.0479  0.518
Total News 0.2290 *** 0.003 0.1647 ** 0.023 -0.0528  0.171 0.1061 ** 0.017
Media Legitimacy -0.3141  0.247 -0.2940  0.315 -0.1011  0.530 -0.1337  0.344
Size -0.1328  0.907 -0.9799  0.438 -1.3263 * 0.054 0.1736  0.781
Adjusted R-squared 0.530 0.470 0.303 0.469
F-statistic 5.593 4.615 2.769 4.603
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 6.766 5.622 3.146 1.399
S.D. dependent var 3.214 3.129 1.426 1.497
Durbin-Watson stat 1.433 1.768 2.170 1.239
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.110 0.489 0.613 0.018
Period Chi-square 0.021 0.235 0.353 0.001
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 65
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 376
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)




The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in 
sustainability reports – case of firms that issued sustainability reports according to the GRI 
guideline 
Furthermore, I study 184 cases where firms disclosed environmental information in 
sustainability reports prepared according to the GRI guideline. Table-8 shows that environmental 
disclosure is not associated with environmental performance (except for the positive association 
between firm specific qualitative disclosure and performance). These findings suggest that 
adopting the GRI guidelines has successfully reduced the reporting bias between the high and 
low performers. Furthermore, higher levels of insider-holdings and reliance on the capital market 
(change in common stock) are positively associated with the different measures disclosure. 
Higher levels of environmentalists’ pressures (negative news) are associated with lower level of 
disclosure. Meanwhile, society awareness (total news) is associated with higher levels of 




Table-8: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports (GRI-Disclosure) – (to be continued) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -11.3288  0.644 -31.2496 * 0.074 19.9208 ** 0.046 3.9562  0.842 -15.2850 ** 0.021
Performance 0.4090  0.343 0.4701  0.140 -0.0610  0.686 0.2648  0.462 0.1443  0.189
Beta -1.7998  0.160 -1.4830  0.106 -0.3169  0.517 -1.1704  0.284 -0.6294 ** 0.046
Trading Volume -0.0070  0.905 0.0248  0.560 -0.0318  0.180 -0.0345  0.466 0.0275 * 0.081
Debt to Equity Change -0.0029  0.850 0.0001  0.994 -0.0030  0.490 -0.0028  0.822 -0.0001  0.982
Common Stock Change 0.0003  0.257 0.0004 ** 0.040 -0.0001  0.391 0.0004 * 0.073 -0.0001  0.155
Block_Insider 0.5259 ** 0.027 0.4135 ** 0.024 0.1124  0.242 0.4833 ** 0.012 0.0427  0.605
Block_Highest 0.1059  0.319 0.0692  0.339 0.0367  0.449 0.0513  0.566 0.0546 * 0.059
ROA -2.3913  0.692 -0.9638  0.832 -1.4274  0.526 0.1598  0.974 -2.5511  0.137
Debt to Assets 2.7415  0.683 5.7333  0.274 -2.9918  0.164 0.0012  1.000 2.7404  0.147
Return 0.7865  0.542 -0.1882  0.851 0.9747 ** 0.045 0.7250  0.485 0.0615  0.873
Negative News -0.3874  0.238 -0.5004 ** 0.041 0.1130  0.422 -0.3446  0.210 -0.0428  0.707
Total News 0.5473 *** 0.008 0.6166 *** 0.000 -0.0694  0.426 0.4390 *** 0.009 0.1083  0.131
Media Legitimacy -1.4932 * 0.051 -1.1897 ** 0.035 -0.3035  0.289 -1.2959 ** 0.040 -0.1973  0.410
Size 5.5913  0.339 8.6212 ** 0.035 -3.0299  0.211 2.3515  0.610 3.2398 ** 0.048
Adjusted R-squared 0.467 0.519 0.370 0.494 0.484
F-statistic 3.196 3.701 2.475 3.449 3.349
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 18.109 13.310 4.799 16.391 1.717
S.D. dependent var 5.280 4.119 1.991 4.590 1.473
Durbin-Watson stat 1.949 1.967 2.120 2.003 2.163
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.859 0.261 0.658 0.884 0.025
Period Chi-square 0.531 0.026 0.242 0.587 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 12
Cross-sections included: 49
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 184
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Positive/Neutral Soft DisclosureHard DisclosureTotal Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)





Table-8: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports (GRI-Disclosure) – (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C -14.7236  0.110 -14.9707  0.306 18.3655 *** 0.001 -2.6413  0.590
Performance -0.0300  0.831 0.5213 * 0.069 -0.0823  0.405 0.0239  0.745
Beta -0.3016  0.506 -1.6655 ** 0.039 0.1673  0.595 -0.2545  0.316
Trading Volume 0.0169  0.444 -0.0041  0.905 -0.0198  0.131 0.0164  0.349
Debt to Equity Change -0.0007  0.911 0.0000  0.997 -0.0022  0.482 0.0048  0.107
Common Stock Change 0.0002 * 0.088 0.0001  0.576 0.0000  0.809 0.0000  0.778
Block_Insider 0.1967 ** 0.027 0.2655  0.120 0.0637  0.349 0.0319  0.536
Block_Highest 0.0110  0.799 0.1200 * 0.055 -0.0252  0.461 0.0279  0.276
ROA -0.2484  0.909 -0.1117  0.977 -2.0312  0.156 0.5546  0.682
Debt to Assets 3.6926  0.131 1.7187  0.678 -2.6698 * 0.077 0.2641  0.843
Return -0.0446  0.939 0.3878  0.592 0.4433  0.253 -0.1450  0.689
Negative News -0.3473 ** 0.011 -0.1298  0.530 0.0896  0.392 -0.1843 ** 0.018
Total News 0.3453 *** 0.000 0.2728 ** 0.027 -0.0709  0.273 0.1936 *** 0.000
Media Legitimacy -0.6594 ** 0.014 -0.6270  0.189 -0.2069  0.315 -0.3144 ** 0.048
Size 4.6294 ** 0.032 3.9248  0.260 -2.9629 ** 0.028 0.7298  0.545
Adjusted R-squared 0.589 0.423 0.372 0.462
F-statistic 4.596 2.840 2.485 3.149
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 7.924 6.929 3.255 1.500
S.D. dependent var 2.488 3.096 1.389 1.272
Durbin-Watson stat 1.905 2.037 2.390 1.940
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.514 0.261 0.447 0.066
Period Chi-square 0.128 0.027 0.091 0.002
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 12
Cross-sections included: 49
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 184
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)




The association between environmental disclosures and environmental performance in 
sustainability reports – case of firms that issued sustainability reports without a reporting 
guideline 
In this section, I examine the association between disclosure and performance in the cases 
where firms issued sustainability reports without relying on a reporting guideline (192 cases). 
Table-9 shows that the low performers disclose more information in their sustainability reports; 
they especially disclose more qualitative information in these reports. High trading volumes are 
associated with higher levels of disclosures in these sustainability reports (see association with 
total, hard, positive, and firm specific disclosures). Reliance on the capital market is also 
associated with higher levels of disclosures. Highest levels of insider-holdings are associated 
with lower levels of proprietary information (see the association with negative, quantitative, and 
economic disclosures). Highest levels of outsider-holdings are associated with lower levels of 
disclosures (see the association with total, hard, positive, and quantitative disclosures). Firms 
with higher debt-to-assets disclose less economic information in the non-guided sustainability 
reports. Environmentalists’ pressures (negative news) are associated with higher levels of less-
proprietary information (see the association with total, soft, positive, and qualitative disclosures).  
While society awareness (total news) is associated with higher levels of disclosure of proprietary 




Table-9: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports (Non-GRI Disclosure) – (to be continued) 
 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 24.3585 ** 0.033 14.2329  0.114 10.1256 ** 0.032 20.5113 ** 0.042 4.4301  0.360
Performance -0.5531 * 0.100 -0.4016  0.108 -0.1514  0.339 -0.3786  0.230 -0.1274  0.252
Beta -1.0072  0.367 -0.9663  0.326 -0.0409  0.941 -0.7084  0.482 -0.2340  0.546
Trading Volume 0.0648 ** 0.031 0.0513 ** 0.036 0.0135  0.445 0.0502 ** 0.042 0.0116  0.418
Debt to Equity Change -0.0003  0.959 -0.0020  0.689 0.0017  0.672 0.0024  0.693 -0.0028  0.109
Common Stock Change 0.0179 * 0.083 0.0117  0.171 0.0062 * 0.071 0.0173 ** 0.045 0.0006  0.864
Block_Insider -0.3160 ** 0.022 -0.2232 * 0.052 -0.0928  0.116 -0.1328  0.268 -0.1893 *** 0.008
Block_Highest -0.2080 ** 0.012 -0.1634 ** 0.014 -0.0446  0.171 -0.1698 ** 0.020 -0.0273  0.224
ROA 8.0516  0.472 6.3511  0.471 1.7005  0.636 6.3456  0.462 1.5396  0.701
Debt to Assets 0.5636  0.917 1.1144  0.804 -0.5509  0.809 2.0367  0.662 -1.8143  0.339
Return 0.2461  0.814 -0.2968  0.719 0.5429  0.229 0.3711  0.681 -0.1415  0.772
Negative News 0.6218 * 0.092 0.3686  0.192 0.2532 * 0.090 0.7482 ** 0.023 -0.1372  0.339
Total News 0.4761 *** 0.002 0.4382 *** 0.000 0.0379  0.471 0.3882 *** 0.001 0.0705  0.303
Media Legitimacy 0.6856  0.272 0.3213  0.510 0.3642  0.206 0.9974 * 0.069 -0.2151  0.459
Size -2.1838  0.356 -1.0066  0.599 -1.1771  0.233 -2.1127  0.304 -0.2102  0.858
Adjusted R-squared 0.622 0.646 0.222 0.550 0.591
F-statistic 4.980 5.416 1.689 3.955 4.491
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 13.047 8.839 4.208 11.802 1.266
S.D. dependent var 6.154 5.161 1.836 5.039 1.861
Durbin-Watson stat 2.325 2.280 2.106 2.263 1.561
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.446 0.258 0.994 0.637 0.400
Period Chi-square 0.067 0.018 0.943 0.178 0.051
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 53
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 192
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Positive/Neutral Soft DisclosureHard DisclosureTotal Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)




Table-9: The Association between Environmental Disclosure and Environmental 
Performance in Sustainability Reports (Non-GRI Disclosure) – (continue) 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  Coeff. Prob.  
C 10.8502 * 0.065 9.1259  0.133 4.9652  0.190 4.1628  0.183
Performance -0.1286  0.448 -0.1734  0.350 -0.2040 * 0.076 -0.0180  0.827
Beta -0.0674  0.925 -0.3947  0.406 -0.4803  0.261 -0.0949  0.752
Trading Volume 0.0128  0.443 0.0371 ** 0.021 0.0119  0.424 0.0019  0.854
Debt to Equity Change 0.0018  0.559 -0.0036  0.196 0.0013  0.639 -0.0012  0.336
Common Stock Change 0.0078 * 0.099 0.0031  0.574 0.0069 *** 0.008 0.0015  0.571
Block_Insider -0.1628 ** 0.035 -0.0791  0.235 -0.0802  0.117 -0.1537 *** 0.001
Block_Highest -0.1652 *** 0.001 -0.0045  0.900 -0.0274  0.275 -0.0241  0.195
ROA 9.1775  0.161 -2.9566  0.547 1.6643  0.456 0.5836  0.827
Debt to Assets -0.4482  0.877 0.8208  0.784 -0.1501  0.937 -3.3133 ** 0.017
Return -0.0411  0.934 -0.2928  0.575 0.5634 * 0.082 -0.0250  0.932
Negative News 0.2329  0.261 0.1457  0.466 0.2325 ** 0.034 -0.0501  0.694
Total News 0.2419 ** 0.011 0.2161 *** 0.001 0.0006  0.988 0.0838  0.195
Media Legitimacy 0.1806  0.616 0.3026  0.355 0.2991  0.194 0.0579  0.749
Size -0.9156  0.454 -1.2057  0.351 -0.2017  0.814 -0.0286  0.969
Adjusted R-squared 0.649 0.482 0.308 0.696
F-statistic 5.479 3.250 2.075 6.548
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean dependent var 5.656 4.370 3.042 1.302
S.D. dependent var 3.438 2.610 1.457 1.682
Durbin-Watson stat 1.802 2.465 2.317 1.572
Effects Test Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period F 0.033 0.994 0.873 0.171
Period Chi-square 0.000 0.946 0.503 0.007
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Periods included: 14
Cross-sections included: 53
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 192
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Economic  Qualitative Firm Specific Quantitative 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)







Based on the findings of this study, Figure-2 shows an ex-post model of the one 
presented in Figure-1. In general, a reporting bias exists based on the firm’s environmental 
performance whereas the high-performers disclose more environmental information in the three 
media annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports combined (support for H1). The results also 
suggest that environmental disclosures are motivated by economic and legitimacy incentives 
combined. However, it shows that economic and legitimacy factors influence the disclosure 
decisions of the low and high environmental performers differently (support for H3 and H4). 
An examination of annual reports shows that the low-performers disclose more 
information in annual reports; taking into consideration that economic and liabilities & litigation 
information are the main themes disclosed in annual reports. There are similarities between the 
type of information disclosed in annual and 10-K reports (i.e. economic and liabilities & 
litigation information); however, the level of disclosure of these themes is significantly higher in 
10-K reports (refer to Appendix E for a comparison between 10-K and annual reports). In 
contrast to annual reports, there is no association between the different measures of 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance in 10-K reports; suggesting that the 
SEC oversight over 10-K reporting was successful in reducing the disclosure bias and inducing 
the high-performing firms to disclose more information about their environmental 
operations(support for H2).  
The information disclosed in sustainability reports is different from that in annual or 10-
K reports. The emphasis in sustainability reports is on the disclosure of governance & 
management, credibility of the firm’s environmental information, environmental performance 
indicators, and environmental vision and strategy information. In general, the high-performers 
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resort to adopting and disclosing more information in sustainability reports. A considerable 
number of firms prepare their sustainability reports according to the GRI guideline. For the 
sample of reports issued according to GRI, there is no association between disclosures and firms’ 
environmental performance suggesting that providing clear reporting guidelines may help reduce 
reporting bias. On the other hand, an examination of sustainability reports that were not prepared 
according to the GRI guidelines shows that the low-performers use these reports to communicate 
more qualitative information which raises questions about the incentives of the low-performers 
for issuing these reports.     
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Figure-2: Ex-Post Environmental Disclosure Model 
Non-Proprietary 
Information 
(Information that has 
indirect/no impact on cash 
flow) 
- According to Table-8 
Appendix-E, shows a 
significant increase in 
environmental governance and 
management structure, 
credibility of firm’s 
environmental management 
and vision and strategy claims 
disclosures over the period 
from 1997 to 2010. 
- This increase meant a 
significant increase in positive 
and qualitative disclosures 
mainly in sustainability 
reports. 
Proprietary Information 
(Information that has direct 
impact on cash flow): 
- According to Appendix E, 
there is a relatively small 
increase in economic related, 
and litigation & liabilities 
information between 1997 and 
2010 (see Table-8).  
- However, there is a 
significant increase of 
environmental performance 
indicators disclosures within 
the same period due to the 
increased publication of 
sustainability reports. 
- It could also be noticed that 
there is a small increase in the 
disclosure of negative 










- According to Table-2, total number of news leads to 
higher levels of environmental disclosure. However, 
higher levels of negative news lead to lower levels of 
disclosure of negative information. Furthermore, firms 
with higher levels of media legitimacy are associated 
with lower levels of negative disclosures.  
- According to results in Table-3, these legitimacy 
incentives differ between the high and low environmental 
performers (support for H4). Disclosure of soft and 
qualitative information is associated with higher levels of 
negative news for the sample of high-performers and not 
the low-performers. There is a negative association 
between the amount of negative news and the disclosure 
of negative information, mainly for the sample of high-
performers. Furthermore, high-performers with higher 
media legitimacy disclose less negative and economic 
information in comparison with the results from the low-
performers sample. 
 
Economic Incentives:  
- Reliance on the capital market and higher levels of 
insider holding are two factors associated with an 
increase in environmental disclosure. Firms that are 
highly traded or firms held by a major shareholder are 
associated with lower level of disclosure (Table-2). 
- According to results in Table-3, these economic 
incentives differ between the high and low 
environmental performers (support for H3). For 
example, High trading volumes are mainly associated 
with lower disclosure for the sample of high performers. 
Disclosure of negative news is negatively associated with 
level of insider holdings for the sample of high-
performers but positively associated with insider 
holdings for the sample of low-performers. Disclosure of 
quantitative information is associated with the level of 
insider holdings for the sample of low-performers only. 
Higher levels of Debt to assets are associated with lower 
levels of disclosure for the sample of high-performers 






Performance: In general, 
Table-2 suggests that firms 
with higher environmental 
performance disclose more 
information (support for 
H1). The results of Table-3 
show that the association 
between economic or 
legitimacy incentives and 
environmental disclosure is 
moderated by the firm’s 
environmental performance. 
The results show that these 
incentives are different 
between samples of firms 
with low and high 
environmental performance 
(support for H3and H4)  
 
Disclosure Incentives: 
The results show that economic and legitimacy incentives 
influence the outcome of firms’ environmental reporting. 
 
Annual Report: 
- According to Appendix E, annual report is the least 
media used for environmental reporting with an 
average of 3.68 themes per report. Economic related 
themes are the main information disclosed in annual 
reports. There is evidence that environmental 
disclosures in annual reports have decreased over time. 
- Results suggest the existence of a reporting bias as 
they show that environmental disclosure in annual 
reports is negatively associated with firm’s 
environmental performance (Table-4). 
10-K Report: 
- According to Appendix E, there are similarities 
between information disclosed in annual reports and 
that in 10-K reports; though the average number of 
themes disclosed in 10-K reports is higher (6.2 
themes). The main disclosures made in 10-K reports 
are liabilities and litigation and economic information. 
- According to Table-5, there is no association 
between environmental disclosure in 10-K reports and 
firm’s environmental performance suggesting that both 
the low and high performers conform to the reporting 
guidelines set by the SEC (support for H1). 
Sustainability Report: 
- According to Appendix E, an average of 15.52 
themes is disclosed in sustainability reports. 
Information related to the credibility of the firm’s 
environmental management, environmental 
performance indicators, and firm’s vision and strategy 
are the main disclosures made in sustainability reports. 
- In general, firms with high-environmental 
performance are associated with disclosures in 
sustainability reports (Table-6). Within the sample of 
firms that reported information according to the GRI 
guideline, there is no significant association between 
disclosure and environmental performance (Table-8).  
- On the contrary, for the sample of reports prepared 
by the firm without the use of a reporting guideline, 
there is a negative association between disclosure 
(especially the disclosure of qualitative information) 





6. Discussion of results 
 The descriptive analysis of disclosures presents a comprehensive view of the 
development of environmental disclosures in annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports. There are 
similarities between disclosures in annual reports and 10-K reports. Both reports focus on the 
disclosure of proprietary information such as economic and litigation information. Further 
analysis shows that both reports communicate higher levels of negative information about the 
firm operations; in comparison to sustainability reports. However, the level of proprietary 
information disclosure (economic, litigation, and negative disclosure) in 10-K reports is higher 
than that in annual reports. I suggest that this is due to the specificity of the guidelines and the 
level of enforcement exercised by the SEC over reporting in 10-K reports. The decrease of 
environmental disclosures over the period from 1997 to 2010 provides evidence of the lax 
enforcement over disclosures in annual reports; in comparison to the steady levels of disclosures 
in 10-K reports. That decline in annual report disclosures may also hint at the weak demand for 
environmental disclosures in annual reports. This may be due to the similarity of disclosures in 
annual and 10-K reports.  
In comparison, sustainability reports emphasize the reporting of pollution abatement and 
environmental performance indicators and the disclosure of the management vision and strategy 
towards the environment. There is continuous growth in the adoption of sustainability reports 
over the sampled period (from 4 reports in 1997 to 50 reports in 2010) and the adoption of GRI 
guidelines for environmental reporting (from 0 in 1997 to 34 in 2010). In contrast to the decline 
in annual report disclosures, this increase in sustainability report adoption suggests that the 
demand for environmental disclosure in this media is growing. Furthermore, the adoption of the 
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GRI guideline results in an increase in sustainability report disclosure (average total disclosure 
using GRI guideline is 18.11 versus 13.05 for firms reporting without the GRI guideline).   
Discussion of aggregate disclosure in annual, 10-K, sustainability reports 
The significant positive association between aggregate measures of environmental 
disclosure and environmental performance shows that there is a bias in the disclosure of 
environmental information (support for Hypothesis 1 suggesting that there is a difference 
between the amounts of information disclosed by firms with high and low environmental 
performance). There is no evidence that the low-performers disclose more non-proprietary 
information to enhance their reputation. The results show that higher levels of performance are 
associated with disclosure of more soft, positive, and qualitative information. However, the lack 
of association between performance and disclosure of negative and economic information 
suggests that there is no bias between the high and low performers regarding the disclosure of 
proprietary information.  
The results also show that both legitimacy and economic incentives affect environmental 
disclosures. The negative association between total disclosure and the firm’s trading volume 
suggests that the capital market assesses that the costs of disclosure are higher than its benefits 
(except for the disclosure of negative information). Higher following by the media is associated 
with higher levels of disclosures of proprietary and non-proprietary information. However, the 
negative association between measure of negative disclosure and negative news or media 
legitimacy shows that firms attempt to maintain a positive image by disclosing less negative 
information.   
There are differences between how the groups of high and low-performers respond to the 
legitimacy and economic motivations. The disclosures are negatively associated with the level of 
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trading-volume; however, this association is higher in the case of the high-performing firms. It 
implies that – in general - the benefits of disclosing environmental information are relatively low 
for the high-performing firms in comparison to the low-performing firms (support for Hypothesis 
3). In other words, for firms with higher trading volumes, there is more demand for 
environmental information for the low-performers than for the high-performers. In terms of 
legitimacy incentives, there is no evidence to suggest that the low-performers attempt to 
legitimize their actions. In general, the responses of the high and low performers to the amount 
of negative news, total news, and the level of media legitimacy is similar. Moreover, high-
performers with higher levels of media legitimacy attempt to maintain their positive image by 
disclosing less negative information. The low-performers exhibit similar behavior but are willing 
to disclose more negative information than the high performers (support for Hypothesis 4). These 
results do not provide evidence that the low-performers are attempting to use their disclosures to 
legitimize their actions or create a favorable reputation.  
Discussion of annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports’ disclosures 
 The negative association between disclosure and performance shows that there is a bias 
in annual report environmental disclosure (support for Hypothesis 1). Economic incentives seem 
to be the main driver of annual report disclosures. Furthermore, total news following leads firms 
to disclose more information in annual reports.  
There is no significant association between disclosure and performance in 10-K reports 
(support for Hypothesis 2). This finding suggest that detailed guideline and the high level of 
enforcement by the SEC induce firms to comply with requirements; hence, improve the quality 
of disclosures. Firms’ 10-K disclosures are affected by economic and legitimacy incentives. 
Unlike annual reports, high-trading volumes are associated with higher levels of disclosures. I 
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suggest that this finding is due to high levels of demand for environmental information in 10-K 
reports; hence, making it more beneficial to disclose
26
.  
 Since the adoption of sustainability reports is voluntary, there is a need to consider the 
disclosures made within these reports. First, the descriptive statistics show that sustainability 
reports communicate private information that is not communicated in annual or 10-K reports. In 
terms of disclosure, the positive association between the different measures of disclosure and 
environmental performance provides evidence of reporting bias in sustainability reports (support 
for Hypothesis 1) - which include firms that did not issue a sustainability report. Higher trading 
volumes are negatively associated with this type of voluntary disclosure and higher debt to assets 
is associated with lower levels of disclosure. Total news following (proxy for society awareness) 
is associated with higher levels of disclosure in sustainability reports. 
 Regarding the sample of firms that issued sustainability reports (376 observations), there 
is no significant association between disclosure and performance except for the negative 
association between performance and measures of soft and qualitative disclosures. The adoption 
of the GRI guidelines makes the disclosure of firms more consistent (no association between 
disclosure and performance). While for the non-GRI sample, I find a negative association 
between performance and total disclosures (especially qualitative disclosures) which implies that 
the low-performers choose to disclose less proprietary information. In sustainability reports, 
society awareness (total news following) is positively associated with measures of disclosures in 
GRI guided sustainability reports, while negative news and higher levels of media legitimacy is 
negatively associated with different measures of disclosures.  
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 Kothari (2000, p. 95) suggests that higher level of enforcement of shareholders’ rights has a positive impact on the 




 This aim of this research is to examine the association between environmental disclosure 
and environmental performance to understand whether a bias exist between reporting practices of 
the high and low environmental performers and to determine the reasons that lead to that bias. 
The study suggests that firms’ environmental disclosures are motivated by both economic and 
legitimacy incentives. These incentives are moderated by the firm’s environmental performance; 
meaning that firms performance would determine the level of economic costs-and-benefits 
associated with disclosure. Further, the level of environmental performance would also 
determine the firm’s needs to legitimize its actions and how the firm would use its environmental 
disclosures to do so. Finally, the study suggests that the type of media (10-K, annual, or 
sustainability reports) mediated the firm’s incentives to disclose according to the level of 
guideline and enforcement associated with each media. 
The findings of this research contribute to the literature on the association between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance (see Clarkson et al., 2008; Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004; Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; Hughes et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2000). Results 
of prior research are divided between two opposing views; supporters of economic theory 
suggest that the costs-and-benefits of disclosure are higher for firms with high environmental 
performance which explains – according to their findings – why these firms disclose more 
information (Clarkson et al., 2008, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Their findings imply that 
disclosures made by high environmental performers are informative since they are driven by 
market demand for information. On the other hand, proponents of legitimacy theory suggest that 
low performers disclose more environmental information since they use these disclosures as an 
impression management tool to alleviate any threats to their legitimacy (Patten, 2002; Cho & 
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Patten, 2007; Hughes et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2000). Whether firms’ environmental 
disclosures are informative or opportunistic is still unclear in environmental disclosure literature. 
In fact, considering legitimacy and economic theory as mutually exclusive is a shortcoming of 
prior research since firms’ disclosure decision is complicated by both economic and legitimacy 
factors (see Neu et al., 1998; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 2003). Second, 
previous research infers the disclosure incentives of the high and low performers rather than 
study them. Third, the gap in prior research could also be due to the fact that the different studies 
examine environmental disclosures in different media – i.e. annual, 10-K, or sustainability 
reports. 
This essay extends previous literature on the association between environmental 
disclosure and environmental performance by (1) testing the association between disclosure and 
performance using a comprehensive disclosure model of the different economic and legitimacy 
factors that motivate firms to disclose their environmental information, (2) examining whether 
these economic and legitimacy factors are moderated by the firm’s environmental performance 
and (3) by considering all information disclosed in annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports. The 
main theoretical contribution of this study is the reconciliation of the two opposing views by 
providing evidence that environmental disclosures are motivated by both economic and 
legitimacy incentives for both types of firms - the high and low environmental performers. In 
other words, the findings of this study suggest that both the high and low performers make 
informative and free from bias disclosures – such as those made in 10-K reports or GRI guided 
sustainability reports - but could also use environmental disclosures as tool for impression 
management as in the case of firms issuing sustainability reports without the GRI guidelines.  
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  The results of this study suggest that there is a bias in the environmental disclosure 
process as there is evidence of a positive association between disclosure and performance that is 
mainly due to the voluntary disclosure of information in sustainability reports. In contrast to 
some previous findings by (Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007), this research shows that low-
performers adopt a more conservative approach towards disclosure of environmental 
information. The results suggest that low-performers comply with the minimum disclosure 
requirements such as the disclosure of economic and negative information caused by firms’ 
compliance with mandated disclosures in 10-K reports, which is due to the specificity of 
guidelines and the level of enforcement by the SEC. In general, there is little evidence that the 
low performers attempt to use their environmental disclosure as a tool for impression 
management; expect in the case of information disclosed in sustainability reports prepared 
without the GRI guideline where the low performers attempt to disclose more qualitative 
information. The study suggests that if the low performers attempt to use environmental 
disclosures to legitimize their actions, they would do so by withholding information rather than 
disclosing them. 
Finding that economic and legitimacy incentives are moderated by the firm’s 
environmental performance is another contribution of this study. There is evidence that the 
effects of economic costs-and-benefits differ between the groups of high and low-performers. 
The cost of disclosure for the low-performers is high; therefore, unless there is demand for 
environmental information the low-performers find it less beneficial to disclose. Concerning the 
firm’s legitimacy incentives, the study finds that firms respond to legitimacy threats using their 
environmental disclosures. In general, society awareness (total news following) about the firm’s 
environmental impacts is associated with higher levels of disclosure. On the other hand, 
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legitimacy threats - higher levels of environmentalist pressures – lead firms to disclose less 
information. There is no significant difference on how high or low-performers respond to these 
threats. Higher media legitimacy is associated with lower level of disclosure for the high-
performers but less so for low-performers. In other words, there is not enough evidence to 
suggest the low-performers try to legitimize their actions. In fact, the low-performers disclose 
more proprietary information (economic disclosures) and less non-proprietary information 
(qualitative disclosures) in response to higher levels of threats to their legitimacy.  
The examination of environmental disclosures in annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports 
shows that firms communicate different types of environmental information in each media. 
Finding that the role of annual reports in disseminating environmental information is reduced 
over time is another contribution of this study. There is evidence that annual reports’ disclosures 
are similar to those made in 10-K reports (though 10-K reports provide more details). 
Furthermore, there is also evidence that enforcement by the SEC reduces the bias between the 
disclosures of the low and high-performers in the 10-K reports. In addition, sustainability reports 
communicate information that is neither reported in 10-K reports nor in annual reports. The 
findings of this study also suggest that adopting a reporting guideline (such as the GRI 
guidelines) plays an important role in improving the quality of disclosures in sustainability 
reports by increasing the amount of information disclosed and reducing the gap between the 
disclosures of the low and high-performers. In brief, the study provides evidence that firms’ 
environmental disclosures are not limited to one media of disclosure but communicated using 
annual, 10-K, or sustainability reports; albeit the decline in using annual reports as a significant 
media for communicating environmental information in recent years. 
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Finally, according to the findings of this study, I make three main recommendations. 
First, unlike some prior research endorsing the legitimacy framework as the main theory that 
explains why firms disclose their environmental information (Patten, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007), 
I do not find enough evidence to suggest that low-performers are mainly tailoring their disclosure 
process to legitimize their actions to portray a positive image of the firm’s environmental 
operations. The low-performers conform to the regulatory disclosure requirements albeit 
adopting a conservative approach towards voluntary disclosure of additional information. The 
study provides assurances to the financial market over the current reporting system but also 
suggests that there is room for improving environmental reporting activities.  
Second, the study shows that higher level of enforcement and higher levels of guidelines 
improve the reporting process. Therefore, regulators need to ensure the enforcement of any 
mandatory disclosure requirements. The results suggest that SEC supervision of 10-K disclosures 
enhances the reporting of firms by eliminating the reporting bias created by differences in their 
environmental performances. On the other hand, low levels of enforcement lead to a decline in 
the use of annual reports as a disclosure media and contribute to the creation of a reporting bias 
evidenced by the fact that firms with low-environmental performance disclose more information 
in these reports. The study also shows that adopting the GRI guidelines improves the quality of 
voluntary reporting and reduces the reporting bias between firms. Therefore, I also suggest that 
regulators should enforce the adoption of the guideline as a first step to improve the reporting 
practices of firms in environmentally sensitive industries.  
Finally, I recommend researchers of environmental reporting to consider disclosures 
made in annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports to ensure that future research provides a 
complete and impartial picture of firms’ reporting processes. The study shows that firms channel 
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different information in the three types of media. Information reported in sustainability reports 
complements that in annual and 10-K reports. For example, firms use annual and 10-K reports to 
disclose economic and litigation information.  Meanwhile, the reporting of environmental 
performance indicators and firms’ strategy and vision towards the environment is the main 
emphasis of sustainability reports. In addition, the results of this study also show that the role of 
annual reports in disseminating environmental information has been declining over the years.   
These complementarities between annual or 10-K reports and sustainability reports and the 
declining role of annual reports mean that overlooking one of these reporting channels will affect 
the comprehensiveness and impartiality of future environmental disclosure research and will cast 
the doubt about the validity of the results.  
Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that coding of environmental disclosures in annual, 10-K, 
and sustainability reports and the coding of firms’ environmental news was performed by one 
coder. One reason for this limitation is that coding more than 2600 reports and 1000 newspaper 
and magazine articles consumed an extensive amount of time (approximately one and half year 
of coding). Hence, engaging more coders in this research project may have extended the data 
collection period to an extent where the time frame of this study would become less relevant. 
Though this limitation may affect the reliability of the environmental disclosure scores, the 
disclosure index employed in this study is developed based on previous indices by Clarkson et al. 
(2008), Wiseman (1982), and Aerts et al. (2008) which means that clear guidelines on how to 
code environmental disclosures were provided during the data collection period.  
Due to the timeliness of their disclosures, corporate websites are considered as an 
important venue for disseminating environmental information. Overlooking information on 
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corporate websites could be considered a limitation of this study. The lack of historical website 
disclosures is the main reason behind their exclusion from this study; which relies on performing 
a longitudinal analysis of firms’ environmental disclosures. Therefore, I suggest that website 
environmental disclosures could be a subject of future studies conditional upon constructing an 
ex-ante database for this type of disclosure.  
This study presents an operational model to measure environmental disclosures based on 
indices provided by previous studies by Aerts et al. (2008),Wiseman (1982) and Clarkson et al. 
(2008). Some of the variables included in this model such as environmental expenditures, 
liabilities and litigation, environmental performance indicators, and governance structure and 
management systems have been validated by prior research (refer to the first essay of this 
dissertation) that shows that these measures are either relevant to the firm’s capital providers or 
to the firm’s non-financial stakeholders. Other variables used in this model are meant to 
measures constructs such as conformity with laws and regulations, environmental profile, or 
environmental initiatives that are not yet validated; meaning that there is no research that 
confirms the relevance of these constructs or how to measure them.  
Opportunities for future research 
 The association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance is not 
consistent among the three media; annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports. There is a negative 
association between annual report’s disclosure and firms’ environmental performance (Table-4), 
no association is found when examining 10-K disclosures (Table-5), and positive association was 
find between sustainability reports’ disclosures and environmental performance (Table-6 to 
Table-9). This inconsistency provides an opportunity for future research to examine how firms 
use different media to communicate environmental information knowing that each media is used 
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to communicate different types of information (refer to Appendix E). Future research should 
examine the disclosure determinants of environmental information in each media separately to 




Chapter 4 - the Determinants of Disclosure of non-Financial 
Environmental Performance Indicators 
1. Introduction 
Research shows that non-financial indicators provide incremental information about 
firm’s current and future performance (Amir & Lev, 1996; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Rajgopal et 
al., 2003; Hall et al., 2005). Among these non-financial indicators, environmental performance 
indicators (EPI) are output measures that inform the different stakeholders about the firm’s 
environmental management. EPIs include the type and amount of pollutants that firms release 
into air, water, and soil. By providing such information, firms reveal their environmental 
performance to shareholders, environmentalists, regulators, and other stakeholders of the firm. 
Epstein & Wisner (2001) point out the importance of environmental performance indicators as a 
“lagging measure of process efficiency and also a leading indicator of environmental costs” 
(page 2). Regarding the disclosure of these indicators, there is a debate whether firms disclose 
truthful information or whether they make disclosures that portray a positive image about the 
firm’s environmental activities (Hughes et al., 2001). This study examines the reliability of EPI 
disclosures by examining if firms were involved in the disclosure of positive news. 
The disclosure of EPI information is largely voluntary by firms and though reporting 
guidelines – such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)27 guidelines – call for disclosure of 
EPI information, there is evidence that the level of information reported is very low (Clarkson et 
                                                 
27
 Requirements EN16 to EN25 of the GRI guidelines demand that firms disclose the amount of emissions, effluents, 
and waste they release into air, water and land. 
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al., 2008). Henri & Journeault (2008) find that although firms measure their environmental 
performance to monitor compliance with environmental laws, they are less concerned about 
reporting this information to external stakeholders. These findings suggest that firms are not keen 
on disclosing EPI information although there are concerns about how firms manage their 
environmental operations (Azzone & Noci, 1996).  
On the other hand, accounting research highlights the importance of non-financial 
information in explaining the gap between a firm’s book and market valuation. Research on the 
value relevance of non-financial indicators suggests that the financial market integrates this type 
of information in investment decisions (Amir & Lev, 1996; Ittner & Larker, 1998; Klock & 
Megna, 2000; Rajgopal et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2005). The results of prior research show that 
non-financial indicators provide investors with incremental information about the firm’s 
intangibles – such as human capital, technological advancements, or management capability – 
that could not be quantified in financial terms (Wyatt, 2008).  
In regards to the disclosure of non-financial environmental performance indicators, prior 
research shows that investors also value environmental performance indicators since they 
provide incremental information about the firm’s environmental management (Cormier & 
Magnan, 1997; Clarkson et al., 2004; Hughes, 2000; Johnston et al., 2008). However, since the 
disclosure of these indicators is totally voluntary, there are doubts about the truthfulness of these 
disclosures and whether firms use them as self-laudatory tools (Cho & Patten, 2013). Meanwhile, 
there is a lack of research about the reliability of firms’ EPI disclosures. Wyatt (2008) suggests 
that the reliability of non-financial indicators increases the relevance of the information 
disclosed. The objective of this paper is to examine the reliability of EPI disclosures made by 
firms from environmental sensitive industries by studying the determinants of disclosure and 
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whether firms reporting of environmental performance indicators are biased towards the 
disclosure of positive information.  
Previous research by Cormier & Magnan (1999), Cormier & Magnan, (2003), and Neu, 
et al. (1998) suggests that the level of environmental disclosure is determined by market forces – 
cost and benefit of disclosure – and by external pressures that drive firms in environmental 
sensitive industries to legitimize their environmental operations. Other research finds that firms’ 
environmental disclosures are a function of the firm’s environmental performance. These studies 
find a difference between the disclosures made by firms with high-environmental performance 
and those with low-environmental performance (see Patten 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008). A more relevant study by Clarkson et al. (2008) 
examines voluntary disclosures in sustainability reports and concludes that firms with high 
environmental performance disclose more information in their sustainability reports.  Such a 
difference signals the presence of a reporting bias suggesting that firms with low environmental 
performance attempt to hide information about their environmental performance.      
Disclosing environmental performance indicators allows firms to provide their 
stakeholders with information about their environmental performance or to manage the 
impressions of these stakeholders by selective EPI disclosure. Whether these voluntary 
disclosures are informative or opportunistic is still unknown since there is little research about 
the determinants of EPI disclosures and the reliability of the information disclosed. Prado-
Lorenzo et al. (2009) is one study that examines the disclosure determinants of environmental 
performance indicators – mainly greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) – and they find an association 
between the disclosure of  GHG information and the firm’s size, industry membership, and 
return on equity. However, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) uses an economic model to explain 
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environmental disclosures and ignore that environmental disclosures are also motivated by social 
threats to legitimacy. Furthermore, their model does not examine the reliability of the 
information disclosed by testing the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance. Finding an association between the level of firms’ EPI disclosure 
and their environmental performance is indicative of a reporting bias. For example, a positive 
association between EPI disclosure and environmental performance may indicate a bias towards 
the disclosure of good news. In brief, besides the lack of research on the determinants of EPI 
disclosure, prior research did not provide a comprehensive disclosure model that includes all the 
factors that affect the firm’s disclosure decision. 
In this study, I extend previous research by Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) on the 
determinants of environmental disclosure by examining whether firms’ disclosures of EPIs are 
biased towards the reporting of positive news. Shedding the light on the reliability of EPI 
disclosures is the main contribution of this study since it was not examined previously. 
Furthermore, studies by Cormier & Magnan (1999), and Cormier & Magnan, (2003) confirm that 
economic factors are the main determinant of environmental disclosure. Meanwhile, Neu et al., 
1998 suggest that legitimacy factors – such a society interest in information, regulator’s scrutiny, 
or environmentalist pressures also affect firms’ environmental disclosure decision. In this study, 
I extend the use of these disclosure models to study the extent to which EPI disclosure is 
motivated by economic factors, legitimacy factors or both factors combined.  
Contrary to the findings of the most recent study by Clarkson et al. (2008), the results of 
this study could not find a significant difference between the disclosures of high and low 
environmental performers. Furthermore, the study finds that a decline in environmental 
performance is associated with an increase in environmental disclosure. Unlike previous research 
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casting doubt about the reliability of the environmental information being disclosed, the findings 
of this study suggest that EPI disclosures by firms from environmental sensitive industries may 
be reliable and free from bias.  
The study also finds that previous disclosure models of Cormier & Magnan (1999), 
Cormier & Magnan, (2003), and Neu, et al. (1998) explain the disclosure of environmental 
performance indicators. The results show that firms integrate the cost-and-benefits of disclosure 
in their decision to report EPI information. Furthermore, the study also finds that higher news 
followings of the firm’s environmental activities are associated with lower levels of disclosure. 
In brief, this study provides further evidence that environmental disclosures are motivated by 
economic and legitimacy incentives. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
With limited amounts of natural resources, Wyatt (2008) highlights the increasing 
importance of intangible assets that enable firms to derive maximum benefits from these 
resources. She suggests that firm’s intangible assets manifest in different forms such as 
technological development, human resources, production management, and social and 
environmental management. The difficulty of accounting for these intangibles may explain why 
the disclosure of financial information is not sufficient in determining firms’ valuation. Thus, 
accounting research shows that investors integrate non-financial indicators in their investment 
decisions since it provides incremental information about the firm’s future cash flow.  
For example, Amir & Lev (1996) examine the value relevance of non-financial indicators 
and find that population size served by telecommunication firms multiplied by the firm’s 
percentage ownership (POPS) is positively and significantly associated with firm’s stock price. 
Similarly, Klock & Megna (2000) find that advertising, research and development, radio 
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spectrum licenses, and customer base are all associated with telecommunication firms’ value. 
Rajgopal et al. (2003) find that information about website traffic of E-commerce firms explains 
their stock returns. Hall et al. (2005) find a positive association between patent citations and 
firm’s value. Regarding human capital, Colombo and Grilli (2005) find an association between 
founder’s education and firm’s growth. Another line of research examines the association 
between the firm’s technological capital and its financial performance. Aral & Weill (2007) find 
a positive association between investments in the different types of IT assets and firms’ return on 
assets and net margins.  
Furthermore, many studies find an association between customer satisfaction indicators 
(CSI) – a proxy for the firm’s internal process of managing its operations - and firms’ financial 
performance, stock market performance and shareholder’s value (Anderson et al., 1994; 
Anderson et al., 1997, Anderson et al., 2004; Ittner & Larker, 1998). For example, Ittner & 
Larcker (1998) find that customer satisfaction indicators are associated with higher level of 
customer retention, improved financial performance, and hence higher levels of stock returns.  
There is a difficulty in defining the intangibles associated with firms’ environmental 
management; therefore, accounting research examines the value relevance of environmental 
performance indicators – an output measure of firms’ environmental management. Researchers 
find that these indicators help determining firms’ value. For example, Cormier & Magnan (1997) 
find a negative association between the market value of equity for a sample of Canadian firms 
and their levels of water pollution. Other studies find a negative association between firms’ value 
and the level of SO2 discharge (Hughes, 2000; Johnston et al., 2008).  Finally, Clarkson et al. 
(2004) find that the market value of firms with good environmental performance (TRI releases) 
is higher than for firms with low environmental performance.  
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These findings indicate that investors include environmental performance indicators in 
their investment decision. However, Wyatt (2008) suggests that the relevance of non-financial 
indicators is associated with the reliability of the information disclosed. Since the disclosure of 
environmental performance indicators is completely voluntary, there are no guarantees that firms 
reveal their true environmental performance. On the other hand, there is little research on the 
determinants of environmental performance indicators’ disclosure to explain whether firms are 
biased towards the disclosure of positive indicators that serve to paint a favorable image of the 
firm’s environmental management or whether disclosures could be reliably used to assess the 
firm’s environmental performance.  
Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) examine the factors influencing the disclosure of greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHG) on the websites of Fortune 500 companies. In conformity with prior 
research, they find that size and industry effects influence disclosure decision about GHG. They 
also find that economic indicators such as leverage and return on assets (ROA) are not associated 
with environmental disclosure of GHG information. In contrast to their hypothesis, they find a 
negative association between return on equity (ROE) and environmental disclosure of GHG. The 
study focuses only on economic costs and benefits to explain the determinants of disclosure; 
whereas prior literature suggests that firms’ environmental disclosures are also influenced by 
other factors such as social threats to legitimacy (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Aerts, et al. 2008; Neu 
et al., 1998). Further, Lorenzo et al. (2009) do not examine the association between the 
information disclosed and the firm’s environmental performance to determine whether the level 
of environmental performance influences the disclosure decision. In this study, I aim to extend 
previous literature on the disclosure determinants of EPI and examine whether EPI disclosures 
are associated with disclosure of positive news. 
171 
 
2.1. Economic factors influencing environmental disclosure of environmental 
information 
Previous literature shows that there are economic costs and benefits associated with the 
disclosure of proprietary information. Diamond (1985) suggests that in the absence of disclosure, 
traders will engage in private information gathering which will increase the cost of trading for 
each individual investor. Therefore, by disclosing their private information, firms benefit from 
reducing the cost of information gathering and improving the trading process. By examining 
annual report disclosures, Botosan (1997) finds that higher levels of disclosure were associated 
with lower cost of capital. On the other hand, Verrecchia (1983) suggests that disclosing 
proprietary information entails costs associated with increased scrutiny from regulatory bodies, 
which might affect the firm’s competitive position or cash flow. Hence, firms would only 
disclose their proprietary information if the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs. 
 Cormier & Magnan (1999) reckon that the decision to disclose environmental 
information is based on a cost and benefit analysis of that disclosure. On one hand, firms disclose 
relevant information to reduce the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
and to reduce the cost of information gathering; thus, ensuring that investors would not discount 
the firm’s share prices (Botosan, 1997). On the other hand, disclosing proprietary information – 
such as the disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions or amounts of sulfur dioxide emitted – may 
cost the firm through increased regulators and environmentalists scrutiny resulting in penalties or 
tighter environmental regulations. Cormier & Magnan (1999) control for information gathering 
costs using several proxies such as a firm’s volatility, reliance on capital markets, trading 
volume, control by a single shareholder, or being a subsidiary of another firm. Volatility, trading 
volume, and reliance on capital market are proxies for firm riskiness and dependence on equity 
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financing, two factors that require firms to disclose more information to satisfy the needs of 
current and potential shareholders. Therefore, it is expected that these measures will be 
positively associated with increased disclosure of EPIs. On the other hand, firms that are closely 
held or subsidiary of another company rely less on capital market and have less pressure to 
disclose EPI information. 
 Cormier & Magnan (1999) also control for a firm’s financial conditions. They expect that 
firms in superior financial condition are better able to withstand the cost of disclosing proprietary 
information and benefit from an open disclosure policy. Meanwhile, firms with a poor financial 
condition would be aware of the political and reputational costs associated with disclosure of 
proprietary information. Thus, these firms would try to avoid the disclosure of EPI information. 
They control for financial condition using return on assets, market returns, and leverage. They 
assume that higher level of leverage is associated with less disclosure of environmental 
information. However, Clarkson et al. (2008) find that leverage is associated with higher levels 
of environmental disclosure in corporate sustainability reports and websites. They refer this 
finding to the increased supervisory role of debt-holders.  
H1: Environmental disclosure of EPI information is positively associated with the firm’s 
information cost gathering. 
H2: Environmental disclosure of EPI information is positively associated with the firm’s 
financial condition.  
2.2. Social pressure and environmental disclosure 
 Economic costs and benefits underlie the rationale of disclosing environmental 
information to satisfy the information needs of shareholders. However, other stakeholders – 
including regulators, environmentalists, and members of the society – have interests in firms’ 
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environmental performances and can influence firms’ disclosure decision. Environmental 
disclosure research suggests that increased interests from outside stakeholders represent a threat 
to the firm’s legitimacy to which the firm would respond – using environmental disclosures – to 
confirm that the firm acts in congruence with the expected norms of operations (Aerts & 
Cormier, 2009; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho, 2009; Deegan, et al., 2002; Gray et al., 1995; Patten, 
1992). For example, Neu et al. (1998) find that social and regulatory concerns are associated 
with a higher level of environmental disclosure. They find that pressure from environmentalist 
groups is associated with lower levels of disclosure. On the contrary, Aerts & Cormier (2009) 
find that news exposure – a measure of community concern – is positively associated with the 
level of economic-based environmental disclosures and social-related environmental disclosures. 
How firms respond to legitimacy threats remains ambiguous. The environmental reporting 
literature suggests that firms choose different disclosure strategies to respond to pressure from 
interested groups. O'Donovan (2002) finds that firms adopt one of four disclosure strategies in 
response to legitimacy threats generated by media or interest groups: (1) they could avoid the 
disclosure of information about the subject matter, (2) attempt to alter social values by educating 
the public about the subject matter, (3) attempt to alter perceptions by disclosing positive 
information about firms’ achievements, or (4) conform to social values by acknowledging their 
low performance. Therefore, I suggest that pressure by interest groups could either induce the 
firm to disclose EPI information or avoid the disclosure of such information if the disclosure 
generates more damage to the firm’s legitimacy.  
H3: There is an association between the disclosure of EPI information and the level of 
interest groups’ pressures. 
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2.3. The information content in EPIs 
Although conservatism is a major trait of financial disclosure (Ball et al., 2000); there are 
suggestions environmental reporting is biased towards the disclosure of positive news (Deegan & 
Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996). Previous research does not provide empirical evidence 
as to whether the content of the information is a disclosure determinant. This may be due to the 
fact that environmental disclosure is proxied by aggregate measures – i.e. content indices - that 
encapsulate different types of information and combine voluntary and mandatory disclosures. 
EPI disclosures are directly related to the firm’s environmental performance; therefore, firms 
who suffer from low-performance provide negative news to their stakeholders by disclosing their 
environmental performance indicators. 
2.3.1. The relation between environmental disclosure and environmental performance 
 There is an ongoing debate about the association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance. Studies of total environmental disclosure suggest that firms with 
low environmental performance disclose more environmental information to defend the 
legitimacy of their operations (Hughes et al., 2000; Hughes et al., 2001; Patten, 2002). On the 
contrary, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2008) suggest that firms with high-
environmental disclosure would disclose more environmental information to obtain the economic 
benefits associated with the disclosure of their performance. With respect to EPI, the disclosure 
of this information could either bear good or bad news depending on the firm’s performance. 
Deegan & Gordon (1996) and Deegan & Rankin (1996) suggest that firms are biased towards the 
disclosure of positive environmental news. Deegan & Rankin (1996) examine the disclosures of 
20 firms prosecuted for violation of environmental regulations and find that only six companies 
provided negative information about their performance. Since EPI disclosures are completely 
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voluntary and since they provide good or bad news depending on the firm’s performance, I 
expect that firms with low environmental disclosure will totally or partially avoid the disclosure 
of such information. From a legitimacy perspective, disclosure may subject the firm to scrutiny 
from interested stakeholders. Furthermore, as EPI are leading indicators of future performance, 
the disclosure of such information may be reflected negatively in the firm’s market value.  
H4: There is a positive association between the disclosure of EPI information and the 
firm’s environmental performance 
2.3.2. Reporting continuous improvement 
Accounting research finds that reporting firms attempt to meet two conditions: to report 
continuous improvements and to meet stakeholder’s expectations (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge, 1999). For example, firms use their discretion within the boundaries of mandatory 
reporting to report positive earnings to their shareholders. Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) finds 
that firms manage their earnings to avoid reporting of losses or earnings decrease. Degeorge 
(1999) also finds that firms manage earnings to meet three thresholds. They attempt to report 
positive profits, show that previous performance is sustainable, and meet analysts’ forecasts. 
Concerning reporting of EPI information, since disclosure is voluntary, firms do not need to 
manage the reported information. They have full discretion over the disclosure process and may 
decide to fully disclose, partially disclose, or avoid disclosure. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
firms experiencing positive change in performance will disclose more EPI information. 
H5: There is a positive association between the disclosure of EPI information and the 
change in the firm’s environmental performance 
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2.3.3. Meeting stakeholders’ expectations 
The findings of Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) & Degeorge (1999) also imply that firms 
attempt to meet interested parties’ expectations. In the case of financial reporting, analysts’ 
forecasts have an influential role in setting the market’s expectations. Hence, firms attempt to 
manage earnings to meet earnings’ forecasts. Regarding the firm’s environmental performance, 
expectations are set by the performance of other firms in the same industry. For example, 
Clarkson et al. (2004) state that regulators use the performance of the top 50 percent firms in the 
pulp and paper industry as a guideline to set new environmental regulations in the industry. 
Furthermore, they find that investors positively value the environmental capital investments 
made by firms with high-environmental performance. On the other hand, investors do not value 
the investments made by the low-performers and assess an un-booked liability due to their 
performance. In brief, firms who show above-average environmental performance – in 
comparison to their industries - set the expectations of interested stakeholders. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that firms with above-average environmental performance – in comparison to their 
industry average - are associated with higher levels of disclosure of EPI. 
H6: Firms with above average environmental performance are associated with higher 
levels of EPI disclosures 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Disclosure model 
Using the following model, I examine the determinants of EPI disclosure by employing a panel 
data analysis.  
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EPI Disclosure = 0 + 1 * Environmental performance + 2 * beta+ 3 * Trading Volume+ 4 
* Debt to Equity Change+ 5 * Common Stock Change+ 6 * Block_Insider+ 7 * 
Block_Highest+8 * ROA+ 9 * Debt to Assets+ 10 * Return+ 11 * Negative News+12 * 
Total News13 * Media Legitimacy+14 * Size 
This model is based on previous disclosure models by Cormier & Magnan (1999b), Cormier & 
Magnan, (2003), and Neu, et al. (1998). Cormier & Magnan (1999b), and Cormier & Magnan, 
(2003) suggest that environmental disclosure is function of economic costs and benefits of 
disclosure, while Neu et al. (1998) introduce the influence of other stakeholders – such as 
environmentalists or the society – that may drive firms to legitimize their actions using 
environmental disclosures. 
Definition of variables: 
a. EPI Disclosure: To examine the determinants of disclosure of environmental performance 
indicators, I use three measures of disclosure provided by Trucost database. The first measure 
is the number of items disclosed (Item Disclosure) in annual or sustainability reports which 
proxies for the firm’s decision to disclose or withhold the information. The second measure is 
a disclosure ratio based on a technical evaluation - made by Trucost - of firms’ disclosures of 
its EPIs (Weighted Disclosure). The numerator of that ratio consists of total number of 
material environmental impacts for direct operations disclosed by the company in annual 
reports, or environmental reports (amount of emitted pollutants disclosed by the firm). The 
denominator is the total number of material environmental impacts for direct operations based 
on Trucost profiling of each company (amount of emitted pollutants estimated by Trucost). 
The ratio is also weighted based on the cost associated with each source of pollution. The 
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third measure is a binary variable equal 1 if the firm discloses information about its CO2 
releases and 0 otherwise (CO2 Disclosure) 
b. Environmental Performance: to proxy for the bias in disclosing environmental information, I 
use three measures of performance: 
i. Performance: the tons of pollutants disclosed could proxy for the firm’s environmental 
performance. However, adding the tons of different pollutants is not indicative of the firm 
performance since some emissions are more significant than others. Trucost provides a 
dollar value for the cost of these pollutants; therefore, I use the cost of pollution as a proxy 
for the firm’s performance scaled by firm’s revenue. 
ii. Performance_Change: is the change in the firm environmental performance. I proxy the 
change in environmental performance using yearly change. 
iii. Performance_Average: This variable is the difference between the firm’s environmental 
performance and the average performance of its industry. 
I extract the environmental disclosure and performance variables from Trucost database. Trucost 
is a company based in the UK that specializes in the analysis of firms’ environmental 
performances and quantifying the external impact of the firm’s performance into monetary 
terms. Trucost database provides performance assessment of firms that do not disclose EPI 
information in their annual report or sustainability report. Trucost contacts firms to request this 
information or estimate it using an econometric model.  
c. Measures of information cost gathering: 
The following measures proxy for the need for private information and the asymmetry 
gap between management and the outside shareholders: 
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ii. Risk (beta): measured using the firm beta. Firms’ beta is calculated using the five 
year monthly returns. 
iii. Trading volume (Trading Volume): using the firm trading volumes divided by the 
outstanding number of shares. Trading volumes are provided by the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
iv. Reliance on the capital market (Debt to Equity Change; Common Stock Change): 
using the change in the firm’s debt to equity and the change in the firm’s common 
stock. Data is provided by Compustat database. 
v. Insider holdings (Block_Insider): measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
firm’s officers and directors. Information is gathered from firms’ proxy statements. 
vi.  Outsider holdings (Block_Highest): measured by the percentage of shares held by the 
highest shareholder. Information is gathered from firms’ proxy statements. 
According to Cormier & Magnan (1999), firm’s beta, trading volume, reliance on the capital 
market are proxies for information demand from investors. Hence, I hypothesize that these 
measures are positively associated with environmental disclosure since disclosure would reduce 
the cost of information gathering for outside shareholders. Meanwhile, significant holdings by 
insider and outsider owners attenuate the cost of information gathering and hence are associated 
with lower levels of disclosure.  
d. Measures of financial condition: 
iv. Accounting performance measured by the firm’s return on assets (ROA). 
v. Market performance measured by the firm’s return (Return). 
vi. Leverage measured using the firm’s debt to assets (Debt to Assets). 
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Cormier & Magnan (1999) suggest that good financial condition would enable firms to withstand 
the cost of disclosing proprietary information. Hence, higher return on assets and market return 
are associated with higher levels of disclosure, while higher levels of debt to assets would be 
associated with lower levels of disclosure.  
e. Measures of firm’s legitimacy 
vii. Media legitimacy (Media Legitimacy): is a measure of the media’s perception of the firm’s 
environmental performance. According to Aerts & Cormier (2009) media legitimacy is 
measured using the Janis-Fadner Coefficient. 
viii. Environmentalists pressure (Negative News) : Neu et al. (1998) account for 
environmentalists’ concerns by measuring the number of negative articles containing 
negative criticism of the firm’s environmental performance. They find that firms subject to 
negative criticism reduce their environmental disclosure. 
ix. Society awareness (Total News): news exposure has been used in prior research as a proxy 
for society awareness and concern about the firm environmental performance (Aerts & 
Cormier, 2009; Neu et al., 1998) 
f. Control Variables: 
Size (Size): larger firms are more visible to the public and more followed by analysts (Aerts 
& Cormier, 2009). Therefore, I assume that the level of environmental performance will 
depend on the firm’s size which proxies for the visibility of the firm within its society  
3.2. Sample Selection 
The sampled firms should meet the following criteria:  
1. The firm should be available on Compustat. 
2. The firm should exist on Trucost database during the period from 2003 to 2010. 
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3. The firm belongs to an environmentally-sensitive industry. 
The selection criteria result in 82 firms distributed as following: 3 firms in SIC 10xx (metal 
mining), 12 firms in SIC 13xx (oil exploration), 9 firms in SIC 20xx (food manufacturing), 10 
firms in SIC 26xx (paper), 16 firms in SIC 28xx (chemical and allied products), 7 firms in SIC 
29xx (petroleum refining), 2 firms in SIC 30xx (rubber and plastic manufacturing) 6 firms in SIC 
33xx (metals), and 17 firms in SIC 49xx (electric and gas services). The sampled firms are listed 
in Appendix F. 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics: 
Using three EPI measures, Chart-1 shows there is a continuous increase in disclosure of 
environmental performance indicators over the period from 2003 to 2010. Interestingly, this 
increase is not consistent as evidenced by the decline in disclosure during the years 2007 and 
2009 which suggests that firms use their discretion over the reporting of their EPIs. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
CO2 Disclosure Number of Items Disclosed Adjusted Data Disclosure Ratio (%) - Weighted
 
Table-1 shows the Pearson correlation between the disclosure of EPIs and the other dependent 
variables. The correlation shows a positive association between disclosure and the three 
measures of performance meaning that lower levels of performance, performance below industry 
average, and negative change in performance are associated with higher levels of disclosures. 
Higher levels of holdings by insiders or by the highest outside-holders are associated with lower 
levels of disclosure. Finally, total news following are associated with higher levels of disclosure. 
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Weighted Disclosure .834** 1
Performance .259** .288** 1
Performance_Average .195** .274** .767** 1
Performance_Change .121** .152** .153** .122** 1
Beta -0.05 -0.018 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 1
Trading Volume -0.015 0.014 0.01 0.025 0.025 -0.053 1
Debt to Equity Change 0.02 0.013 0.01 -0.014 0.007 -0.034 -0.001 1
Common Stock Change -0.029 -0.026 -0.023 0 -0.002 0.03 -0.001 -0.002 1
Return -0.025 -0.045 0.025 -0.033 0.023 0.057 0.058 -0.054 -0.024 1
ROA 0.019 0.022 -.237** -0.052 -.084* .163** -.099* 0.061 -0.029 0.017 1
Size .306** .316** -0.029 .086* -0.035 -0.027 -.077* 0.005 -0.018 -.103** 0.076 1
Debt to Assets -0.045 -.108** .199** -0.005 0.033 .088* -.084* -.122** -0.027 -0.002 -.365** 0.005 1
Change in debt to Equity 0.02 0.013 0.01 -0.014 0.007 -0.034 -0.001 1.000** -0.002 -0.054 0.061 0.005 -.122** 1
Change in Common Stock -0.029 -0.026 -0.023 0 -0.002 0.03 -0.001 -0.002 1.000** -0.024 -0.029 -0.018 -0.027 -0.002 1
Block_Insider -.118** -.127** -.124** 0.001 -0.015 0.011 -0.024 0.014 0.072 -0.009 -.079* -0.012 -.077* 0.014 0.072 1
Block_Highest -.161** -.173** -.098* 0 -0.011 0.076 -0.015 -0.003 0.022 -0.017 -.081* -0.054 0.013 -0.003 0.022 .822** 1
Negative News .176** .219** 0.067 .113** -0.034 -0.014 -0.057 0.022 -0.012 -0.037 .121** .387** -.146** 0.022 -0.012 -0.032 -0.074 1
Media Legitimacy -0.019 -0.027 -0.019 -0.019 0.002 0.031 -0.058 -.077* -0.001 -0.007 0.039 -0.045 .079* -.077* -0.001 -.092* -0.061 -.423** 1
Total News .227** .268** .172** .229** -0.041 -0.037 -.101** 0.016 -0.018 -0.073 .089* .486** -.094* 0.016 -0.018 -0.068 -.103** .814** -.115** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).




4.2. Multivariate Analysis: 
Table-2 shows the results of a panel data least-square regression of the determinants of EPI’s 
disclosure – using the number of items disclosed. The results show that the number of items 
disclosed is positively associated with the trading volume and the firm’s yearly return. These 
results confirm previous findings by Cormier & Magnan (1999), that the higher the cost of 
information gathering and the higher the firm’s ability to withstand the cost of disclosure, the 
more the firm would disclose proprietary information (support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2). On the other hand, Total News is associated with lower level of EPI disclosure (support for 
Hypothesis 3). This finding suggests that higher levels of society awareness about the firm’s 
environmental performance lead firms to conceal information about its environmental 
performance. Finally, there is no significant association between the amount of disclosure and 
firms’ environmental performance or firm’s performance in comparison to industry average (lack 
of support for Hypothesis 4 or Hypothesis 6). However, unlike the prediction of Hypothesis 5, a 
decline in performance is positively associated with higher levels of disclosure. This finding 
suggests that firms continue to disclose EPI information albeit experiencing decline in their 
performance which provides empirical evidence that disclosure is not biased towards the 
disclosure of positive news.
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  Table-2: The Association between EPI Disclosure (items) and Environmental Performance 
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Variable Coeff. Prob.  Variable Coeff. Prob.  
C 0.9699  0.801 C 1.1367  0.766 C 2.1427  0.556
Performance 0.0771  0.211 Performanc_Average 0.0893  0.151 Performanc_Change 0.0047 *** 0.000
Beta 0.1492  0.345 Beta 0.1180  0.462 Beta 0.0818  0.588
Trading Volume 0.0125 * 0.059 Trading Volume 0.0123 * 0.063 Trading Volume 0.0119 * 0.066
Debt to Equity Change -0.0196  0.170 Debt to Equity Change -0.0185  0.196 Debt to Equity Change -0.0201  0.181
Common Stock Change -0.0003  0.275 Common Stock Change -0.0003  0.280 Common Stock Change -0.0003  0.310
Block_Insider 0.0257  0.210 Block_Insider 0.0268  0.187 Block_Insider 0.0280  0.175
Block_Highest -0.0109  0.556 Block_Highest -0.0117  0.526 Block_Highest -0.0148  0.423
ROA 0.8829  0.677 ROA 0.7930  0.704 ROA 1.2185  0.586
Debt to Assets 1.4261  0.320 Debt to Assets 1.5728  0.273 Debt to Assets 1.4359  0.318
Return 0.6626 ** 0.010 Return 0.6820 *** 0.008 Return 0.7375 *** 0.004
Negative News 0.0921  0.277 Negative News 0.0945  0.262 Negative News 0.0909  0.281
Total News -0.1199 ** 0.030 Total News -0.1196 ** 0.028 Total News -0.1155 ** 0.037
Media Legitimacy 0.3154  0.124 Media Legitimacy 0.3326  0.106 Media Legitimacy 0.2920  0.156
Size -0.1718  0.854 Size -0.1195  0.899 Size -0.3522  0.693
Adjusted R-squared 0.567 Adjusted R-squared 0.568 Adjusted R-squared 0.581
F-statistic 9.395 F-statistic 9.433 F-statistic 9.888
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Mean dependent var 2.087 Mean dependent var 2.087 Mean dependent var 2.087
S.D. dependent var 2.823 S.D. dependent var 2.823 S.D. dependent var 2.823
Durbin-Watson stat 1.817 Durbin-Watson stat 1.806 Durbin-Watson stat 1.799
Effects Test Prob. Effects Test Prob. Effects Test Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 Cross-section F 0.000 Cross-section F 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 Cross-section Chi-square 0.000
Period F 0.000 Period F 0.001 Period F 0.000
Period Chi-square 0.000 Period Chi-square 0.000 Period Chi-square 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 Cross-Section/Period F 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000
Periods included: 8 Periods included: 8 Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 82 Cross-sections included: 82 Cross-sections included: 82
Total panel (balanced) observations: 656 Total panel (balanced) observations: 656 Total panel (balanced) observations: 656
Item Disclosure Item Disclosure
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)




Table-3 examines the association between weighted disclosure – a proxy for the accuracy of the 
disclosures made - and the other disclosure determinants. The results show that lower levels of 
performance, below industry average performance and decline in performance are associated 
with higher levels of precision in EPI disclosure (results do not support H4, H5, or H6). Further, 
reliance on the capital market is associated with lower level of precision (lack of support for H1). 
This finding suggests that new stock issuance is associated with low demand for EPI 
information; therefore, firms that issue new stocks do not find it beneficial to disclose precise 
information about their environmental performance. Combined with previous findings presented 
in Table-2, this negative association suggests that firms’ reliance on the capital market does not 
influence the firm’s disclosure policy but rather influence the precision of the disclosure. In other 
words, firms that rely on the capital market would disclose their environmental indicators but 
would not disclose all the information that would enable new investors to determine the firm’s 
performance with precision. Finally, firms with higher media legitimacy make more precise EPI 
disclosures. This finding suggests that firms that have higher media legitimacy are able to 
withstand the resulting perception created by their disclosure (support for Hypothesis 3).  
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Table-3: The Association between EPI Disclosure (weighted) and Environmental Performance  
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Variable Coeff. Prob.  Variable Coeff. Prob.  
C 26.2756  0.548 C 28.5651  0.512 C 41.5874  0.317
Performance 1.0086  0.107 Performanc_Average 1.1576 * 0.066 Performanc_Change 0.0685 *** 0.000
Beta 3.5892  0.105 Beta 3.1796  0.152 Beta 2.6618  0.151
Trading Volume 0.1113  0.107 Trading Volume 0.1095  0.115 Trading Volume 0.1041  0.116
Debt to Equity Change -0.1268  0.512 Debt to Equity Change -0.1124  0.560 Debt to Equity Change -0.1325  0.519
Common Stock Change -0.0044 * 0.073 Common Stock Change -0.0044 * 0.075 Common Stock Change -0.0042 * 0.083
Block_Insider 0.1191  0.610 Block_Insider 0.1345  0.562 Block_Insider 0.1487  0.523
Block_Highest -0.2232  0.309 Block_Highest -0.2338  0.288 Block_Highest -0.2766  0.202
ROA 8.3562  0.685 ROA 7.1805  0.723 ROA 13.3719  0.540
Debt to Assets -1.4181  0.922 Debt to Assets 0.4928  0.973 Debt to Assets -1.3930  0.923
Return 2.2109  0.422 Return 2.4649  0.370 Return 3.2700  0.227
Negative News 1.0795  0.445 Negative News 1.1124  0.431 Negative News 1.0493  0.442
Total News -0.9667  0.170 Total News -0.9645  0.163 Total News -0.8931  0.176
Media Legitimacy 5.4065 ** 0.026 Media Legitimacy 5.6268 ** 0.021 Media Legitimacy 5.1037 ** 0.035
Size -3.0063  0.776 Size -2.3470  0.826 Size -5.3577  0.598
Adjusted R-squared 0.547 Adjusted R-squared 0.549 Adjusted R-squared 0.572
F-statistic 8.765 F-statistic 8.807 F-statistic 9.577
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Mean dependent var 21.507 Mean dependent var 21.507 Mean dependent var 21.507
S.D. dependent var 31.960 S.D. dependent var 31.960 S.D. dependent var 31.960
Durbin-Watson stat 1.865 Durbin-Watson stat 1.861 Durbin-Watson stat 1.828
Effects Test Prob. Effects Test Prob. Effects Test Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 Cross-section F 0.000 Cross-section F 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 Cross-section Chi-square 0.000
Period F 0.001 Period F 0.003 Period F 0.000
Period Chi-square 0.000 Period Chi-square 0.001 Period Chi-square 0.000
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 Cross-Section/Period F 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000
Periods included: 8 Periods included: 8 Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 82 Cross-sections included: 82 Cross-sections included: 82
Total panel (balanced) observations: 656 Total panel (balanced) observations: 656 Total panel (balanced) observations: 656
Weighted Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects




Table-4: The Association between EPI Disclosure (CO2) and Environmental Performance  
Variable Coeff. Prob.  Variable Coeff. Prob.  Variable Coeff. Prob.  
C -0.1920  0.745 C -0.0727  0.902 C -0.0159  0.978
Performance 0.0279 *** 0.000 Performanc_Average 0.0316 *** 0.000 Performanc_Change 0.0003 *** 0.000
Beta 0.0344  0.282 Beta 0.0300  0.351 Beta 0.0307  0.321
Trading Volume 0.0026 *** 0.005 Trading Volume 0.0024 ** 0.011 Trading Volume 0.0021 ** 0.017
Debt to Equity Change -0.0015  0.604 Debt to Equity Change -0.0014  0.629 Debt to Equity Change -0.0018  0.551
Common Stock Change -0.0001 ** 0.040 Common Stock Change -0.0001 ** 0.043 Common Stock Change -0.0001 ** 0.036
Block_Insider 0.0043  0.317 Block_Insider 0.0043  0.311 Block_Insider 0.0045  0.303
Block_Highest -0.0049  0.178 Block_Highest -0.0050  0.177 Block_Highest -0.0056  0.130
ROA 0.1913  0.533 ROA 0.1872  0.537 ROA 0.1904  0.525
Debt to Assets 0.0923  0.697 Debt to Assets 0.1230  0.605 Debt to Assets 0.0808  0.732
Return 0.0864 * 0.063 Return 0.0882 * 0.058 Return 0.0868 * 0.062
Negative News 0.0049  0.771 Negative News 0.0059  0.723 Negative News 0.0026  0.879
Total News -0.0108  0.340 Total News -0.0110  0.324 Total News -0.0090  0.414
Media Legitimacy 0.0019  0.961 Media Legitimacy 0.0049  0.900 Media Legitimacy -0.0006  0.988
Size 0.0910  0.521 Size 0.0789  0.580 Size 0.0733  0.601
Adjusted R-squared 0.486 Adjusted R-squared 0.488 Adjusted R-squared 0.489
F-statistic 7.073 F-statistic 7.123 F-statistic 7.152
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Mean dependent var 0.369 Mean dependent var 0.369 Mean dependent var 0.369
S.D. dependent var 0.483 S.D. dependent var 0.483 S.D. dependent var 0.483
Durbin-Watson stat 1.910 Durbin-Watson stat 1.905 Durbin-Watson stat 1.895
Effects Test Prob. Effects Test Prob. Effects Test Prob. 
Cross-section F 0.000 Cross-section F 0.000 Cross-section F 0.000
Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 Cross-section Chi-square 0.000 Cross-section Chi-square 0.000
Period F 0.038 Period F 0.049 Period F 0.035
Period Chi-square 0.014 Period Chi-square 0.020 Period Chi-square 0.013
Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 Cross-Section/Period F 0.000 Cross-Section/Period F 0.000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000 Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 0.000
Periods included: 8 Periods included: 8 Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 82 Cross-sections included: 82 Cross-sections included: 82
Total panel (balanced) observations: 656 Total panel (balanced) observations: 656 Total panel (balanced) observations: 656
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
CO2 Disclosure CO2 Disclosure CO2 Disclosure
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
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Finally, I examine the determinants of disclosing the amount of CO2 emitted by the firm. 
The results presented in Table-4 confirm previous findings. Lower levels of performance, below 
average performance, and decline in performance are associated with higher levels of disclosure 
of CO2 performance indicator. Furthermore, higher trading volumes and higher market returns 
are associated with higher levels of disclosure. The reliance on the capital market (common stock 
change) is associated with lower levels of disclosure. This latest finding is consistent with the 
finding about the firm’s precision of disclosures since CO2 emissions are the most significant 
and costly pollutant.  
5.  Discussion 
This research study examines the determinants of EPIs to understand why firms disclose 
this information and whether there is a bias in these disclosures. The study employs three 
measures to proxy for EPI disclosures. The first measure is the number of items disclosed in the 
firm’s annual or sustainability reports, the second measure proxies for the precision of these 
disclosures, and the last measure represents whether the firm discloses information about its CO2 
emissions or not. The findings of this study show that low-performers do not attempt to conceal 
their environmental information. There is no significant difference between the disclosures of the 
low and high-environmental performers; however, the precision of the disclosures of the low-
performers is higher than that of the high-performers.  
The results also suggest that both economic and legitimacy incentives affect the 
disclosure of environmental performance disclosure. The higher the cost of information 
gathering, the higher the level but not the precision of the information disclosed. Similarly, firms 
with better financial condition have the ability to withstand the costs of disclosing this 
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proprietary information; thus, they exhibit a higher level of disclosure. In contrast, firms react 
differently to the other stakeholders’ needs for information. Higher levels of society awareness 
about the firm’s environmental performance lead to lower levels of disclosure. Furthermore, the 
higher the level of the firm’s media legitimacy, the more the firm would disclose more precise 
information about its environmental indicators. 
The study shows that there is little concern that the reporting of EPI is biased towards the 
disclosure of positive news. In fact, the results suggest that firms with lower levels of 
environmental performance are keener on disclosing their EPI in comparison to the high-
performers. The study also shows that firms are responsive to the needs of their shareholders as 
we find that higher demand for EPI information from the financial market is associated with 
higher levels of disclosure. On the contrary, firms are less responsive to the needs of their outside 
stakeholders as we find that the level of disclosure is negatively associated with total news 
following of the firm. Furthermore, firms will not disclose precise information unless they have a 
high level of media legitimacy. Although there is little doubt about the reliability of the 
information disclosed, the findings of this paper suggest that firms avoid disclosing precise 
information when they assess that the disclosures will present a threat to their legitimacy. 
Therefore, there is a need for more guidelines and more enforcement over the reporting of EPIs 




Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 Research on corporate environmental disclosure generates inconclusive results about the 
reliability of the information disclosed. Furthermore, there is also an ensuing debate about the 
factors that drive firms to disclose environmental information. Some argue that environmental 
disclosure is driven by investors’ demand for information and that economic costs-and-benefits 
of disclosure are determinants of firms’ disclosure policies (Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Cormier 
& Magnan, 2003). Others suggest that firms use their environmental disclosures to legitimize 
their operations and avoid pressures from environmentalists, regulators, or the wide society (Neu 
et al, 1998; Patten, 2002; Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; Cho & Patten, 2007). A third string 
of research provides evidence that internal and external institutional forces shape firms 
environmental disclosures (Aerts et al., 2006; Alciatore et al., 2004; Stanny, 1998). That debate 
has cast doubt about the usefulness of firms’ environmental disclosures; whether these 
disclosures are informative or illusive. 
This dissertation contributes to that ongoing debate by studying the development of 
environmental disclosures over time to understand whether these disclosures are indicative of 
firms’ environmental performance. To answer this question there is a need to first understand 
what has been disclosed and why do firms disclose environmental information. In the first essay, 
I review prior research of five environmental themes: capital expenditures, litigation and 
liabilities, pollution abatement, environmental performance indicators, and governance and 
management systems. The results show that over time firms have continuously increased the 
amount of mandatory information – such as the disclosure of environmental capital expenditures 
or liabilities – due to the tightening of disclosure regulation (Stanny, 1998, Alciatore et al., 
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2004). Meanwhile, the level of voluntary disclosures – such as the disclosure of performance 
indicators or governance and management information - is still very low although firms 
continuously increased their disclosures over time (Clarkson et al, 2008). These findings 
highlight the role of regulations in closing the disclosure gap between firms. This study shows 
that both economic and legitimacy incentives have influenced – or biased – environmental 
disclosures but it also suggests that disclosure regulations have helped reducing this bias and 
induced firms to provide more information about their environmental operations even if the 
information is immaterial.  
There is extensive research about mandatory environmental disclosure themes – mainly 
the disclosure of capital expenditures, liabilities and litigation, and pollution abatement 
information – that confirm the value relevance of these disclosures to the capital market since it 
provides them with information about the impact of firms’ environmental operations on their 
future cash flow. However, there is less research about how these types of information is relevant 
to non-financial stakeholders  who are more interested in firms’ environmental performance per 
se. This literature review also suggests that other environmental themes are still under-researched 
– such as the disclosure of environmental governance and management system information, 
disclosure of environmental performance indicators, or the disclosure of laws and regulations 
influencing the firm’s operations. There is a need to understand how investors and other 
stakeholders integrate these disclosures into their assessment of the firm’s future environmental 
and financial performance. Although the value relevance of these disclosures is still unproven, 
these themes have been extensively used in accounting research as parts of content indexes 
which raises questions about the findings of many environmental disclosure studies. Therefore, 
more focused research of these themes is required. 
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The second research paper studies the reliability of environmental information by 
examining the association between environmental disclosure and environmental performance. 
The findings of this study confirm that environmental performance leads to a reporting bias 
where I find that – on aggregate - the high performing firms disclose more environmental 
information in their annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports. The study also confirms previous 
findings that tightening of disclosure regulations and increased scrutiny from regulators 
improves the reliability of environmental disclosures as witnessed in 10-K disclosures. The 
results of this study suggest that there is no significant difference between the 10-K disclosures 
of firms with low environmental performance and those with high environmental performance.  
The study also explores the motivation of the low and high performers to disclose their 
proprietary environmental information. The results suggest that firms’ environmental disclosures 
are motivated by both economic and legitimacy incentives; meaning that, firms use their 
environmental disclosures to satisfy information demand from different stakeholders such as 
investors, environmentalists, and members of the society. Although the disclosures of both the 
low and high performers are motivated by their needs to legitimize their environmental 
operations, the results do not suggest that the low performers attempt to hide proprietary 
information or provide disclosures that will portray the firm’s environmental performance in a 
positive light. This is mainly due to two factors; first, that a large amount of proprietary 
environmental information is regulated and second that the low performers will be penalized by 
the financial market if they do so. Therefore, I suggest that the impact of legitimacy incentives 
on environmental disclosures is counterbalanced by market demand for information and other 
institutional factors such as regulations of environmental disclosures or the issuance of voluntary 
disclosure guidelines such as the GRI. In brief, I conclude that there has been a positive 
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development in environmental reporting over the last two decades which resulted in a continuous 
increase in the amount of information reported and a convergence of the reporting practices 
between firms. Although there is evidence that firms use their environmental disclosure to 
legitimize their actions, I do not share the cynical view of some scholars that firms’ disclosures 
only serve this purpose. 
The last paper examines the disclosure determinants of environmental performance 
indicators (EPI); a voluntary disclosure which is indicative of the firms environmental 
performance. The main objective is to understand whether EPI disclosures are biased towards the 
disclosure of positive information. The results show that firms’ disclosures are not associated 
with the level of environmental performance suggesting that the information provided by firms 
are reliable and free from bias. Furthermore, the study also shows that firms continue to provide 
EPI information even if they witness a decline in their environmental performance. Similar to 
other studies examining the voluntary disclosure of environmental information, I find that the 
level of EPI disclosure is still very low and is continuously varying over the sampled period 
indicating that firms use their discretion to disclose this type of information. The results of this 
study suggest – in conformance with the findings of the previous study - that firms’ 
environmental disclosures are reliable; however, it also suggests that mandating EPI disclosure 
may increase the level of information disclosed and reduce firms’ discretion over the reporting of 
such information. 
Limitations 
 That this dissertation does not examine the consequences of environmental disclosures – 
i.e. value relevance of disclosures or how environmental disclosures affect the social domain – is 
a shortcoming of this research although the dataset collected for this dissertation could still be 
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used for that purpose in future studies.  To better understand the consequences of environmental 
disclosures, it would be more beneficial to first know what constitutes these disclosures. 
Furthermore, understanding why firms decide to disclose their environmental information and 
whether the information disclosed provides a faithful representation of the firm’s environmental 
performance strengthens the findings of research looking at the consequences of these 
disclosures. 
Recommendations      
 The outcome of this dissertation indicates that environmental reporting has positively 
developed over time; however, there is still more work to be done for firms to provide their 
stakeholders with a complete picture about their environmental performances. It also shows that 
disclosure regulation has played a fundamental role in increasing the level of environmental 
disclosure and increasing the reliability of the information reported by reducing the level of 
reporting bias. There is also a need to regulate other types of environmental information such as 
the disclosure of environmental performance indicators, environmental governance and 
management, and others to insure consistent reporting of these types of information. The 
development of voluntary reporting guidelines – such as the GRI – increased the level of 
information reported and reduced reporting bias resulting from firms environmental 
performance; however, the level of information reported is still low due to firms’ unwillingness 
to adopt these guidelines. I suggest that mandating the adoption of the GRI guidelines could 
provide a step towards a more comprehensive reporting framework that includes environmental 
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Appendix A: Disclosure Requirements in Annual, 10-K, and Sustainability Reports 
 
Disclosure Requirements Enforcement 
Annual 
Report 
FASB statement no 5: accounting for contingencies. 
FASB interpretation no14: require the reasonable estimation of the amount of 
loss. 
Issue no 90-8: capitalization of costs to treat environmental contamination. 
Issue no 89-13: accounting for the cost of asbestos removal. 
Issue of no 93-5: accounting for environmental liabilities. 
 
Requirements are set by the 
FASB and AICPA. No 
evidence of enforcement. 
10-K Report In addition to FASB requirements the SEC recommends the following in 10-K 
reports: 
Item 101: requires the description of business and disclosure of environmental 
matters affecting the business. 
Item 103: requires the disclosure of legal proceedings involving the company. 
Item 303: requires the disclosure of material events and uncertainties, and 
long-term contractual liabilities. 
Item 503: requires the disclosure of the company’s risk factors.  
Staff Accounting Bulletin no 92: accounting and disclosure of loss 
contingencies. 
 
Additional requirements are 
set by the SEC. Reports are 
reviewed and enforced by 
the SEC.  
Sustainability 
Report – GRI 
Guideline 
 Disclosure on management approach 
 Goals and performance 
 Policy 
 Organizational responsibility 
 Training and awareness 
 Monitoring and follow-up 





o Emissions, effluents, and waste 






Requirements are set by the 
Global Reporting Initiative. 
No evidence of enforcement. 
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Appendix B: List of Firms for Essay 2 
COMPANY NAME SIC 
CODE 
COMPANY NAME SIC 
CODE 
3M Company 2670 Heinz (H.J.) Company 2030 
AGL Resources Inc. 4924 Helmerich & Payne, Inc. 1381 
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 2810 Hershey Company (The) 2060 
Alberto-Culver Company 2844 IDACORP Inc. 4911 
Alcoa, Inc. 3350 International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. 2860 
American Electric Power 
Company, Inc. 
4911 International Paper Company 2600 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 1311 Kellogg Company 2040 
Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. 2082 Kimberly-Clark Corporation 2621 
Apache Corporation 1311 Marathon Oil Corporation 2911 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 2070 Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. 3089 
Avery Dennison Corporation 2670 Newmont Mining Corporation 1040 
Avon Products, Inc. 2844 Nicor, Inc. 4924 
Bemis Company, Inc. 2670 NIKE, Inc. 3021 
Cabot Corporation 2890 Nucor Corporation 3312 
Calgon Carbon Corporation 2810 Occidental Petroleum Corporation 1311 
Campbell Soup Company 2030 OGE Energy Corp. 4922 
Church & Dwight Co., Inc. 2840 Pepco Holdings, Inc. 4911 
Cleco Corporation 4911 PepsiCo, Inc. 2080 
Clorox Company (The) 2842 PG&E Corporation 4931 
Coca-Cola Company 2080 PPG Industries, Inc. 2851 
Colgate-Palmolive Company 2844 PPL Corporation 4911 
ConAgra Foods, Inc. 2000 Praxair, Inc. 2810 
Consolidated Edison Inc. 4931 Procter & Gamble Company 2840 
Cooper Tire and Rubber Company 3011 Public Service Enterprise Group, 
Incorporated 
4931 
Dominion Resources, Inc. 4911 Rohm and Haas Company 2821 
Dow Chemical Company 2821 Rowan Companies, Inc. 1381 
DTE Energy Company 4911 Sara Lee Corporation 2000 
Duke Energy Corporation 4931 Schlumberger N.V. 1389 
DuPont Company 2820 Sealed Air Corporation 2670 
Eastman Chemical Company 2821 Sherwin-Williams Company (The) 2851 
Ecolab Inc. 2842 Sonoco Products Company 2650 
Edison International 4911 Southern Company 4911 
Energen Corporation 4924 Sunoco, Inc. 2911 
Entergy Corporation 4911 Temple-Inland Inc. 2631 
Equitable Resources, Inc. 4923 Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. 2060 
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & 
Gold Inc. 
1000 Tupperware Brands Corporation 3089 
General Mills Incorporated 2040 United States Steel Corporation 3312 
odyear Tire & Rubber 
Company 
3011 WGL Holdings, Inc. 4924 
Halliburton Company 1389 Williams Companies, Inc. 4922 
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HARD DISCLOSURES           
Governance structure and management systems           
1. Existence of a department for pollution control and/or management positions for environmental management X     X   
2. Existence of an environmental and/or public issues committee in the board X     X   
3. Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental practices X     X   
4. Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies X     X   
5. Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level X     X   
6. Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance X     X   
Credibility           
1. Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a CERES report X     X   
2. Independent verification/assurance about environmental performance and/or systems X     X   
3. Periodic independent verification/audits on environmental performance and/or systems X     X   
4. Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies X     X   
5. Product certification with respect to environmental impact X     X   
6. External environmental performance awards and/or inclusion in a sustainability index X     X   
7. Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process X     X   
8. Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by EPA or Department of Energy X     X   








































































10. Participation in other environmental organizations/associations to improve environmental practices  X     X   
Contamination and remediation efforts           
1. Spills (number, nature, efforts of reduction)   X   X   
2. Specific disclosure that the company has been named as a Potentially Responsive Party   X   X   
3. Efforts of remediation or corrective actions X     X   
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI)           
1. Control, installations, facilities or processes described X   X     
2. Recycling (description of processes) X   X     
3. EPI on energy use and/or energy efficiency X   X     
4. EPI on water use and/or water use efficiency X   X     
5. EPI on green house gas emissions X   X     
6. EPI on other air emissions X   X     
7. EPI on TRI (land, water, air) X   X     
8. EPI on other discharges releases and/or spills (not TRI) X   X     
9. EPI on waste generation and/or management X   X     
10. EPI on land and resources use, biodiversity and conservation X   X     








































































12. EPI on compliance performance (e.g. exceedances, reportable, incidents) X   X     
Economic factors           
1. Past and current expenditures for pollution control equipment and facilities X   X     
2. Past and current operating costs of pollution control equipment and facilities X   X     
3. Future estimates of expenditures for pollution control equipment and facilities X   X     
4. Future estimates of operating costs for pollution control X   X     
5. Financing for pollution control equipment or facilities X   X     
6. Summary of dollar savings from environmental initiatives to the company X   X     
7. Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues   X X     
8. Disclosure of monetary accruals and/or expenses incurred for remediation   X X     
9. Dollar amount for environmental liabilities   X X     
Litigation and liabilities           
1. Present litigation   X   X   
2. Potential litigation   X   X   
3. Orders to conform   X   X   
4. Actual or potential fines   X   X   
5. Environmental debts   X   X   








































































Vision and strategy claims           
1. CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders X       X 
2. A statement of corporate environmental policy, value, and principles, environmental codes of conduct X       X 
3. A statement about formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance X       X 
4. A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environmental performance X     X   
5. A statement of measurable goals in terms of future environmental performance  X     X   
6. A statement about environmental innovations and/or new technologies X     X   
Laws and regulations conformity           
1. Discussion of regulations and requirements X       X 
2. Future legislation and regulations X       X 
3. A statement about the firm compliance (or lack thereof) with specific environmental standards X       X 
Environmental profile           
1. An overview of environmental impact of the industry X       X 
2. An overview of how the business operations and/or products and services impact the environment X       X 
3. An overview of corporate environmental performance relative to industry peers X       X 
Environmental initiatives           








































































2. Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents X     X   
3. Internal environmental awards X     X   
4. Internal environmental audits X     X   
5. Internal certification of environmental programs X     X   





Appendix D: Example of Classifying Firms Disclosures – 2005 disclosures of Alcoa Company  
   Type of Disclosure 




























































Alcoa Shanghai is educating students to sustain the environment 
by supporting The Jane Goodall Institute’s Roots & Shoots® 
program, which promotes community service and educational 
activities. Jane Goodall is a renowned primatologist (p.6) 
Environmental initiatives  1 1   1  
Annual Report 
Alcoa’s Tapoco hydroelectric project in Tennessee has been 
certified as an environmentally responsible, low-impact 
hydropower project by the Low Impact   Hydropower Institute, 
a U.S. nonprofit (p.18) 
Credibility 1  1   1  
10-K Report 
As previously reported, since 1989 Alcoa has been conducting 
investigations and studies of the Grasse River, adjacent to 
Alcoa’s Massena, New York plant site, under order from the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued under 
Section 106 of CERCLA. Sediments and fish in the river 
contain varying levels of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) (p.22) 
Contamination and remediation efforts 1   1  1  
10-K Report 
The range of costs associated with the remedial alternatives 
evaluated in the 2002 Report was between $2 million and $525 
million (p.22) 
Economic Factors 1   1 1   
Sustainability 
Report 
We must remain vigilant to reach our goal of a 60% reduction in 
water use by 2009 and 70% by 2010 from a base year of 2000 
(p.9). 
Vision and strategy claims  1 1  1   
Sustainability 
Report 
Through 2005, we achieved a 23% reduction in process 
water (p.9) 
Pollution abatement and environmental 
performance indicators (EPI) 
1  1  1   
Sustainability 
Report 
In January 2005 and 2006, Alcoa was named one of the most 
sustainable corporations in the world during a ceremony at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. At the end of 
2005, we were also named one of the top green companies in the 
Vision and strategy claims  1 1    1 
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   Type of Disclosure 



























































world by BusinessWeek magazine and the Climate Group in 
recognition of our performance in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (CEO Statement p.2) 
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 Appendix E: Analysis of information disclosed in annual reports, 10-K reports, and 
sustainability reports 
1. Analysis of environmental information disclosed in annual reports, 10-K reports, 
and sustainability reports. 
Environmental disclosures in annual reports 
The sample firms issued 1092 annual reports during the period from 1997 to 2010. Table-
1 shows that the average total disclosure in annual reports is around 3.7 themes per year. Annual 
reports include more hard disclosures than soft disclosures (2.7 vs. 1.0). They include less 
negative disclosures (1.4 themes) in comparison to positive and neutral disclosures (2.3 themes). 
In annual reports, firms focus on disclosing firm-specific qualitative disclosures (1.7themes), 
followed by quantitative disclosures (1.2 themes) and general qualitative disclosures (0.8 
themes). Among the different disclosure themes there is slight emphasize on disclosure of 
economic factors (1.05 themes).  
Environmental disclosures in 10-K reports 
The sample firms issued 1092 10-K reports during the period from 1997 to 2010. Table-2 
shows that the level of total disclosure is higher than that in annual reports with an average 6.2 
themes. 10-K reports include higher ratio of hard to soft disclosures (4.9 vs. 1.3 themes). Further, 
there is more balance in the disclosure of negative versus positive or neutral information (3.3 vs. 
2.9 themes). Finally, firm-specific qualitative disclosures amount to 2.7 themes with quantitative 
and general qualitative disclosures equal to 2.4 and 1.2 themes respectively. In 10-K reports, 
firms focus on the disclosure of economic factors, and litigation & liabilities information (2.29 
and 1.52 themes respectively).
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Table-1: Descriptive Statistics of Annual Report Disclosures 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
        Statistic Std. error   
Governance Structure and Management System 1092 0 3 .32 .020 .647 
Credibility 1092 0 3 .23 .016 .524 
Contamination and remediation efforts 1092 0 3 .34 .017 .572 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 1092 0 6 .19 .019 .620 
Economic factors 1092 0 7 1.05 .050 1.649 
Litigation and liabilities 1092 0 4 .57 .028 .935 
Vision and strategy claims 1092 0 5 .60 .026 .860 
Laws and regulations conformity 1092 0 3 .26 .018 .602 
Environmental profile 1092 0 3 .05 .007 .226 
Environmental initiatives 1092 0 1 .08 .008 .264 
Hard Disclosure Annual Report 1092 0 15 2.70 .102 3.369 
Soft Disclosure Annual Report 1092 0 7 .98 .038 1.253 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure 1092 0 17 2.32 .085 2.804 
Negative Disclosure 1092 0 9 1.36 .061 2.027 
Quantitative Disclosure 1092 0 8 1.24 .055 1.817 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure 1092 0 10 1.66 .060 1.973 
Qualitative Disclosure 1092 0 6 .78 .032 1.067 
Total Disclosure Annual Report 1092 0 20 3.68 .125 4.144 
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Table-2: Descriptive Statistics of 10-K Report Disclosure 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
      Statistic Std. Error   
Governance Structure and Management System 1092 0 3 .17 .014 .469 
Credibility 1092 0 2 .09 .009 .308 
Contamination and remediation efforts 1092 0 3 .78 .021 .690 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 1092 0 4 .08 .011 .348 
Economic factors 1092 0 7 2.29 .061 2.032 
Litigation and liabilities 1092 0 5 1.52 .042 1.372 
Vision and strategy claims 1092 0 4 .24 .017 .555 
Laws and regulations conformity 1092 0 3 .96 .026 .852 
Environmental profile 1092 0 2 .04 .006 .212 
Environmental initiatives 1092 0 5 .03 .007 .228 
Hard Disclosure 1092 0 15 4.92 .116 3.827 
Soft Disclosure 1092 0 9 1.28 .033 1.089 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure 1092 0 14 2.92 .070 2.328 
Negative Disclosure 1092 0 10 3.28 .080 2.653 
Quantitative Disclosure 1092 0 7 2.37 .064 2.107 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure 1092 0 11 2.68 .065 2.153 
Qualitative Disclosure 1092 0 5 1.15 .029 .968 






Environmental disclosures in sustainability reports 
The sample firms issued 376 sustainability reports during the period from 1997 to 2010. 
Table-3 provides an analysis of sustainability report disclosures. On average, total disclosure is 
equal to 15.5 themes and hard and soft disclosures are equal to 11.0 and 4.5 themes respectively. 
Sustainability reports are biased towards the disclosure of positive or neutral information (14.0 
themes) in comparison to negative disclosures (1.5 themes). Furthermore, sustainability reports 
communicate more quantitative information (6.8 themes) followed by firm-specific qualitative 
information (5.6 themes) and general qualitative information (3.2 themes). Finally, pollution 
abatement disclosures and performance indicators (5.4 themes) and vision and strategy 
disclosures (2.8 themes) are the focus of sustainability reports followed by credibility and 
governance related disclosures (2.1 and 1.3 themes respectively). Table-4 and Chart-1 show that 
issuance of stand alone sustainability reports increased over the sampled period from 4 reports in 
1997 to 50 reports in 2010. Furthermore, firms increased their adoption of a reporting guideline – 
mostly the GRI guideline – from zero reports in 1997 to 34 reports in 2010. 
Environmental disclosures in sustainability reports: Case of firms that did not adopt a 
reporting guideline 
Among the 376 sustainability reports, there are 192 observations where firms issued the reports 
without adopting a disclosure guideline. Table-5 shows that total disclosure in these reports 
averaged 13.0 themes. These reports include 8.9 themes of hard disclosure versus 4.21 themes of 




Chart 1: Number of Sustainability Reports Issued between 1997 and 2010 
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Table-3: Descriptive Statistics of Sustainability Report Disclosure 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
      Statistic 
Std. 
Error   
Governance Structure and Management System 376 0 5 1.28 .057 1.106 
Credibility 376 0 7 2.12 .073 1.418 
Contamination and remediation efforts 376 0 2 .19 .024 .464 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 376 0 10 5.37 .120 2.334 
Economic factors 376 0 7 1.40 .077 1.497 
Litigation and liabilities 376 0 3 .67 .041 .795 
Vision and strategy claims 376 0 6 2.82 .061 1.183 
Laws and regulations conformity 376 0 3 .23 .026 .503 
Environmental profile 376 0 2 .45 .028 .539 
Environmental initiatives  376 0 4 .99 .048 .932 
Hard Disclosure Sustainability Report 376 0 26 11.03 .267 5.182 
Soft Disclosure Sustainability Report 376 0 12 4.50 .100 1.934 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure  376 1 30 14.05 .275 5.338 
Negative Disclosure 376 0 6 1.49 .087 1.695 
Quantitative Disclosure 376 0 15 6.77 .166 3.214 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure 376 0 16 5.62 .161 3.129 
Qualitative Disclosure 376 0 8 3.15 .074 1.426 




Table-4: Number of Sustainability Reports per Year 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Total Sustainability Reports 4 9 10 18 21 27 23 30 29 32 36 44 43 50 376 
Sustainability Reports with GRI Guidelines 0 0 1 3 7 8 9 14 17 19 20 25 27 34 184 
Sustainability Reports without GRI Guidelines 4 9 9 15 14 19 14 16 12 13 16 19 16 16 192 
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Table-5: Descriptive Statistics of Sustainability Report Disclosure – Reporting without GRI Guideline 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
      Statistic 
Std. 
Error   
Governance Structure and Management System 192 0 4 1.04 .068 .943 
Credibility 192 0 5 1.43 .083 1.155 
Contamination and remediation efforts 192 0 2 .19 .034 .465 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 192 0 10 4.35 .168 2.331 
Economic factor 192 0 7 1.30 .121 1.682 
Litigation and liabilities 192 0 3 .55 .059 .824 
Vision and strategy claims 192 0 6 2.72 .082 1.140 
Laws and regulations conformity 192 0 3 .19 .037 .511 
Environmental profile 192 0 2 .43 .039 .546 
Environmental initiatives 192 0 4 .86 .060 .833 
Hard Disclosure Sustainability Report 192 0 22 8.84 .372 5.161 
Soft Disclosure Sustainability Report 192 1 9 4.21 .132 1.836 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure 192 1 26 11.80 .364 5.039 
Negative Disclosure 192 0 6 1.27 .134 1.861 
Quantitative Disclosure 192 0 15 5.66 .248 3.438 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure 192 0 12 4.37 .188 2.610 
Qualitative Disclosure 192 0 7 3.04 .105 1.457 




Quantitative disclosure, firms’ specific qualitative disclosure and qualitative disclosure 
averaged 5.7, 4.4, and 3.0 respectively. The main themes included in these reports are pollution 
abatement and performance indicators (4.35 themes), and vision and strategy claims (2.72 
themes). 
Environmental disclosures in sustainability reports: Case of firms reporting according to 
GRI guidelines 
There are 184 observations where firms adopted a reporting guideline (mostly the GRI guideline 
with very few cases where firms adopted CERES guidelines). In comparison to observations 
where firms did not adopt a reporting guideline, Table-6 shows that there is an increase in total 
disclosure to 18.1 themes per report. There is also a substantial increase in hard disclosure (13.3 
themes) but not in soft disclosure (4.8 themes).  Further, there are 16.4 positive or neutral themes 
versus 1.7 negative themes. There is also an increase of quantitative disclosure (7.92 themes) and 
firm specific qualitative disclosure (6.93 themes) but not in qualitative disclosure (3.26 themes). 
Reporting according to the GRI guideline lead to increase in disclosure of pollution abatement 
and performance indicators (6.4 themes) followed by disclosure of vision and strategy claims 
(2.93 themes). Finally, total disclosure’s standard deviation of firms who report according to the 
GRI guideline is lower than that of firms who report without the guideline (5.3 vs. 6.2); which 
provides evidence of the guideline reducing the gap between the disclosing firms.  
Aggregate disclosure in annual reports, 10-K reports, and sustainability reports 
Aggregate disclosure accounts for the themes disclosed in the three reports combined. 
Table-7 shows that the average total disclosure is 12 themes over the sampled 
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Table-6: Descriptive Statistics of Sustainability Report Disclosure – Reporting According to GRI Guideline 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
      Statistic Std. Error   
Governance Structure and Management System 184 0 5 1.54 .089 1.205 
Credibility 184 1 7 2.85 .096 1.301 
Contamination and remediation efforts 184 0 2 .20 .034 .465 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 184 1 10 6.42 .134 1.815 
Economic factors 184 0 5 1.50 .094 1.272 
Litigation and liabilities 184 0 2 .80 .055 .745 
Vision and strategy claims 184 0 6 2.93 .090 1.219 
Laws and regulations conformity 184 0 2 .27 .036 .493 
Environmental profile 184 0 2 .48 .039 .533 
Environmental initiatives 184 0 4 1.12 .075 1.012 
Hard Disclosure Sustainability Report 184 4 26 13.31 .304 4.119 
Soft Disclosure Sustainability Report 184 0 12 4.80 .147 1.991 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure 184 5 30 16.39 .338 4.590 
Negative Disclosure 184 0 5 1.72 .109 1.473 
Quantitative Disclosure 184 2 13 7.92 .183 2.488 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure 184 2 16 6.93 .228 3.096 
Qualitative Disclosure 184 0 8 3.26 .102 1.389 




 Table-7: Aggregate Disclosure in Annual, 10-K, Sustainability Report - Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum 
Mean Std. 
Deviation Statistic Std. Error 
Governance Structure and Management System 1092 0 5 .77 .032 1.059 
Credibility 1092 0 7 .90 .042 1.375 
Contamination and remediation efforts 1092 0 3 .83 .022 .716 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 1092 0 10 1.99 .087 2.883 
Economic factors 1092 0 8 2.66 .066 2.168 
Litigation and liabilities 1092 0 5 1.71 .042 1.386 
Vision and strategy claims 1092 0 6 1.46 .047 1.545 
Laws and regulations conformity 1092 0 3 1.02 .026 .851 
Environmental profile 1092 0 3 .21 .013 .439 
Environmental initiatives 1092 0 5 .42 .023 .759 
Hard Disclosure 1092 0 31 8.86 .220 7.267 
Soft Disclosure 1092 0 13 3.12 .078 2.584 
Positive/Neutral Disclosure 1092 0 32 8.29 .233 7.691 
Negative Disclosure 1092 0 10 3.69 .082 2.720 
Quantitative 1092 0 16 4.64 .129 4.249 
Firm Specific - Qualitative 1092 0 19 4.91 .121 3.998 
General - Qualitative 1092 0 8 2.43 .059 1.941 
Total Disclosure 1092 0 40 11.99 .283 9.363 
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period. On average, the main theme disclosed in these reports is economic factors (2.66 themes) 
followed by pollution abatement (2.0 themes), litigation and liabilities (1.7 themes), and vision 
and strategy claims (1.5 themes).  
Table-8 and Chart-2 show a continuous increase of the aggregate disclosure from 1997 to 
2010.  In 2010, total disclosure reached a high of 16.3 themes. The main themes disclosed by 
firms in their 2010 reports are pollution abatement and performance indicators (3.9 themes), 
economic factors (2.7 themes), vision and strategy claims (2.1 themes), and litigation factors (1.9 
themes). Chart-3 shows that average total disclosure in sustainability reports increased over the 
period from 1997 to 2010. On the other hand, average total disclosure in 10-K reports slightly 
increased between 1997 and 2010 while annual reports’ disclosures drastically declined over the 
same period. Aggregate total disclosure in the three reports continuously increased between 1997 
and 2010. Finally, aggregate disclosure in the three reports is higher than the disclosure level in 
each report separately.  
In Table-9, the paired differences between disclosures made in 2010 and those made in 
1997 show that there is a significant increase in total disclosure by 9.7 themes. Hard disclosure 
increased by 6.9 themes while soft disclosure increased by only 2.7 themes. There is also a 
significant increase in quantitative disclosure by 4.1 themes. On the other hand, there is small 
increase in negative information by 1.2 themes. Pollution abatement and environmental 
performance indicators increased by 3.6 themes followed by disclosures about credibility of the 
firm’s environmental operations (1.5 themes) and vision and strategy claims (1.5 themes). There 
















































































































































Total Disclosure - All Reports
Total Disclosure Annual Report
Total Disclosure 10K Report
Total Disclosure Sustainability Report
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Governance Structure and Management System .5 .8 .5 .8 .6 1.0 .6 1.0 .7 1.1 .8 1.0 .7 1.0 .8 1.0 .9 1.1 .9 1.2 .9 1.2 .9 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1
Credibility .2 .5 .3 .8 .3 .9 .5 .9 .7 1.1 .7 1.2 .7 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Contamination and remediation efforts .7 .7 .8 .6 .7 .7 .9 .8 .9 .7 .8 .7 .8 .7 .8 .8 .8 .7 .9 .8 .9 .8 .8 .7 .8 .7 .9 .8
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators 
(EPI)
.3 1.0 .9 2.1 .8 1.9 1.4 2.6 1.6 2.7 1.8 2.8 1.7 2.9 2.1 2.9 1.9 2.8 2.3 2.9 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.1 3.9 3.4
Economic factors 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.8 2.2 2.7 2.2 2.9 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.8 2.1 2.9 2.0 2.9 2.1 2.7 2.0
Litigation and liabilities 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.4
Vision and strategy claims .6 .9 .8 1.4 .8 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.1 1.7 2.1 1.6
Laws and regulations conformity .8 .8 .8 .8 .9 .8 1.0 .9 .9 .8 .9 .8 .9 .9 1.0 .8 1.1 .8 1.2 .8 1.2 .9 1.2 .8 1.2 .9 1.3 .9
Environmental profile .0 .2 .1 .3 .1 .3 .1 .4 .1 .4 .2 .4 .2 .5 .2 .4 .2 .4 .2 .5 .3 .5 .4 .6 .3 .5 .4 .5
Environmental initiatives .1 .3 .2 .6 .2 .5 .5 .9 .5 .8 .5 .8 .5 .8 .5 .9 .5 .8 .6 .9 .5 .8 .5 .7 .5 .7 .5 .8
Hard Disclosure 5.1 4.6 6.1 6.0 6.2 5.9 7.4 6.8 8.4 7.5 8.7 7.5 8.4 7.3 9.2 7.5 9.4 7.5 10.0 7.8 10.4 7.5 11.1 6.7 11.5 7.3 12.1 7.7
Soft Disclosure 1.5 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.4 3.1 2.4 2.8 2.4 3.4 2.6 3.4 2.6 3.8 3.0 3.8 2.8 4.1 2.7 4.2 2.7 4.2 2.6
Positive/Neutral Disclosure 3.8 3.7 5.0 5.6 5.1 5.6 6.6 6.9 7.3 7.3 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.4 8.8 7.7 8.9 8.0 9.9 8.5 10.2 8.3 11.2 7.7 11.6 8.2 12.3 8.3
Negative Disclosure 2.8 2.5 3.1 2.6 3.2 2.7 3.5 2.8 3.9 2.9 3.8 2.7 3.8 2.8 3.8 2.7 3.9 2.7 3.9 2.8 4.0 2.8 4.0 2.6 4.0 2.6 4.0 2.7
Quantitative 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.8 4.3 4.8 4.4 5.1 4.3 5.5 4.3 6.1 4.1 6.3 4.4 6.6 4.5
Firm Specific - Qualitative 3.0 2.7 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.2 4.0 3.6 4.7 4.0 4.8 4.0 4.6 3.8 5.3 4.2 5.5 4.3 5.9 4.8 5.5 4.1 5.7 3.7 6.2 3.9 6.5 4.3
General - Qualitative 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.5 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.9 2.2 1.8 2.5 1.8 2.5 1.8 2.8 2.0 3.1 2.2 3.3 2.2 3.2 2.1 3.3 1.9
Total Disclosure 6.7 5.3 8.1 7.3 8.3 7.3 10.1 8.8 11.1 9.4 11.8 9.5 11.3 9.3 12.6 9.6 12.8 9.7 13.8 10.2 14.2 9.8 15.1 9.0 15.7 9.5 16.3 9.7
2008 2009 20102004 2005 2006 20072000 2001 2002 20031997 1998 1999
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Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System 2010 - 1997 .538 1.224 .139 .262 .814 3.885 .000 
Credibility 2010 - 1997 1.538 1.771 .200 1.139 1.938 7.674 .000 
Contamination and remediation efforts 2010 - 1997 .205 .745 .084 .037 .373 2.432 .017 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 2010 - 1997 3.615 3.343 .379 2.862 4.369 9.552 .000 
Economic factors 2010 - 1997 .513 1.905 .216 .083 .942 2.377 .020 
Litigation and liabilities 2010 - 1997 .513 1.365 .155 .205 .821 3.318 .001 
Vision and strategy claims 2010 - 1997 1.474 1.756 .199 1.078 1.870 7.415 .000 
Laws and regulations conformity 2010 - 1997 .526 .990 .112 .302 .749 4.690 .000 
Environmental profile 2010 - 1997 .359 .558 .063 .233 .485 5.685 .000 
Environmental initiatives 2010 - 1997 .372 .884 .100 .172 .571 3.713 .000 
Hard Disclosure 2010 - 1997 6.923 7.318 .829 5.273 8.573 8.355 .000 
Soft Disclosure 2010 - 1997 2.731 2.996 .339 2.055 3.406 8.049 .000 
Positive/Neutral Disclosure 2010 - 1997 8.474 8.366 .947 6.588 10.361 8.946 .000 
Negative Disclosure 2010 - 1997 1.179 2.411 .273 .636 1.723 4.321 .000 
Quantitative 2010 - 1997 4.128 4.403 .499 3.135 5.121 8.281 .000 
Firm Specific - Qualitative 2010 - 1997 3.487 4.158 .471 2.550 4.425 7.406 .000 
General - Qualitative 2010 - 1997 2.038 2.276 .258 1.525 2.552 7.910 .000 
Total Disclosure 2010 - 1997 9.654 9.534 1.080 7.504 11.804 8.942 .000 
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2. Comparison between information in annual reports, 10-K reports, and 
sustainability reports 
In this section, I provide a comparison between annual, 10-K, and sustainability reports to 
understand the differences between the disclosures made in the three media. 
Comparison between annual report and 10-K report disclosures 
Table-10 presents a pair-wise difference between the means of annual report disclosures 
and that in 10-K. The average disclosures in 10-K reports are significantly higher than annual 
reports in the categories of economic factors (by 1.2 themes), litigation & liabilities (by 1.0 
themes), and laws and regulations by (by 0.7 themes). The levels of hard disclosures, negative 
disclosures, quantitative disclosures are also higher in 10-K than annual reports by 2.2, 1.9, and 
1.1 themes respectively. On average, total disclosure in 10-K reports is higher than that in annual 
reports by 2.5 themes. 
Table-11 shows the information disclosed in 10-K reports that is not in annual reports. 
On average, there are 4.0 themes disclosed in 10-K that firms do not reveal in annual reports. 
This additional information is mainly associated to the disclosure of economic factors (1.4 
themes) and litigation & liabilities information (1.0 themes). The additional negative information 
in 10-K reports is 2.0 themes higher than that in annual reports. In contrast, Table-12 shows that 
the additional information in annual reports that is not in 10-K reports is around 1.5 themes. 
There are more vision and strategy claims in annual reports (0.5 themes) that are not disclosed in 
10-K reports. In brief, the results show that 10-K reports have more environmental information 
in comparison to that 
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Table-10: Comparison between Annual Report and 10-K Report Disclosures 













Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System - AR - 
Governance Structure and Management System - 10K 
.148 .617 .019 .112 .185 7.939 .000 .424 .000 
Credibility - AR - Credibility - 10K .143 .515 .016 .112 .173 9.161 .000 .323 .000 
Contamination and remediation efforts - AR - 
Contamination and remediation efforts - 10K 
-.437 .717 .022 -.479 -.394 -20.136 .000 .367 .000 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance 
indicators (EPI) - AR - Pollution abatement and 
environmental performance indicators (EPI) - 10K 
.114 .634 .019 .077 .152 5.965 .000 .239 .000 
Economic factors - AR - Economic factors - 10K -1.246 1.946 .059 -1.362 -1.131 -21.161 .000 .457 .000 
Litigation and liabilities - AR - Litigation and liabilities - 
10K 
-.950 1.369 .041 -1.031 -.868 -22.925 .000 .344 .000 
Vision and strategy claims - AR - Vision and strategy 
claims - 10K 
.358 .880 .027 .306 .410 13.445 .000 .285 .000 
Laws and regulations conformity - AR - Laws and 
regulations conformity - 10K 
-.696 .827 .025 -.745 -.647 -27.793 .000 .393 .000 
Environmental profile - AR - Environmental profile - 10K .005 .248 .007 -.010 .019 .611 .542 .360 .000 
Environmental initiatives - AR - Environmental initiatives 
- 10K 
.040 .337 .010 .020 .060 3.946 .000 .063 .037 
Hard Disclosure Annual Report - Hard Disclosure 10K 
Report 
-2.222 3.811 .115 -2.448 -1.995 -19.264 .000 .445 .000 
Soft Disclosure Annual Report - Soft Disclosure 10K 
Report 
-.293 1.310 .040 -.371 -.215 -7.392 .000 .381 .000 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure - AR - Total Positive 
or Neutral Disclosure - 10K 
-.602 2.555 .077 -.753 -.450 -7.783 .000 .517 .000 
Negative Disclosure - AR - Negative Disclosure - 10K -1.920 2.688 .081 -2.080 -1.761 -23.612 .000 .365 .000 
Quantitative Disclosure - AR - Quantitative Disclosure - 
10K 
-1.134 2.084 .063 -1.257 -1.010 -17.973 .000 .444 .000 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure - AR - Firm Specific 
Qualitative Disclosure - 10K 
-1.016 2.139 .065 -1.143 -.890 -15.707 .000 .466 .000 
Qualitative Disclosure - AR - Qualitative Disclosure - 10K -.372 1.129 .034 -.439 -.305 -10.881 .000 .388 .000 
Total Disclosure Annual Report - Total Disclosure 10K 
Report 
-2.515 4.331 .131 -2.772 -2.258 -19.188 .000 .469 .000 
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Table-11: Incremental Environmental Disclosures Included in 10-K Reports but not in Annual Reports 








Statistic Std. Error Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System 0 2 .091 .010 .315 .07 .11 .000 
Credibility 0 2 .047 .007 .215 .03 .06 .000 
Contamination and remediation efforts 0 3 .471 .020 .661 .43 .51 .000 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 0 3 .055 .008 .269 .04 .07 .000 
Economic factors 0 7 1.399 .054 1.779 1.29 1.50 .000 
Litigation and liabilities 0 5 1.024 .039 1.288 .95 1.10 .000 
Vision and strategy claims 0 3 .146 .012 .413 .12 .17 .000 
Laws and regulations conformity 0 3 .734 .023 .776 .69 .78 .000 
Environmental profile 0 2 .027 .005 .169 .02 .04 .000 
Environmental initiatives 0 5 .030 .007 .218 .02 .04 .000 
Hard Disclosure 0 13 3.087 .106 3.490 2.88 3.29 .000 
Soft Disclosure 0 9 .937 .029 .946 .88 .99 .000 
Positive or Neutral Disclosure 0 13 1.935 .057 1.893 1.82 2.05 .000 
Negative Disclosure 0 10 2.088 .075 2.482 1.94 2.24 .000 
Quantitative Disclosure 0 7 1.454 .056 1.848 1.34 1.56 .000 
Qualitative Firm-Specific Disclosure 0 9 1.708 .058 1.928 1.59 1.82 .000 
Qualitative Disclosure 0 5 .861 .026 .868 .81 .91 .000 





Table-12: Incremental Environmental Discloure Included in Annual Reports but not in 10-K Reports 




95% Confidence Interval 






Governance Structure and Management System 0 3 .239 .016 .532 .21 .27 .000 
Credibility 0 3 .190 .014 .467 .16 .22 .000 
Contamination and remediation efforts 0 2 .034 .006 .214 .02 .05 .000 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 0 6 .169 .017 .573 .14 .20 .000 
Economic factors 0 6 .152 .019 .621 .12 .19 .000 
Litigation and liabilities 0 3 .074 .010 .336 .05 .09 .000 
Vision and strategy claims 0 4 .504 .023 .770 .46 .55 .000 
Laws and regulations conformity 0 2 .038 .006 .200 .03 .05 .000 
Environmental profile 0 1 .032 .005 .176 .02 .04 .000 
Environmental initiatives 0 1 .071 .008 .256 .06 .09 .000 
Hard Disclosure 0 12 .858 .047 1.561 .77 .95 .000 
Soft Disclosure 0 5 .644 .028 .939 .59 .70 .000 
Positive or Neutral Disclosure 0 12 1.333 .055 1.820 1.23 1.44 .000 
Negative Disclosure 0 8 .168 .023 .757 .12 .21 .000 
Quantitative Disclosure 0 6 .321 .026 .851 .27 .37 .000 
Qualitative Firm-Specific Disclosure 0 6 .691 .033 1.100 .63 .76 .000 
Qualitative Disclosure 0 4 .489 .023 .771 .44 .53 .000 





included in annual reports which confirm previous findings suggesting that annual reports are 
losing content on sustainability information. 
Comparison between sustainability report disclosures and information in both 10-K and 
annual reports 
In this section, I compare between sustainability reports’ disclosures and those of 10-K or 
annual reports. The comparison between average disclosure in10-K reports and sustainability 
reports in Table-13 shows that 10-K reports include more information about firms’ economic 
factors and litigation & liabilities while sustainability reports include more information on 
pollution abatement efforts, firm’s vision and strategy, credibility, and firm’s governance and 
management systems. It is to be noticed that 10-K reports include more negative information 
about a firm’s operations than sustainability reports.  
Table-14 shows the difference between average disclosure in annual reports and 
sustainability reports. In comparison to annual reports, the average disclosure of pollution 
abatement efforts and performance indicators, firm’s vision and strategy, and firms’ credibility is 
higher in sustainability reports. The difference between economic factors and litigation and 
liabilities information in both reports is not significant. Furthermore, there is no significant 
difference between the amounts of negative information in sustainability reports and annual 
reports.  
Table-15 presents additional environmental disclosures in sustainability reports that are 
neither in 10K reports or annual reports. The results show that there are on average 12.4 
additional disclosure themes in sustainability reports that are neither disclosed in 10-K reports or 
annual reports. The majority of these themes are disclosures 
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Table-13: Comparison between 10-K Reports and Sustainability Report Disclosures 












Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System  (10K) - Governance Structure and Management 
System (SR) 
-1.06 1.21 .062 -1.18 -.93 -17.0 .000 .059 .253 
Credibility (10K) - Credibility (SR) -1.98 1.47 .076 -2.13 -1.83 -26.1 .000 .011 .825 
Contamination and remediation efforts (10K) - Contamination and remediation efforts (SR) .75 .78 .040 .67 .83 18.8 .000 .052 .312 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) (10K) - Pollution abatement 
and environmental performance indicators (EPI) (SR) 
-5.25 2.33 .120 -5.48 -5.01 -43.6 .000 .089 .085 
Economic factors (10K) - Economic factors (SR) 1.65 2.21 .114 1.42 1.87 14.4 .000 .262 .000 
Litigation and liabilities (10K) - Litigation and liabilities (SR) 1.26 1.67 .086 1.09 1.42 14.6 .000 .004 .938 
Vision and strategy claims (10K) - Vision and strategy claims (SR) -2.56 1.33 .069 -2.70 -2.43 -37.3 .000 .026 .617 
Laws and regulations conformity (10K) - Laws and regulations conformity (SR) .83 .95 .049 .73 .93 16.9 .000 .175 .001 
Environmental profile (10K) - Environmental profile (SR) -.38 .61 .032 -.44 -.32 -12.0 .000 -.030 .561 
Environmental initiatives (10K) - Environmental initiatives (SR) -.97 .93 .048 -1.06 -.87 -20.1 .000 .061 .237 
Hard Disclosure (10K) - Hard Disclosure (SR) -4.61 6.34 .327 -5.25 -3.97 -14.1 .000 .061 .241 
Soft Disclosure (10K) - Soft Disclosure (SR) -3.08 2.20 .113 -3.30 -2.85 -27.1 .000 .047 .359 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure (10K) - Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure (SR) -10.40 5.85 .302 -10.99 -9.81 -34.5 .000 .006 .907 
Negative Disclosure (10K) - Negative Disclosure (SR) 2.70 3.18 .164 2.37 3.02 16.4 .000 .038 .464 
Quantitative Disclosure (10K) - Quantitative Disclosure (SR) -3.60 3.68 .190 -3.97 -3.23 -19.0 .000 .105 .042 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure (10K) - Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure (SR) -2.30 3.91 .202 -2.69 -1.90 -11.4 .000 -.014 .781 
Qualitative Disclosure (10K) - Qualitative Disclosure (SR) -1.81 1.71 .088 -1.98 -1.63 -20.5 .000 .062 .231 


















Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System (AR) - Governance 
Structure and Management System (SR) 
-.78 1.36 .07 -.92 -.64 -11.10 .00 .02 .73 
Credibility (AR) - Credibility (SR) -1.69 1.48 .08 -1.84 -1.54 -22.08 .00 .14 .01 
Contamination and remediation efforts (AR) - Contamination and 
remediation efforts (SR) 
.16 .70 .04 .09 .23 4.32 .00 .11 .03 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators (EPI) 
(AR) - Pollution abatement and environmental performance indicators 
(EPI) (SR) 
-5.07 2.45 .13 -5.32 -4.82 -40.10 .00 .01 .77 
Economic factors (AR) - Economic factors (SR) -.14 2.25 .12 -.36 .09 -1.17 .24 .08 .12 
Litigation and liabilities (AR) - Litigation and liabilities (SR) -.11 1.20 .06 -.23 .02 -1.71 .09 .05 .37 
Vision and strategy claims (AR) - Vision and strategy claims (SR) -1.93 1.48 .08 -2.08 -1.78 -25.35 .00 .11 .03 
Laws and regulations conformity (AR) - Laws and regulations 
conformity (SR) 
.07 .70 .04 .00 .14 1.83 .07 .23 .00 
Environmental profile (AR) - Environmental profile (SR) -.36 .62 .03 -.42 -.30 -11.21 .00 -.03 .55 
Environmental initiatives (AR) - Environmental initiatives (SR) -.90 .91 .05 -.99 -.81 -19.12 .00 .22 .00 
Hard Disclosure Annual Report - Hard Disclosure Sustainability Report -7.61 6.12 .32 -8.23 -6.99 -24.14 .00 .07 .15 
Soft Disclosure Annual Report - Soft Disclosure Sustainability Report -3.13 2.26 .12 -3.35 -2.90 -26.86 .00 .13 .01 
Total Positive or Neutral Disclosure (AR) - Total Positive or Neutral 
Disclosure (SR) 
-10.69 5.93 .31 -11.30 -10.09 -34.94 .00 .11 .03 
Negative Disclosure (AR) - Negative Disclosure (SR) -.06 2.65 .14 -.33 .21 -.45 .65 .03 .52 
Quantitative Disclosure (AR) - Quantitative Disclosure (SR) -5.21 3.76 .19 -5.59 -4.83 -26.88 .00 .02 .69 
Firm Specific Qualitative Disclosure (AR) - Firm Specific Qualitative 
Disclosure (SR) 
-3.47 3.55 .18 -3.83 -3.11 -18.95 .00 .14 .01 
Qualitative Disclosure (AR) - Qualitative Disclosure (SR) -2.07 1.76 .09 -2.25 -1.89 -22.87 .00 .10 .05 





Table-15: Environmental Disclosures in Sustainability Reports that are not in 10-K reports or Annual Reports 
 





Interval of the 
Difference Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System (in 
ER) 
0 5 1.05 .054 1.050 .94 1.15 .000 
Credibility (in ER) 0 7 1.82 .071 1.375 1.68 1.96 .000 
Contamination and remediation efforts (in ER) 0 2 .06 .013 .251 .04 .09 .000 
Pollution abatement and environmental 
performance indicators (EPI) (in ER) 
0 10 5.06 .123 2.378 4.82 5.30 .000 
Economic factors (in ER) 0 4 .62 .047 .905 .53 .71 .000 
Litigation and liabilities (in ER) 0 3 .35 .030 .573 .29 .40 .000 
Vision and strategy claims (in ER) 0 6 2.09 .064 1.250 1.96 2.21 .000 
Laws and regulations conformity (in ER) 0 1 .08 .014 .271 .05 .11 .000 
Environmental profile (in ER) 0 2 .40 .027 .532 .34 .45 .000 
Environmental initiatives (in ER) 0 4 .93 .045 .879 .84 1.01 .000 
Hard Disclosure (in ER) 0 23 8.95 .227 4.397 8.51 9.40 .000 
Soft Disclosure (in ER) 0 9 3.49 .097 1.873 3.30 3.68 .000 
Positive or Neutral Disclosure (in ER) 0 26 11.73 .260 5.050 11.21 12.24 .000 
Negative Disclosure (in ER) 0 6 .72 .057 1.115 .61 .83 .000 
Quantitative Disclosure (in ER) 0 13 5.68 .145 2.813 5.39 5.96 .000 
Qualitative Firm-Specific Disclosure (in ER) 0 15 4.46 .145 2.815 4.17 4.75 .000 
Qualitative Disclosure (in ER) 0 6 2.31 .072 1.395 2.17 2.45 .000 





of pollution abatement efforts (5.0 themes), firm’s vision and strategy (2.1 themes), credibility 
(1.8 themes), and firm’s governance and management systems (1.1 themes). Further analysis 
shows that these additional disclosures are mainly positive or neutral in nature (11.7 themes) and 
that the majority of these themes are quantitative in nature (5.7 themes). In contrast, Table-16 
presents additional information in 10-K reports or annual reports that is not disclosed in 
sustainability reports. On average, there are 7.1 additional environmental themes disclosed in 10-
K reports or annual reports that are not in sustainability reports. Mainly, these themes involve the 
disclosure of economic factors (2.5 themes) and litigation and liabilities (1.7 themes). 
Consequently, the disclosure of negative information in 10-K or annual reports is higher than 
that in sustainability reports by an average of 3.6 themes. 
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Table-16: Environmental Disclosures in 10-K reports or Annual Reports that are not in Sustainability Reports  




Interval of the 
Difference Sig. (2-
tailed) Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Lower Upper 
Governance Structure and Management System (in AR or 
10K) 
0 3 .37 .036 .696 .30 .44 .000 
Credibility (in AR or 10K) 0 2 .20 .023 .454 .15 .24 .000 
Contamination and remediation efforts (in AR or 10K) 0 3 .85 .037 .712 .78 .92 .000 
Pollution abatement and environmental performance 
indicators (EPI) (in AR or 10K) 
0 3 .08 .016 .308 .05 .11 .000 
Economic factors (in AR or 10K) 0 7 2.49 .095 1.834 2.30 2.67 .000 
Litigation and liabilities (in AR or 10K) 0 5 1.69 .070 1.366 1.55 1.83 .000 
Vision and strategy claims (in AR or 10K) 0 3 .32 .030 .578 .26 .38 .000 
Laws and regulations conformity (in AR or 10K) 0 3 .94 .043 .839 .86 1.03 .000 
Environmental profile (in AR or 10K) 0 2 .08 .015 .285 .05 .11 .000 
Environmental initiatives (in AR or 10K) 0 1 .04 .010 .196 .02 .06 .000 
Hard Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 15 5.68 .191 3.712 5.30 6.05 .000 
Soft Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 5 1.38 .058 1.118 1.27 1.50 .000 
Positive or Neutral Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 10 3.43 .115 2.221 3.21 3.66 .000 
Negative Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 9 3.63 .134 2.602 3.36 3.89 .000 
Quantitative Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 7 2.57 .098 1.893 2.37 2.76 .000 
Qualitative Firm-Specific Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 10 3.28 .120 2.327 3.04 3.51 .000 
Qualitative Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 5 1.22 .052 1.011 1.11 1.32 .000 
Total Disclosure (in AR or 10K) 0 18 7.06 .215 4.165 6.64 7.48 .000 
 
N = 376 
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Appendix F: List of Firms for Essay 3 
COMPANY NAME SIC COMPANY NAME SIC 
3M Co. 26XX International Paper Co. 26XX 
Air Products & Chemicals Inc. 28XX Kellogg Co. 20XX 
AK Steel Holding Corp. 33XX Kimberly-Clark Corp. 26XX 
Alcoa Inc. 33XX Kraft Foods Inc. 20XX 
Allegheny Technologies Inc. 33XX Marathon Oil Corp. 29XX 
American Electric Power Co. Inc. 49XX McCormick & Co. Inc. 20XX 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. 13XX MeadWestvaco Corp. 26XX 
Apache Corp. 13XX Molson Coors Brewing Co. Cl B 20XX 
Avery Dennison Corp. 26XX Murphy Oil Corp. 29XX 
Avon Products Inc. 28XX Nabors Industries Ltd. 13XX 
Bemis Co. Inc. 26XX Newell Rubbermaid Inc. 30XX 
Cabot Corp. 28XX Newmont Mining Corp. 10XX 
Celanese Corp. (Series A) 28XX Gas Natural SDG S.A. 49XX 
CenterPoint Energy Inc. 49XX NiSource Inc. 49XX 
Chesapeake Energy Corp. 13XX Noble Corp. 13XX 
Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. 10XX Nucor Corp. 33XX 
Clorox Co. 28XX Occidental Petroleum Corp. 13XX 
Coca-Cola Co. 20XX ONEOK Inc. 49XX 
ConocoPhillips 29XX Packaging Corp. of America 26XX 
Devon Energy Corp. 13XX Patterson-UTI Energy Inc. 13XX 
Dow Chemical Co. 28XX Pepco Holdings Inc. 49XX 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 28XX PepsiCo Inc. 20XX 
Eastman Chemical Co. 28XX PG&E Corp. 49XX 
Ecolab Inc. 28XX Pinnacle West Capital Corp. 49XX 
Edison International 49XX PPG Industries Inc. 28XX 
El Paso Corp. 49XX Praxair Inc. 28XX 
Energen Corp. 49XX Progress Energy Inc. 49XX 
Entergy Corp. 49XX Rowan Cos. Inc. 13XX 
EOG Resources Inc. 13XX Sara Lee Corp. 20XX 
Exelon Corp. 49XX Schlumberger Ltd. 13XX 
Exxon Mobil Corp. 29XX Sealed Air Corp. 26XX 
FirstEnergy Corp. 49XX Sherwin-Williams Co. 28XX 
FMC Corp. 28XX Sonoco Products Co. 26XX 
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. 10XX Sunoco Inc. 29XX 
BTG PLC 33XX Temple-Inland Inc. 26XX 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 30XX Tyson Foods Inc. Cl A 20XX 
Halliburton Co. 13XX United States Steel Corp. 33XX 
Hershey Co. 20XX Valero Energy Corp. 29XX 
Hess Corp. 29XX Valspar Corp. 28XX 
Huntsman Corp. 28XX Williams Companies Inc 49XX 
International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. 28XX Xcel Energy Inc. 49XX 
 
